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EN
Guessing and item omission may be regarded as risk-taking or risk-avoidance strategies – sex specific adaptations to testing situations. In this article, these phenomena were analysed by (a) percentage of omissions by sex, (b) negative binomial regression to asses sex differences in the number of omissions, (c) c-DIF analysis using IRT-LR test and (d) linear regression using item attributes, to assess whether the c-parameter is sex differentiated by the percentage of omits (controlling item difficulty). The data set analysed were from the 2012–2014 Polish lower-secondary schools final exams, comprising tests in maths, language, science and humanities. Contrary to the vast body of literature, boys omitted items slightly more frequently than girls. Possible explanations of this finding – specific to the Polish examination system – were provided. The hypothesis of a higher c-parameter for boys did not find strong support from this study. It was shown that the c-parameter should not only be interpreted as resulting from item non-omission. This supports the modern concept of the c-parameter as a consequence not only of random guessing, but also problem solving, creative guessing or cheating.
EN
Modern approaches to measuring cognitive ability and testing knowledge frequently use multiple-choice items. These can be simply and rapidly scored without problems associated with rater subjectivity. Nevertheless, multiple-choice tests are often criticized owing to their vulnerability to guessing. In this paper the impact of guessing was examined using simulation. Ability estimates were obtained from the two IRT models commonly used for binary-scored items: the two-parameter logistic model and the three-parameter logistic model. The latter approach explicitly models guessing, whilst the former does not. Rather counter-intuitively, little difference was identified for point estimates of ability from the 2PLM and 3PLM. Nevertheless, it should be noted that difficulty and discrimination parameters are severely downwardly biased if a 2PLM is used to calibrate data generated by processes involving guessing. Estimated standard errors for ability estimates also differ considerably between these models.
Human Affairs
|
2013
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vol. 23
|
issue 4
606-615
EN
I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.
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