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Egzystencjalna interpretacja Tomasza z Akwinu koncepcji bytu w ujęciu Étienne Gilsona

100%
Kunat N.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
|
vol. 5
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issue 3
451-464
EN
The article attempts to present Étienne Gilson’s approach to Thomas Aquinas’ existential interpretation of being. The French thinker’s apprehension of Aquinas’ system is characterized by accentuating existential perspective within the framework of the analysis of the structure of being. Gilson supported existential Thomism and, consequently, strongly emphasized the role of existence (esse) for being real. The French philosopher was of opinion that the existence of being should be depicted by means of existential judgments that affirm real and specific existence of beings. According to Gilson, the existential judgment of the affirmation-oriented being is the starting point for metaphysics.
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W poszukiwaniu źródłowego doświadczenia filozoficznego. Paralele pomiędzy fenomenologią i filozofią dialogu a współczesnym tomizmem egzystencjalnym

72%
Ćwiertniak T.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2020
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vol. 2
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issue 9
115-132
EN
The aim of this article is to indicate certain ideas common to existential Thomism, Phenomenology, and the Philosophy of Dialogue. While the often polemical philosophical literature more frequently emphasizes the discrepancies between these philosophical schools, a closer look, which takes into account the current state of philosophy and its relationship to dynamically developing science (especially natural science), reveals several common elements. Despite their differences, manifested especially in their use of different conceptual apparatuses, all three philosophical schools point to the existence of primary, irreducible experiences that are inaccessible to science. These experiences indicate the primacy of the personal world over the naturalistic representation of the world (reality) that emerges from natural science.
3
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Étienne Gilson in The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy

58%
Sochoń J.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2018
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vol. 7
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issue 4
689-708
EN
The article aims at presenting the life and work of Étienne Gilson (1884–1978)—a historian of philosophy, medievalist, renewer of the scholastic tradition, proponent of a return to the original doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, and philosopher. It is focused on selected areas of Gilson’s philosophical interest, such as: medieval philosophy, the history of philosophy, existential Thomism, atheism, literature and art. In the final analysis, Gilson appears as a firm advocate of philosophical realism which makes it possible to find a way out of contradictory explanations of the world, and allows man to live in openness to the voice of God’s revelation that constantly flows from reality.
4
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Tomistyczna krytyka ontologii fenomenologicznej

58%
Duchliński P.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2017
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vol. 53
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issue 2
29-75
EN
The aim of this article is to present and reconstruct the existential arguments formulated by thomists in opposition to ontology as pursued by phenomenologists. The entire discussion is presented against the general background of a critique of phenomenology as a way of pursuing philosophy. The article presents the most important arguments before evaluating them, taking into account their historical, subject-specific, and methodological contexts. Attention is paid to the significance of this discussion in shaping the philosophical dialogue between thomism and phenomenology, and with respect to the current relevance of the issues addressed. For some thomists, this dialogue has led to rethinking a number of metaphysical questions (e.g. the structure of intentional being). It is also pointed out that contemporary thomism and phenomenological ontology share a common opponent: namely, naturalism in its various guises. In relation to this, a deeper level of cooperation between thomism and phenomenological ontology is also advocated here as the only way to establish a meaningful debate with naturalism, given that the strong hold exercised by the latter – even at the level of how resources are administratively assigned – is such as to push in the direction of eliminating classical metaphysics and phenomenology altogether.
PL
Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i rekonstrukcja argumentów sformułowanych przez tomistów egzystencjalnych przeciwko ontologii uprawianej przez fenomenologów. Całość dyskusji zaprezentowano na ogólnym tle krytyki fenomenologii jako sposobu uprawiania filozofii. W artykule zaprezentowano najważniejsze argumenty, następnie oceniono ich wartość merytoryczną, biorąc pod uwagę kontekst historyczny, przedmiotowy i metodologiczny. Zwrócono uwagę na wartość tej dyskusji dla kształtowania dialogu filozoficznego między tomizmem a fenomenologią oraz na aktualność podejmowanej problematyki. Dialog ten u niektórych tomistów doprowadził do nowego przemyślenia szeregu kwestii metafizyki tomistycznej (np. struktury bytu intencjonalnego). Wskazano również, że współcześnie tomizm i ontologia fenomenologiczna mają wspólnego przeciwnika jakim jest naturalizm w różnych wariantach. W związku z tym rekomendowano, że między tomizmem a ontologią fenomenologiczną powinna zachodzić głębsza współpraca, gdyż tylko wtedy będzie można podjąć sensowną debatę z naturalizmem, który sięgając nawet po środki administracyjne stara się wprost wyeliminować tak metafizykę klasyczną, jak i fenomenologię.
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