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Matematyka - nauka o fikcjach?

100%
PL
According to mathematical realism, mathematics describes an abstract realm of mathematical entities, and mathematical theorems are true in the classical sense of this term. In particular, mathematical realism is claimed to be the best theoretical explanation of the applicability of mathematics in science. According to Quine's indispensability argument, applicability is the best argument available in favor of mathematical realism. However, Quine's point of view has been questioned several times by the adherents of antirealism. According to Field, it is possible to show, that - in principle - mathematics is dispensable, and that so called synthetic versions of empirical theories are available. In his 'Science Without Numbers' Field follows the 'geometric strategy' - his aim is to reconstruct standard mathematical techniques in a suitable language, acceptable from the point of view of the nominalist. In the first part of the article, the author briefly presents Field's strategy. The second part is devoted to Balaguer's fictionalism, according to which mathematics is indispensable in science, but nevertheless can be considered to be a merely useful fiction.
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Quinean Ontological Commitment Derailed

72%
EN
What should we believe exists? The Quinean response is straightforward: We should believe in all and only those objects over which we must quantify in our best scientific theories. Let us call this view Ontological Commitment = Quantifier Commitment, or OC=QC. The author draws upon resources from Jody Azzouni and Stephen Yablo, who reject this criterion to disrupt a central argument for platonism in mathematics. The project has two parts. First, the negative project is to argue that OC=QC is misguided because we ought not read our ontological commitments off of our quantifier commitments. Second, the positive project is to suggest an alternative criterion to OC=QC that allows us to accept the idea that statements that quantify over mathematical objects that would be abstract if they existed are indispensable to our best scientific theories, but nevertheless reject the existence of numbers.
EN
All hitherto development in philosophy has been nothing other than the development of fictionalism. According to Ferdinand Pelikán, fictionalism reaches its peak in the works of I. Kant and D. Hume in the form of their rejection of the thing-in-itself. Pelikán maintains that, from that moment on, philosophy has been in decadence. Understandably, it is essential to reverse this process. In order to do so, Pelikán puts forward his affective theory of personality in the belief that revisiting this concept could constitute the first step that will lead philosophy out of the clutches of fictionalism. Thus, Pelikán assumes the position of J. G. Fichte and, with his aid, sets out on a journey towards a new philosophy. Pelikán’s emerging individualism can best be traced by following his publishing activity, primarily in journals such as Ruch filosofický, which he co-founded in 1921 along with his colleague Karel Vorovka.
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Fikcja etyczna jako narracja

58%
DE
Der Artikel präsentiert Argumente für die These, dass das von Paul Ricoeur dargestellte Konzept der Erzählung der ontologischen und epistemologischen Fundierung der fiktionalistischen Theorien in der gegenwärtigen Ethik dienen kann. Im ersten Teil wird das Konzept der Erzählung bei Ricoeur unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Theorie der dreifachen Mimesis analysiert. Dann wird kurz der ethische Fiktionalismus aufgrund der Schriften von John Mackie und Richard Joyce dargestellt. Es werden ontologische und epistemologische Fragen hervorgehoben, mit denen der Fiktionalismus anscheinend nicht zurecht kommt. Der letzte Teil ist dem Vorschlag gewidmet, ethische Fiktion als Erzählung im Verständnis von Ricoeur zu behandeln, was problematische Fragen, vor denen der Fiktionalismus steht, beantworten lässt.
EN
In this paper the author argues that the concept of narrative, as Paul Ricoeur describes it, can be useful for providing ontological and epistemological grounds for theories of fictionalism in contemporary ethics. In the first section, Ricoeur's views on narrative are briefly described, special attention being given to the concept of triple mimesis. Later on, fictionalism as a theory is described, basing on the works of John L. Mackie and Richard Joyce. The author points out to several ontological and epistemological issues, which fictionalists do not seem to solve properly. The final part is devoted to a proposition of treating ethical fiction as a form of Ricoeurian narrative, which seems to answer some of the most problematic questions that fictionalism has to face.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest argumentacji za tezą, że koncepcja narracji, jaką przedstawia Paul Ricoeur, może posłużyć za ontologiczne i epistemologiczne ugruntowanie teorii fikcjonalistycznych we współczesnej etyce. W pierwszej części analizie poddana zostaje koncepcja narracji Ricoeura, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem teorii potrójnego mimesis. Następnie krótko opisany zostaje fikcjonalizm etyczny na podstawie prac Johna Mackiego i Richarda Joyce`a. Uwypuklone zostają kwestie ontologiczne i epistemologiczne, z którymi fikcjonalizm wydaje się sobie nie radzić. Ostatnia część poświęcona jest propozycji potraktowania fikcji etycznej jako narracji w Ricoeurowskim sensie, co pozwala odpowiedzieć na problematyczne pytania, przed którymi staje fikcjonalizm.
5
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Modele, metafory i teoria ekonomii

51%
Diametros
|
2014
|
issue 41
13-37
PL
Artykuł analizuje modele ekonomiczne, wykorzystując pojęcie metafory. W tekście przedstawiane są dwa konkurencyjne ujęcia charakteru modeli ekonomicznych – pierwsze, bliskie izolacjonizmowi, traktuje modele jako reprezentacje rzeczywistości i drugie, zbliżone do fikcjonalizmu, gdzie modele mają charakter tzw. metafor z ornamentami, i gdzie liczy się przede wszystkim ich wartość retoryczna, a nie stopień podobieństwa do rzeczywistości. Artykuł prezentuje również rozumienie modeli wychodzące poza tę dychotomię i prezentowane w filozofii ekonomii przez N. Cartwright. Tekst zawiera refleksję nad realizmem modeli ekonomicznych i kończy się konkluzją o istotnym podobieństwie modeli do metafor.
EN
The paper conceptualizes economic models as metaphors. It presents two different approaches to economic modeling. In the first one, economic models are treated as isolations which aim at representing the real world. In the second, they are conceptualized according to various philosophical approaches that are close to fictionalism. The aim of such modeling is to persuade and not to represent. Next, the author tries to escape the dichotomy between models as isolations and models as purely rhetorical devices by referring to N. Cartwright’s understanding of economic models. The issue of their realism is also considered. The final conclusion states that models (in economics) are very similar to metaphors.
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