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Studia Semiotyczne
|
2017
|
vol. 31
|
issue 2
201–226
EN
The history of so-called ‘linguistic relativity’ is an odd and multifaceted one. After knowing alternate fortunes and being treated by different academic branches, today there are some new ways of investigating the language-thought-reality problem that (i) put into dialogue the latest trends in language-related disciplines (ii) generate room for philosophical themes previously overlooked, (iii) reassess the very idea of linguistic relativity, despite its popularized versions which have circulated for decades and which have led an otherwise fruitful debate to extremes. It is argued that a multidisciplinary approach is desirable in order to broaden future research. In the last few years the opportunity to study this matter following a common trend in several disciplines has been created. Language, and cognition too, are now conceived as intrinsically social phenomena. It is argued that relativistic effects should be investigated in social realms, and that analytic philosophy could help with this task.
EN
The aim of the paper is to show the way in which human cognitive system uses external prostheses. Currently developed technologies provide human beings with tools that change their way of functioning in the environment, their understanding and the perspective from which they perceive the world. Modifying systems of thoughts, reasoning and modes of operation non­‑biological prostheses extend human cognitive system. A human being uses non­‑biological interfaces for processing information from the external world.
EN
The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.
EN
The aim of this article is to briefly introduce and critically analyze the dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary theories of embodied cognition in relation to the study of affectivity. The author explains how these theoretical approaches interpret the dynamic relationship between affective experiences on the one hand and bodily behavior and intersubjectively observable processes taking place in the environment on the other. He first summarizes the positions of Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti, who draw on the theories of extended cognition and enactivism, and then compares them with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach. In this way, there are found to be inconsistencies in Krueger’s and Colombetti’s approaches, whose resolution, in the author’s opinion, requires the working out of a rigorously “relational” interpretation of affectivity. From this point of view, affectivity is not understood as an internal phenomenon causally linked to external material factors, but strictly as a dynamic relationship between a sense-making agent and his or her meaningful environment.
CS
Cílem tohoto článku je krátce představit a kriticky analyzovat dialog mezi fenomenologií a současnými teoriemi vtělené kognice ve vztahu ke zkoumání afektivity. Autor vysvětluje, jakým způsobem tyto teoretické přístupy interpretují dynamický vztah mezi afektivními zkušenostmi na jedné straně a tělesným chováním a intersubjektivně pozorovatelnými procesy probíhajícími v prostředí na straně druhé. Nejdříve shrnuje pozice Joela Kruegera a Giovanny Colombettiové, kteří čerpají z teorií rozšířené kognice a enaktivismu, a poté je srovnává s Merleau-Pontyho fenomenologickým přístupem. V koncepcích Kruegera a Colombettiové tak vycházejí najevo rozpory, jejichž řešení si podle názoru autora vyžaduje vypracování důsledně „relační“ interpretace afektivity. Z tohoto hlediska je afektivita chápána nikoli jako vnitřní fenomén kauzálně propojený s vnějšími materiálními faktory, nýbrž přísně jako dynamický vztah mezi tím, kdo uskutečňuje „výkon smyslu“, a jeho či jejím smysluplným prostředím.
PL
Zadaniem artykułu jest analiza trzech tytułowych kategorii: umysłu rozszerzonego, poznania rozszerzonego oraz „nauki rozszerzonej” i ukazanie zależności między nimi. Wszystkie te kategorie odwołują się do koncepcji rozszerzonego umysłu, zaś pojęcie nauki rozszerzonej jest propozycją zastosowania koncepcji umysłu rozszerzonego do analizy podmiotu badań naukowych, rezultatów badań oraz samego procesu powstawania wiedzy naukowej, a także rozumienia nauki i jej funkcjonowania.
EN
The paper analysesh three categories mentioned in the title: extended mind, extended cognition, extended science, and to reveal their interconnections. All the categories refer to the conception of extended mind, whereas the notion of extended science is a proposal of applying the conception of extended mind to analysing the subject of scientific research, results of the research and the very process of establishing scientific knowledge, as well as understanding science and its functioning.
EN
The paper analyses three categories mentioned in the title: extended mind, extended cognition, extended science, and to reveal their interconnections. All the categories refer to the conception of extended mind, whereas the notion of extended science is a proposal of applying the conception of extended mind to analysing the subject of scientific research, results of the research and the very process of establishing scientific knowledge, as well as understanding science and its functioning.
PL
Zadaniem artykułu jest analiza trzech tytułowych kategorii: umysłu rozszerzonego, poznania rozszerzonego oraz „nauki rozszerzonej” i ukazanie zależności między nimi. Wszystkie te kategorie odwołują się do koncepcji rozszerzonego umysłu, zaś pojęcie nauki rozszerzonej jest propozycją zastosowania koncepcji umysłu rozszerzonego do analizy podmiotu badań naukowych, rezultatów badań oraz samego procesu powstawania wiedzy naukowej, a także rozumienia nauki i jej funkcjonowania.
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