Search results

1

Proč nemůže množinový objekt hrát roli Fregova „smyslu“

100%

Materna P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 6

869-881

EN

The phenomenon of “hyperintensionality” can be linked to Frege’s famous article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892). Frege here showed the need in semantics to take account not only of reference but also of the way in which referent is given – and this “mode of presentation” he named sense (Sinn). The basic property of sense (which Frege did not, however, define) is that two expressions, though they differ in sense, may pick out (refer to) the same object. For example (Frege offered other examples), the expression “integer larger than 1 and divisible only by itself and the number 1” certainly differs from the expression “integer having exactly two divisors”, but both expressions pick out, by virtue of their (different) senses, one and the same object, that is, the set of prime numbers. It can be shown that no set-object can have this property. In order that the proof of this important property of set-objects be easily comprehensible, the main part of the paper focuses on an account of the basic characteristics of Tichý’s transparent intensional logic (TIL), in which hyperintensionality is defined as a procedural property. There may seem to be a disproportion between the several pages of the text and the brief and straightforward proof. In this brief proof, however, it is assumed that the concept of construction is clear, that the sense of an expression is represented as a construction, and that the reference (if it exists) is that which the sense-construction construes, so that the property of Frege’s sense given by the statement VS can be thus formulated by an assertion concerning not expressions, but primarily the relation between sense and referent, for example thus: Two differing senses can be the mode of presentation of the same object (referent). The preponderance of text providing concise information about the basic concepts of TIL over the proof itself can therefore be easily explained.

2

Against the Quotational Theory of Meaning Ascriptions

75%

Raimondi A.

Studia Semiotyczne

|

2020

|

vol. 34

|

issue 2

EN

According to the quotational theory of meaning ascriptions, sentences like “‘Bruder (in German) means brother” are abbreviated synonymy claims, such as “‘Bruder (in German) means the same as ‘brother’”. After discussing a problem with Harman’s (1999) version of the quotational theory, I present an amended version defended by Field (2001; 2017). Then, I address Field’s responses to two arguments against the theory that revolve around translation and the understanding of foreign expressions. Afterwards, I formulate two original arguments against both Harman’s and Field’s versions of the theory. One of them targets the hyperintensionality of quotations and the other raises a problem pertaining to variant spellings of words.

3

Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?

51%

Materna P.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

|

2014

|

vol. 23

|

issue 1

47–55

EN

It is shown that: (a) classicality is connected with various criteria some of which are fulfilled by TIL while some other are not; (b) some more general characteristic of classicality connects it with philosophical realism whereas (radical) anti-realism is connected with non-classical logics; (c) TIL is highly expressive due to its hyperintensionality, which makes it possible to handle procedures as objects sui generis. Thus TIL is classical in obeying principles of realism and non-classical in transcending some principles taught by textbooks of classical logic.

Refine search results

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Logic and Logical Philosophy

1 Studia Semiotyczne

2 Materna P.

1 Raimondi A.

1 2020

1 2016

1 2014

Proč nemůže množinový objekt hrát roli Fregova „smyslu“

Against the Quotational Theory of Meaning Ascriptions

Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?