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EN
The article reviews the book Adam Adamandy Kochański (1631–1700). Studium z dziejów filozofii i nauki w Polsce w XVII wieku, by Bogdan Lisiak.
EN
This paper offers a personal report on the author's investigations concerning the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author outlines the origin of his interests in Twardowski's school and his reasons for deciding to write a comprehensive monograph about this group of philosophers. The last part of the paper mentions other people working on the same topic and focuses on problems related to the popularization of Polish philosophy.
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Principium sapienciae

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EN
I show the main mechanisms that led to victory rational thinking over mythology and religion in ancient Greece. I carry out far reaching analogies between the situation in ancient Greece between the eighth and sixth centuries BC and the situation in the Western world within the last several dozen of years. I have noticed similarities in changes concerning mentality, rationality, and keeping a distance from religion.
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The purpose of the paper is take a look from the perspective of the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu at the history of the Polish post-war philosophy with special attention given to the so-called Christian philosophy. In reference to Bourdieu’s research practice, the author postulates application of research strategies of the sociology of science/philosophy to historical and philosophical studies with a belief that they enhance the picture of philosophical dynamics of the past. From this point of view, the author focuses on relations between the field of Christian philosophy and the field of church authority, exposing the issue of philosophy’s autonomy.
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Studia Gilsoniana
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 2
213-227
EN
In his essay “The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization” presented at the 6th International Philosophical Congress at Harvard in 1926, Gilson outlined three general trends among historians of philosophy. Some reduce the history of philosophy to study sources and find explanations of the philosophy beyond itself. Others try to go beyond the source of a given philosophy to find the original intuition that generates it. A third position, which Gilson espoused, is ahistorical. It depends neither on society nor on the creative genius of philosophers; it is simply truth. Systems of philosophy are uniquely conditioned by the necessary relations that link the ideas. If philosophies are expressions of an eternal truth, dominating men and societies, which discovers itself progressively by the mediation of philosophers, philosophy is transcendent with regard to every given state of civilization and the worth of a civilization depends upon the extent it participates in truth. Gilson’s conception of philosophy can go far in restoring Western civilization’s loss of confidence in human reason with its resulting pathologies and threats to human freedom today.
EN
The author of the paper presents the main phases of academic work of Professor Barbara Skarga, who died on 18 September 2009. Her work is a result of a consequent development from the research in the field of the history of philosophy to metaphysics. She started her research with the studies of the history of positivism in Poland and France in the 19th century. In her research she used a category of intellectual formation which was related to forms and matter of the modes of thinking in a given period. A decisive step towards metaphysics was taken when the scholar started analysing the structures and transformations of the intellectual formations. Then, the questions regarding the constant and variable elements of each formation were turned into metaphysical questions about identity and difference. Her philosophy was shaped as a result of dialogue with Michele Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Heidegger.
EN
Modern philosophers of mathematics in their discussions tend to refer to mathematical Platonism. Usually they believe that they talk about philosophical thought of Plato himself and understanding of mathematics that was introduced by the ancient philosopher. Unfortunately, contemporary mathematical Platonism has very little in common with original Platonism. In this paper I would like to clarify this issue and present Plato’s philosophy of mathematics.
EN
The paper attempts a theoretical confrontation of two paradigms underlying contemporary historical reflection on the development of Polish philosophical and religious thought: the traditional paradigm of history of philosophy, and the paradigm of history of ideas which predominates in more recent research (and, to a certain extent, constitutes an alternative to the former). What is the general methodological status of scientific procedures employed within each of these approaches? Are these approaches qualitatively akin, i.e. aiming towards relatively equivalent cognitive goals using different theoretical means, or essentially competitive? Is there a mutual genealogical relationship underpinning the evolution of these paradigms? And finally, what factors determine the process of evolution from a metaphysical perspective? The aspects enumerated above, as well as other considerations related to the general problem outlined in the title of the paper, will constitute an attempt to assess the current state of research in this field.
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EN
My argument in this paper is that Charles Taylor’s view of liberty and ethics unites Isaiah Berlin’s liberal pluralism with Elizabeth Anscombe’s virtue ethics. Berlin identifies, in “Two Concepts of Liberty,” a tradition of negative liberty advocated by figures like Locke and Mill. He maintains that this concept of liberty is unique to modernity, and it is the form of liberty best suited to the political sphere. The much older concept of positive liberty, which is found in ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, as well as modern thinkers like Hegel, Berlin regards as ill-suited to the political sphere. Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy,” specifically identifies and criticizes the Anglo-Saxon tradition of moral philosophy. Utilitarian thinkers like Mill are, for Anscombe, consequentialists. The virtue ethics of Aristotle gives a basis for the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions not in sentiment but reason. Charles Taylor draws upon the views of both thinkers. He advocates a liberal pluralism in a manner comparable to Berlin. However, Taylor strongly emphasizes, with Anscombe, that the most complete conception of ethical and political life must be rooted in virtue ethics and positive liberty. Thus, Taylor’s views constitute a synthesis of the approaches of his two mentors.
EN
Metaphilosophy as a research discipline is concerned with the overall metatheoretical reflection of philosophy on its own subject matter, assumptions, methodology, and goals guiding this form of human intellectual activity. The aim of this article is to present a cross-sectional analysis of the main stages in the historical development of this discipline, and offer a general characterization of the current state of research. The means to achieving this goal of study is a confrontation between two partly competitive and partly complementary paradigmatic approaches to metaphilosophical reflection which currently determine a relatively wide range of interests in this theoretically promising and heuristically fertile field of philosophical analysis.
EN
The main purpose of the paper is to characterize the metaphilosophical paradigm of today’s philosophy.The author argues that contemporary philosophical thought is thoroughly – and in a complexsense – metaphilosophical in nature. Namely, it takes the form of philosophy’s reflection on itselfpracticed after its end, but still from within philosophy. Understood in this way, metaphilosophyunifies the formal-spatial and temporal meanings of the prefix “meta-” as well as the two correspondingspecific paradigms of metaphilosophy: philosophy of philosophy and post-philosophy. In orderto substantiate this hypothesis, (1) the Hegelian historical-philosophical position, which marks thefinal moment of classical philosophy, is first presented, and on its basis the situation of contemporarythought, which is determined by the problem of the future of philosophy, is outlined. (2) Then the“early” and “late” philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which belongs to the metaphilosophical epochof post-classical philosophy, is discussed. (3) This ultimately allows the author not only to drawconclusions about the condition of philosophy today, but also to outline an original context fora potentially fruitful confrontation between these two authors, which is the second aim of the paper.
EN
Hegel’s history of philosophy has irreplaceable place within the whole of his philosophizing and this fact grounds its philosophical importance. It has become the organ of the self-knowing mind in time as an integral component of philosophy of objective mind. Patočka was very precise with defining four main dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy: 1. The development of philosophy is organic. Different philosophies are different stages of the same organism development. 2. The role of individuality is subordinate; it does not belong to philosophical contents. 3. Time is but a mere external milieu, a mirror of inner development in the organism of mind. Philosophy and other aspects of mind in different periods are certain manifestations of the very same stage in the development of spiritual substance. Each historical period can be expressed rationally. Time thus doesn´t have positive, content meaning. 4. Advance of philosophical systems corresponds with the logical development of thought. The crucial core of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy as Patočka identified it couldn´t be even put forward in a better way. According to Patočka, Hegel is right that history of philosophy lives a life of systematic philosophy; it reflects our systematic nature, our tendency to system. History of philosophy and philosophy itself for Patočka, as well as for Hegel, create unity – a kind of organic totality. 
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Co to jest prawda?

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EN
This question has entered to history of the European culture not only in the version of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, but also as Pilate’s question. However, is this question every time about the same? Or is its intellectual version, which we deal with in philosophy, equivalent with the religious formula? Ancient philosophers, such as Descartes or Aristotle have already studied the question of truth. Truth is not an issue completely clear for man. Despite so many clear definitions, it does not give us full form of the notion of truth. All these centuries various inquires did not give us any answers. Every of definitions of truth shows us how to act, and according to which rules. We can agree on the classic definition of truth or reject it.
Mäetagused
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2021
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vol. 81
151-160
EN
The paper discusses George Berkeley’s metaphysical account of the Creation in his work Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). As we know from Berkeley’s correspondence, his detailed attempt to show that his immaterialist philosophy is compatible with the Mosaic description of the Creation was occasioned by an objection from the wife of his friend Sir John Percival. According to Berkeley’s philosophy, only minds and ideas exist. Physical things such as books and trees are mere collections of ideas in human minds. No thing can exist unless there is a mind to perceive it. Yet the Mosaic story states that many things were created and existed before humans came into being. Lady Percival pointed out that Berkeley’s view makes it hard to understand how things could be created if there were no human beings around to perceive them. In response, Berkeley offered a sophisticated metaphysical construct in which the creation of the physical world is interpreted as God’s decree to produce certain kinds of ideas in potential perceivers. The paper aims to show how Berkeley’s response to Lady Percival’s objection reflects the complicated relationship between philosophy and revealed religion in the early 18th century. Berkeley’s commitment to biblical truth sets significant limits to his philosophical speculation.
EN
The paper focuses on al-Kindī’s Treatise on definitions - the oldest surviving Arabic glossary of philosophical and scientific terms. Its author presents more than one definition of the term falsafa (philosophy). Does this mean that he was not sure how to explain to his coreligionists what philosophy really is? In this article I aim to focus on the content of all six definitions of philosophy presented in the treatise. I also compare some of al-Kindī’s definitions of philosophy with the way in which some Greek philosophers, known to him, understood it, as well as with certain ideas derived from the source texts of Islam. The results of the study led to the belief that al-Kindī sought to induce his readers to agree that philosophy was not a threat to the Muslim faith, but rather a science which aims to improve man in the moral sense, and also to significantly increase the human knowledge of the world created by God.
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Pojęcie nazwy oraz funktora

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EN
Syntactic categories fulfil different roles in constructing compound expressions. Sentences and names, and also some functors are syntactic categories. Sentences are expressions which state that something is this way and not another. Therefore, in the logical sense, a sentence is a following statement: “The earth is a planet”. Sentences (expressions) are intensional when they do not deserve a feature of extensionality. There can be sentences saying about conditions of the mind, causal or time relationships etc. Therefore, they are intensional because their logical value (i.e. truth or falsity) depends not only on component elements (e.g. from truth / falsity of clauses of the compound sentence), but also on different factors. Between the modules of this expression (e.g. between the component sentences of the compound sentence) some more different relations occur. These sentences get in relationships between them, e.g. in the cause and effect relationship - as a logical implication relation. Therefore, the logical value of these sentences goes beyond simple logical deductions, and according to some theories goes beyond logic itself.
EN
The Hegelian philosophy of history constitutes the ideal picture of development of the world as the process of progress in realizing freedom. Ontological subject of history is the spirit of the world (Reason) based on freedom. History is self-reflection and selfaffirmation of the absolute spirit. The state is the social-historical, political and ethical condition of development of the mankind. The positive result of the world development assumes fulfilment of two following requirements: firstly, individuals should be governed by their own conscience and secondly, the world (state) along with its all social and political institutions should be organized and administered rationally. Thanks to fulfilment of these requirements, that is, thanks to the realization of freedom at its objective and subjective level, a development of the world will reach its culminating point. In this way also in Hegel, what J. Burckhardt proves, ‘we find the Enlightening science about the endeavour to attain perfection, and about the possibility of improvement or also about so-called progress’. Already in the first half of the XIXth century Hegel’s philosophy of history was also clearly reflected in Slovakia. First of all, the works of a prominent representative of Slovakian Hegelianism Ĺudovít Štúr (1815-1856) prove it. Similarly as Hegel also Štúr distinguishes three methods of historical research. They are as follows: ‘primitive history, understanding one and philosophical one’, but for the best method of historical dissertations he considers the philosophical method which is nothing else but only rational comprehension of history. Štúr not only cites or paraphrases individual Hegel’s views with avocation but also modifies them with the intention of using them for his needs, and he even creatively extrapolates them on the new ideological meaning planes connecting, first of all, with the problems of cultural and national life of Slavs and Slovaks. Štúr’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history is still relevant today in such a perspective despite the passage of time.
EN
The article consists of the following parts: 1. Spreading É. Gilson’s thought by professor S. Świeżawski: (a) Achievements, (b) The history of contacts as a proof of the acceptance of É. Gilson’s thought. 2. Spreading É. Gilson’s thought through reacting to the translations of his books: (a) Remarks on the role of the translations, (b) The reactions of the philosophy of being proponents, (c) The reactions of the opponents against the philosophy of being. 3. Perfecting É. Gilson’s metaphysics as an actual form of his influence.
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O platońskich ideach

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PL
This paper is an attempt to clarify the ontological status of Platonic ideas. My considerations are based on the example of mathematical ideas and their relation to the subjects of mathematics and phenomena, since such modes of existence are distinguished in the philosophy of Plato.
EN
John Searle roundly rejects what he calls the Bad Argument: a long-standing equivocation in philosophy over the contents and the objects of perception. But, as Josh Armstrong points out, this insight is not unique to Searle. By the late 19th Century the equivocation had been observed by Franz Brentano and students of his, such as Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski, and was highlighted too in the 20th century by G. E. M. Anscombe. What Armstrong does take to be a novel to Searle is his use of this observation to undermine some of the primary objections to a realist theory of perception. In fact, though, it had already been put to much the same use by Mary Shepherd in her 1827 book Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation. Shepherd not only argues that the equivocal use of the term “things we perceive” is a crucial flaw in Berkeley’s case for Idealism, but also goes on to use this in service of her own, largely realist, theory of perception.
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