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EN
From the article we learn how timely and significant are the deliberations, especially on the freedom of human will, of one of the most prominent living German philosophers R. Spaemann. He presents his attitude in the dispute with the representatives of modern materialistic determinism, brain scientists and neurophilosophers. For these intelectuals our decisive acts are nothing more than states of the brain. These acts may come to life by the power of neural processes, not by the power of reasons (motives) initiated by us, as Spaemann convincingly shows. From the main and largest part of the article we learn why thedeterministic vision is not acceptable. Now it leads itself to absurd because of contradictions and mistakes in its assumptions (petitio principii, regressus ad infinitum) and (openly declared) proclaimed dogmatism. Moreover, it is contrary to experience, facts, practice of life, commonly accepted opinions on freedom. The famous Dennett’s experiment, which was supposed to give an argument against the classic thesis on our free will, in reality did not showany connection with our decisive acts.
EN
The article deals with the concept or the image of God in the Hebrew Bible and the various understandings and interpretations of it by Jewish thinkers through generations. The biblical text, full of contradictions and anthropomorphic assertions about God, was a source of discomfort for Jewish philosophers and theologians. Therefore, the sublima-tion and distillation of the text was necessary, and it was done by use of different her-meneutical methods. The article deals with various attributes of the biblical God, and presents different theological and philosophical interpretations of that issue by major Jewish thinkers.
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EN
In the article, I present the meaning and variability of the concept of indeterminacy, or indeterminism, in the current debate on the freedom of the will. I explore various concepts of uncertainty by which libertarians attempt to grasp the possibility of free action and moral responsibility. I consider the solutions that they present to be promising and sufficient to justify the enduring libertarian intuitions. As regards the strictly incompatibilist thesis defending the fundamental uselessness of indeterminism in the acquisition of moral responsibility, I reject this and formulate an objection to it of fastidiousness. In this objection, I confront the strict incompatibilists with the internal inconsistency of their position, which is manifested in their approach to indeterminism
CS
V článku představuji význam a variabilitu pojmu neurčenosti nebo též indeterminismu v současné debatě o svobodě vůle. Zkoumám různá pojetí neurčenosti, jejichž prostřednictvím se libertariáni snaží uchopit možnost svobodného jednání a morální odpovědnosti. Považuji tato řešení, jež v recentní stati představuji, za slibná a postačující k ospravedlnění přetrvávajících libertariánských intuicí. Pokud jde o přísně inkompatibilistickou tezi hájící principiální neužitečnosti indeterminismu při získávání morální odpovědnosti, tuto odmítám a formulují proti ní námitku z vybíravosti. V této námitce konfrontuji přísné inkompatibilisty s vnitřní nekonzistencí jejich pozice, jež se projevuje v jejich přístupu k indeterminismu.
DE
den freien Willen Im vorliegenden Artikel werden die Bedeutung und die Variabilität des Begriffs der Unbestimmtheit oder auch Indeterminismus in der aktuellen Diskussion über den freien Willen vorgestellt. Dabei werden verschiedene Auffassungen der Unbestimmtheit untersucht, mithilfe derer Anhänger des Libertarianismus versuchen, die Möglichkeit der Freiheit des Handelns und der moralischen Verantwortung zu erfassen. Die vorgestellten libertarianistischen Lösungsansätze sind laut Meinung des Autors vielversprechend und rechtfertigen die bleibende libertarianistische Intuition. Was die streng inkompatibilistische These betrifft, die den Indeterminismus bei der Erlangung von moralischer Verantwortung grundsätzlich für unnütz hält, so lehne ich diese ab und formuliere dagegen den Einwand der Rosinenpickerei. In diesem Einwand konfrontiere ich die Anhänger des strengen Inkompatibilismus mit der inneren Inkonsistenz ihrer Position, die sich in ihrem Zugang zum Indeterminismus äußert.
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