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EN
Austin rejected the objectification of “meanings” and was also critical of the identification of meaning with truth-conditions. Much of his work appears to be inspired by a conception of meaning as use. In particular, apparently at least, his “performative utterances” are utterances whose understanding amounts to the understanding of their use. But Austin did not endorse the tendency, common in Ordinary Language Philosophy, to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use alone. His distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force was designed to avoid such a reduction. But it is unclear whether (and if so, how) speech act theory can escape paying the price of a new objectification of meaning (as consisting of “propositions” to which “forces” apply).
EN
The paper offers a proposal of a new classification of hearer roles in media discourse represented by political debates. It is posited that broadcast talk operates on distinct, yet mutually dependent, communicative levels, entailing different hearers: listening interlocutors, recipients in the studio as well as TV recipients. Secondly, it is argued that Speech Act Theory, which is anchored in the dyadic model, must be extended to account for multi-party interactions, notably mediated ones. This is best appreciated on the basis of the problem of a twofold illocutionary intention underlying utterances in political broadcast talk. Such utterances are illustrated with jibes deployed in Polish PM pre-election debates with a view to deprecating the addressee and, simultaneously, entertaining the audience.
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EN
It seems that a lie is a well-understood term. However, on the scientific ground, there is no precise and commonly accepted definition of a lie. There are various proposals how to understand it in psychology, in the theory of communication, and linguistics. In the paper, there is proposed such a definition which could be useful in the fields just mentioned, as well as in the educational sciences. Especially, from the practical point of view an accurate meaning of lying should be important for pedagogues, educators, and teachers. Moreover, a proposed definition of a lie can become the base to define, as precisely as possible, another apparently vague term: psycho-manipulation.
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