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EN
The new SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) started in Wuhan City of China on December 31st 2019As at August 3,2020 a total of 18,056,310 million cases had been diagnosed globally with over 689,219 deaths with cases in Nigeria snowballing gradually becoming lethal. Given Nigeria’s socio-economic and demographic significance to African continent, it is imperative to understand the cultural norms that may aid or obstructs prevention and treatment of the disease in order to halt its transmission. Data for study came from the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and other publicly available data sources supported with PEN-3 cultural model developed in 1989 by Airhihenbuwa. The model places culture at the core of the development, implementation and evaluation of successful public health interventions. COVID-19 transmission increases with large population concentration in urban areas and proximity to major entry points to other adjacent states and countries. The paper suggested that dominant cultures, civilization and religious practices should be adhered to, adopted as the case may be for restrictions such physical distancing, hand hygiene, use of face masks and another prophylactic regimen to flatten the curve of the pandemic in Nigeria and likely occurrence of similar disease in future.
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The article presents arguments for theological and logical fatalism and analyzes the view that the theological fatalism can be reduced to or transformed into the logical one. Next, there follows a critique of Linda Zagzebski’s thesis that theological fatal- ism is not reducible to logical fatalism. The article begins with a brief presentation of the controversy between the proponents and opponents of the theological fatalism.
EN
Purpose: The three goals of the article are: first, to show some arguments surrounding the notion of capitalism in theoretical perspective, and also somewhat bashful connotations since it was intro-duced in Poland after the fall of communism; second, to present some historical facts about the rise of capitalism in Poland in comparative perspective, mostly European; third, to look for cultural categories necessary for analysing the peculiarities of Polish socio-economic development as the part of so-called „the second Europe”. Methodology: I go back to the history of European patterns of capitalist formation: Anglo-Saxon, French, German, Russian in order to show the Polish trajectory as strikingly different. Before enter-ing the Polish case, I present Mary Douglas and Aaron Widavsky’s proposal – how to analyze four cultures: individualist, egalitarian, hierarchical and fatalistic (authoritarian). Implications: The main finding is that economic interests are always socio-cultural constructions, hence all definitions of the real life decisions (on public vs private, risk, externalities etc.) that the people make, must frame them within working life of given culture as the combination of universa-lism and particularism (of above-mentioned four cultures).
EN
The paper attempts to answer the question what is fatalism and blind necessity in the philosophical doctrines of Kant and Leibniz. My concern is with what precisely makes the necessity “blind”, according to these thinkers. In connection with this, I discuss the issue whether to “enlighten” necessity means to lower its degree. I answer this question in the negative. As to fatalism, I show that Kant’s and Leibniz’s denial of it should rather be taken for an expression of prudence than philosophy. Accordingly, I say what this denial entails but, more importantly, what it does not entail. In general, I argue that making it clear what such concepts like fatum, fatalism and blind necessity mean in Kant and Leibniz is a good landmark for a revised understudying of their – otherwise different, of course – conceptions of freedom.
PL
W artykule odpowiadam na pytanie, czym jest fatalizm i ślepa konieczność w filozofii Kanta i Leibniza. W szczególności interesuje mnie to, co dokładnie czyni konieczność „ślepą”, według tych myślicieli. W tym kontekście omawiam kwestię tego, czy „oświecenie” konieczności oznacza obniżenie jej stopnia. Na to pytanie odpowiadam negatywnie. Co do fatalizmu, to pokazuję, że odrzucenie tego poglądu przez Kanta i Leibniza powinno być raczej brane za wyraz roztropności niż filozofii. Zgodnie z tym pokazuję, czego nie pociąga za sobą ich negacja doktryny fatalizmu. Poza tym twierdzę, że rozjaśnienie znaczenia takich pojęć jak fatum, fatalizm i ślepa konieczność u Kanta i Leibniza stanowi dogodny „punkt obserwacyjny” dla zrozumienia ich – skądinąd różnych, rzecz jasna – koncepcji wolności.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2023
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vol. 71
|
issue 2
147-161
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest kompatybilistycznemu rozwiązaniu problemu relacji między Boską przedwiedzą a ludzką wolnością. W tekście argumentuje się, że asymetria polegająca na naszej zdolności do wypływu na przyszłość i braku analogicznej zdolności do kontroli przeszłości jest rezultatem asymetrii otwartości między przyszłością a przeszłością interpretowanej w kategoriach asymetrii kontrfaktycznej zależności. W konsekwencji, jeśli asymetria otwartości nie stosuje się do pewnych typów faktów, wówczas możemy posiadać zdolność do kontroli tych faktów, nawet jeśli są to fakty dotyczące przeszłości. Okazuje się, że z najbardziej rozpowszechnionych ujęć natury i genezy Boskiej przedwiedzy wynika, iż asymetria otwartości nie stosuje się do posiadanych przez Boga w przeszłości przekonań na temat przygodnych zdarzeń przyszłych. Zatem nieuzasadnionym pozostaje twierdzenie, że jesteśmy pozbawieni zdolności do uczynienia teraz czegoś takiego, że jeśli byśmy to zrobili, to Boskie przekonania byłyby w przeszłości inne niż były.
EN
The paper defends a compatibilist solution to the problem of the relationship between divine and human freedom. It is argued that the asymmetry of ability constituted by our ability to foreknowledge influence the future and our inability to control the past results from the asymmetry of openness between fixed past and open future interpreted in terms of the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. Therefore, if the asymmetry of openness is not true of some types of facts, then we may be able to control them even if they are facts about the past. It turns out that widely shared accounts of the nature and source of God’s foreknowledge entail that the asymmetry of openness does not apply to God’s past beliefs about future contingencies. Thus, it is unjustified to claim that we are unable to now do anything such that, if we were to do it, God’s past beliefs would have been different.
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