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Skúmanie významu experimentálnej filozofie skrze koncept osobnej identity:

100%
Jirout Košová M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 4
581-603
EN
The article introduces experimental philosophy, critiquing it while at the same time deepening our general understanding of it with concrete examples from practice: experimental research in the field of the issues of personal identity. Through this, the author illustrates the methods, development and possible benefits of experimental philosophy while also discussing the critics who have been drawing attention to deficiencies in its methodology, as well as to its inability to reveal precisely defined lay concepts. In response to the critics, the author is called upon to consider the nature of lay concepts, which by their nature are not precisely defined and often serve a specific social function. Although a well-grasped experimental philosophy cannot decide a given philosophical question, it can help us identify and extract essential elements from the specific and, for a person, deeply characteristic conceptual bedrock, while additionally replenishing philosophical research so that it does not lose contact with the world from which it originally arose.
2
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The concept of intuition in experimental philosophy

100%
Sękowski K.
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
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2022
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vol. 12
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issue 1
111-128
EN
Although the concept of intuition has a central place in experimental philosophy, it is still far from being clear. Moreover, critics of that movement often argue that the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy does not correspond to the concept of intuition used in traditional, armchair philosophy. However, such a claim is problematic, because most attempts to define this concept are made with regard to the armchair philosophy’s point of view and not that of experimental philosophy. In the article I analyse the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy by taking into account its theoretical assumptions, and the research practice of its representatives. By analysing the most influential experimental philosophers’ views, I formulate its core characteristics. According to them, intuition is a mental state that is a reaction to the described case, which is revealed in the readiness to express a judgment about this case. Then, I investigate step by step the frequently postulated methodological, phenomenological, and etiological conditions that could narrow down the initial definition. I show that the only condition coherent with experimental philosophy’s assumptions and its practice is an etiological one, as the mental state that could be classified as intuition has to be shaped by pragmatic, and not only semantic factors. In the last parts of the text, I draw out some of the consequences of the position that I have presented, regarding the methodology of experimental philosophy and philosophy in general.
3
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Analiza empirycznych argumentów na rzecz tezy o zróżnicowaniu kulturowym intuicji epistemicznych

88%
Sękowski K.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2019
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vol. 14
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issue 2
75-102
EN
The founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experimental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (2001). The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified. That study has brought about at least three replication attempts (Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim, Yuan 2015; Nagel, San Juan, Mar 2013). None of them confirmed the original results. The aim of this article is to critically analyze in detail Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s methodology and the three replications mentioned. Regarding the results of my analysis, I will try to examine what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the outcomes of analized studies. In particular I will refer to far-reaching conclusions about the universality of epistemic intuitions or universality of folk epistemology, which are sometimes—hastily, as I will argue—extrapolated from the results of such kind of studies (e.g., Kim, Yuan 2015; Kim Yuan 2016).
4
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A Critique of Turri's Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions

75%
Gaszczyk G.
Diametros
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2019
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vol. 16
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issue 59
23-34
EN
In this paper, I show that Turri’s (2015a) experimental study concerning selfless assertions is defective and should therefore be rejected. One performs a selfless assertion when one states something that one does not believe, and hence does not know, despite possessing well supported evidence to the contrary. Following his experimental study, Turri argues that agents in fact both believe and know the content of their selfless assertions. In response to this claim, I demonstrate that the conclusions he draws are premature in this regard. More specifically, I criticize his methodology, showing that his study is not only incomplete but also yields contradictory results. In closing, I propose how such a study should be conducted in order to receive comprehensive results.
5
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A Softwaremodule for an Ethical Elder Care Robot. Design and Implementation

75%
Misselhorn C.
Ethics in Progress
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 2
68-81
EN
The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This is particularly true of artificial systems that are used in geriatric care environments. The goal of this article is to describe how one can approach the design of an elder care robot which is capable of moral decision-making and moral learning. A conceptual design for the development of such a system is provided and the steps that are necessary to implement it are described.
6
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Undertaking Empirically-Engaged African Philosophy: The Development and Validation of the African Time Inventory

63%
Terblanché-Greeff A. C., Nel P.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2023
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vol. 7
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issue 1
47-64
EN
Cross-cultural conflict is often rooted in variation between values from different cultures, for example, differences in time orientation. Usually, individuals are monochronic or polychronic regarding time orientation. In South Africa, the term African time represents a nuanced polychronic time orientation. As this term is often used pejoratively, it is cardinal to break down stigmatization and create cultural awareness regarding this unique time orientation. In this paper, we argue that people must be cognizant of particular time orientations to facilitate intercultural dialogue better and lessen conflict. With this in mind, we employed empirically-engaged African philosophy and developed the African Time Inventory (ATI). We theoretically introduce African time as a unique time orientation during the scale development process. The psychometric properties of the ATI are presented and proved to be reliable and valid in South Africa. In praxis, utilizing the ATI can facilitate decolonization resulting from some needed cultural awareness for dialogue and conflict mitigation.
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Objektivita přírodních věd pohledem experimentální filosofie

63%
Jedlička P., Paitlová J.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2019
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vol. 41
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issue 2
229-258
EN
Objectivity, as one of the key attributes of science, has become an indispensable part of its ethos and a central theme of the philosophy of science. As such, it has been a subject of philosophical refl ection by a number of authors. In our project – in which both philosophers of science and scientists participate – we examine the concept of objectivity in the natural sciences with the tools of experimental philosophy. We aim to identify specifi c operational dimensions of objectivity, those with which current scientist actually work, thus making them accessible for further theoretical analysis and research. In this text, we present results from the fi rst, qualitative phase of our research based on in-depth interviews and focus groups with scientists working in the Czech Republic. Further, we confront this empirical data with theoretical notions of objectivity (Hacking, Crombie, Solomon, Popper, Galison, Daston, Quine, Kuhn and others). We also present other fi ndings from the research and formulate hypotheses for the research’s subsequent phases.
CS
Objektivita, jako jeden ze základních atributů vědy, se stala nedílnou součástí jejího étosu i ústředním tématem fi losofi e vědy a jako taková byla refl ektována řadou významných autorů. V rámci projektu, na němž participují jak fi losofové vědy, tak vědci, zkoumáme pomocí metod experimentální fi losofi e koncept objektivity v současných přírodních vědách. Jedním z cílů je identifi kace jednotlivých dimenzí tohoto konceptu, tedy těch, s nimiž současní vědci skutečně pracují, a tím jejich zpřístupnění pro další teoretické analýzy i výzkum. V tomto příspěvku předkládáme závěry z první, kvalitativní fáze výzkumu vycházející z individuálních i skupinových rozhovorů s vědci působícími v České republice. p ý Tento empirický materiál konfrontujeme s některými teoretickými koncepty objektivity (Hacking, Crombie, Solomonová, Popper, Galison, Dastonová, Quine, Kuhn a další). Zároveň zde uvádíme řadu konkrétních poznatků ze současné české vědy a formulujeme hypotézy pro další fáze výzkumu.
8
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X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance

63%
Paulo N., Pölzler T.
Diametros
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2020
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vol. 17
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issue 64
72-89
EN
This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board.
9
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Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism

63%
Bush L. S., Moss D.
Diametros
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2020
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vol. 17
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issue 64
6-21
EN
Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are not reliable measures of metaethical belief. We end by discussing the implications of our account for the philosophical and practical implications of research on the psychology of metaethics.
10
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Odniesienie nazw własnych, intuicje semantyczne i filozofia eksperymentalna

51%
Ziółkowski A.
Studia Semiotyczne
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2016
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vol. 30
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issue 2
45-97
PL
Tekst stanowi głos w dyskusji dotyczącej filozoficznych wniosków, jakie można (bądź jakich nie można) wysnuć z systematycznych badań empirycznych nad intuicjami w kwestii odniesienia nazw własnych. Artykuł nawiązuje do słynnych badań Machery’ego i współpracowników (2004), w których zaobserwowali oni różnice międzykulturowe w intuicjach semantycznych Amerykanów i Chińczyków. Autorzy badań używają tego rezultatu, by podać w wątpliwość użyteczność intuicji w sporach filozoficznych dotyczących zagadnienia odniesienia nazw własnych. W artykule przedstawiam wyniki własnych badań filozoficzno-eksperymentalnych, które mają na celu nie tyle badanie intuicji semantycznych, ile analizę metod wykorzystywanych do tego w dotychczasowych studiach poświęconych tej tematyce. Rezultaty moich badań wskazują na znaczącą niestabilność werdyktów dotyczących kwestii odniesienia nazw własnych i podatność tych werdyktów na czynniki nieistotne z filozoficznego punktu widzenia. Bazując na zebranych danych, twierdzę, że metody stosowane w dotychczasowych badaniach filozoficzno-eksperymentalnych poświęconych tematyce odniesienia nazw własnych nie gwarantują pomiaru intuicji o pożądanym charakterze.
EN
This paper contributes to the debate concerning philosophical conclusions that can (or cannot) be drawn from systematic, empirical studies on intuitions about the reference of proper names. The article discusses the famous study by Machery et al. (2004) in which they observed intercultural differences in semantic intuitions between Americans and Chinese. The authors of that experiment used the obtained results to question the usefulness of intuitions in philosophical discussions regarding the reference of proper names. The paper presents the results of my own experimental studies, which are aimed not at revealing semantic intuitions, but rather at analyzing the methods used in previous experiments that focused on these issues. The results of my studies have indicated high instability of verdicts concerning the reference of proper names and the susceptibility of these verdicts to philosophically insignificant factors. Basing on the collected data, I argue that methods used in experimental studies about the reference of proper names carried out so far do not guarantee revealing intuitions of the desired kind.
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