Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help
Authors help
Years help

Results found: 83

first rewind previous Page / 5 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  free will
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 5 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

100%
EN
The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed.
EN
The figure of Cassandra is well-known from numerous representations in ancient and modern literature as an archetype of a woman who has the power to see the future, but whose visions are not believed. In ancient Greek literature, Cassandra was an important character serving as a prophet of an approaching catastrophe. In her modern adaptations, this figure became a metaphor in psychoanalytical research on human moral behaviour (Melanie Klein and the Cassandra complex) developed in feminist writing. Cassandra has also been of interest to filmmakers, with perhaps the best adaptation of the subject of Cassandra’s clairvoyance being Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report. Loosely based on Philip K. Dick’s 1956 short story The Minority Report, the plot presents a version of the Cassandra myth, in which a woman together with male twins operate as a group mind to predict future crimes. Their visions are used by the state to prevent the crimes and imprison the would-be criminals. This article offers a thorough analysis of all the ancient and modern features of the metaphor of Cassandra employed in this movie within the overarching framework of the central theme of free will vs. determinism. According to this approach, the central theme is examined with reference to ancient Aristotelian and Stoic moral philosophy, the modern feminist psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein, and the political philosophy and legal issues in the post-9/11 world.
EN
The biblical narrative about Moses’ call to become Israel’s liberator, his coming to Egypt and liberating Israel from Egypt by passing through the Red Sea is a version of a well-known narrative motif about the Liberator Hero. Traditional church exegesis interprets this story as a prefiguration of Jesus´ coming to the world and delivering humanity from the rule of sin. In his interpretation, Gregory of Nyssa takes over the fundamental idea of the tradition – the liberation theme, but stresses the activity of the one called to freedom. For him, the story about Israel’s liberation from Egypt is a narrative about the human struggle for one’s own spiritual freedom. When the divine liberator has provided the basic precondition for human liberation by means of the Incarnation, he recedes into the background and leaves further activity to humans.
EN
This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism. First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms. Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible. I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls “objective validity.” The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization – a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.
EN
We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.
Afryka
|
2017
|
issue 46
73-94
EN
Islam teaches the role of destiny (qadar) in human life and reaffirms the belief that what is destined to be yours will come. This paper investigates to what extent the Islamic concept of fate and free will has shaped the mindset of the Hausa people (Northern Nigeria). It has been based on the analysis of Hausa sayings, proverbs and poetry which serve as an avenue for transmitting knowledge, attitudes and moral values and constitute an important aspect of the Hausa culture.
7
88%
EN
The article aims to provide an introduction to the understanding of the notion of freedom in the School of Salamanca. This school was active in Spain in sixteenth and seventeenth century. The major figures of the school include Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Martín de Azpilcueta, Francisco de Suárez. Though their members were Dominican or Jesuit theologians, the School of Salamanca has an immense significance not only for theology, but also for political theory. The essay sheds light on one of the important aspects of the school’s thought, i.e. the problem of human freedom. The proper understanding of it presupposes acknowledging the profound difference between our contemporary notion of freedom which is based on the moral agent’s free activity and the notion of freedom developed within the school which conceives the moral agent in its relation to the species nature, i.e. the human nature, as well as in its relation to the Divine grace.
8
88%
EN
Three well-known physicists have recently argued that libertarian freedom is impossible. In their view, free will is incompatible with what we know about science at the most fundamental level. Here I show that their arguments presuppose a naïve version of reductionism and consider two alternatives, one appealing to mind–body dualism and the other to emergentism. The former says that free will is a capacity of one’s mind, an immaterial entity not subject to the laws of nature. The latter says that free will is an emergent capacity that cannot be reduced to the properties of an agent’s constitutive atoms. These alternatives, however, face the same problem: They seem to violate a fundamental law, namely the conservation of energy. I show how the libertarian can respond to this objection.
EN
The primary goal of the study was to examine the relationships between spirituality, belief in free will and perceived self-efficacy among young adults. In order to develop the preliminary adaptation of the FAD-Plus questionnaire, used for measuring the lay beliefs in free will and three related constructs, Study 1 was carried out among 485 young adults. The tool had satisfactory psychometric properties. Study 2, in which 340 students participated, verified the role of believing in free will as a potential mediator between spirituality and perceived self-efficacy. In the case of male students, total mediation was found, and in the case of female students, partial mediation was noted. The studies indicate the need to put greater emphasis on the spiritual sphere and the sense of free will in the education provided for young adults.
EN
This article addresses the issue of the two-level nature of acts of the will, i.e. its ability to voluntarily refer to its own acts. First, we will examine the ancient sources of the concept of the two-level will (Plato and Augustine). Then, we will focus on the views of John Duns Scotus on the types of acts of will, with particular emphasis on the concept of non velle and its application in philosophical and theological issues. Against the backdrop of Scotus’s concept, we will examine the ways in which 14th-century thinkers engaged with his position and developed his account of the two-level acts of will and types of acts of will. Finally, the article discusses a significant change in the function of non velle and the use of this type of volitional act in 14th-century ethics by exploring the views of Buridan and Kilvington.
11
Content available remote

Moral Perfection and the Demand for Human Enhancement

75%
Ethics in Progress
|
2015
|
vol. 6
|
issue 1
23-37
EN
In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of selfunderstanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally better future motives”.
Forum Philosophicum
|
2010
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
141-159
EN
A new version of the incompatibilist argument is developed. Knowledge is (at least) justified true belief. If God’s divine knowledge must be justified knowledge, then humans cannot have the “alternative possibilities” type of free will. This incompatibilist argument is immunized against the application of the hard-soft fact distinction. If divine knowledge is justified, then the only kind of facts that God can know are hard facts, permitting this incompatibilist argument to succeed.
EN
In this paper free volitions are construed as a subclass of reflective judgements in the Kantian meaning, i.e. judgements not involving any fixed concepts but displaying a concept-like form. Judgements expressing volitions and issuing in action may be termed volitional judgements, therefore free volitions are construed as reflective volitional judgements. Due to an element of conceptual novelty and the fact that in a reflective judgement volition gets conceptually fixed out of an unstable equilibrium between different conceptualizations, free volitions thus construed seem to be apt candidates for causally undetermined events.
PL
The article describes the results of Libet’s experiment and its resulting critique, as witnessed by the articles published between 2000 and 2012. As a result of his experiments, Libet concluded that conscious intentions of making a movement are preceded by brain activity registered as the readiness potentials (RP). In this interpretation, free will does not initiate the decision of making a move but is however capable of stopping this process. For this reason, Libet does not conclude that will is determined by biological processes. The resulting discussion in the literature concerns mainly methodology and conclusions drawn by Libet. The methodological points raised include an argument against the use of EEG as an accurate research tool and criticism of the method of timing the occurrence of the conscious intention of making a move. We note that subsequent modifications made to the original experiment, did however allow putting some of the methodological doubts to rest. On the other hand, the critique of Libet’s conclusions focuses on the problematic nature of correlation of physical movements with the readiness potentials. The most recent research also shows that the potentials might have a more complicated origin than previously thought. Libet’s interpretation is also criticised for its vagueness in defining intention and for not distinguishing it from wishes and desires. The last part of our article summarises the latest state of affairs as emerging from the analysis. We point out the difficulties in correlating potentials with movement, their interpretation and difficulties with the notion of veto, since it seems to require that contradictory intentions of making and refraining from a movement are present simultaneously. The article concludes that on the basis of the current research, the thesis about a biological determination of voluntary processes lacks a sound justification.  
PL
I ask the following question: “How should theology develop in order to avoid conflicts with neurosciences?” I believe that the answer to this question is a turn towards the monistic structure of human nature. It seems that insisting on the concept of a human being as composed of two realities – the body and the soul – makes it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into a constructive dialogue with neuroscientists who point to a clear connection between consciousness and biological processes.
EN
The author presents a model of moral responsibility based on the actual sequence and the notion of reason-responsiveness, and draws an analogy between this model and Robert Nozick’s model of knowledge based on the actual sequence. In addition, the concept of semicompatibilism is introduced and explained.
PL
Autor przedstawia model odpowiedzialności moralnej oparty na faktycznej sekwencji i pojęciu zdolności reagowania na racje, a następnie przeprowadza analogię między tym modelem a opracowanym przez Roberta Nozicka modelem wiedzy opartej na faktycznej sekwencji, oraz wprowadza pojęcie semikompatybilizmu.
17
75%
EN
The author argues that the moral of the Frankfurt stories is this: if causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities, and replies the most important challenge to this claim, namely an argument called “The Dilemma Defense.”
PL
Autor argumentuje, że morał przykładów frankfurtowskich jest następujący: jeśli determinizm przyczynowy wyklucza odpowiedzialność moralną, to nie na mocy eliminacji alternatywnych możliwości, a następnie odpowiada na najważniejsze wyzwanie dla tej tezy, mianowicie argument nazywany „obroną przez dylemat”.
EN
Lawyers who deal with applying law in practice very often are not aware of many hidden suppositions, which justify the existence of law and make it reasonable. It is obvious that in discovering them philosophy can be helpful. The main part of this article is the analysis of the thought of two European philosophers: S. Kierkegaard and B. Spinoza. The important field of their interest was a philosophy of human existence. Its significant element is liberty. The attitude to it creates their visions of being.Kierkegaard is well known as the author of „three periods of human life (esthetical, ethical and religious)” concept. In his opinion the necessary element of any progress in existence is taking the plunge and changing the way of life. It is possible by dint of liberty. A totally different vision can be found in Spinosa’a „Ethics more geo-metrico”. The author wants to convince us that the potentiality of making decisions is only an illusion.The possible consequences of the acceptance of such a vision were shown very briefly; the goal of the paper is also to demonstrate that since the beginning of our civilisation we have had to assume a concept similar to Kierkegaardian’s.
EN
The article tends to fathom the relations between the “baroque” as the certain identification of the Spanish World of the 16th and 17th centuries and the breathes of modernity that mere apparent in Europe, being under pressure of the iniciation of the scientific revolution, “religion reforms” and the historical background. We try to analyse this dispute by referring to some extracts from Cervantes’s Don Quijote de la Mancha and it’s influence on the formation of the proper of the ESP – American culture. 
ES
Esta comunicación pretende ahondar en la relación entre “barroco” como sustrato identitario del mundo hispánico en los siglos xvi y xvii y los aires de modernidad que se hacían presentes en una Europa convulsionada entre los inicios de la revolución científica, las “reformas religiosas” y las permanencias históricas. Trataremos de analizar ese debate mediante ciertos pasajes de la obra cervantina Don Quijote de la Mancha y su efecto sobre la gestación de una cultura propiamente hispanoamericana. 
The Biblical Annals
|
2022
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4
513-543
EN
The article focuses on the phenomenon of free will in Paul, taking as the starting point Rom. 8:16. At the beginning, a concise exegetical analysis of Rom 8:16 is presented, placed in the rhetorical context of Rom 8. Subsequently, a comparison is drawn between Paul’s and Epictetus’s views on divine and human agency. First, the Epictetus’s idea of freedom is presented with a special emphasis on the notion of proairesis, understood as the true self of a person, responsible for free moral choices and actions. Next, the similarities and differences between the Epictetus’s and Pauline vision of free will are discussed. What connects the apostle and the philosopher are convictions that free will can exist in a divinely determined world and that human volition requires continuous education and subordination to God’s will. The elements that clearly distinguish Paul from Epictetus are the natural image of deity to be imitated in the human pursuit of freedom, and a genuinely relational, corporeal and emotive character of free will in the apostle. The psycho-somatic nature of human personality and will in Paul invites a dialogue between the apostle and modern science but it has to be carried out cautiously, bearing in mind the different methodologies, the idea of transcendent deity and Christological foundation upon which the Pauline idea of freedom and free will is built.
first rewind previous Page / 5 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.