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EN
This article concerns the principle of in dubio pro tributario in tax law (Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance). The legal provision regulates the resolution of doubts in favour of the taxpayer. The scope of application of the principle has been narrowed to doubts about the content of tax law provisions that cannot be removed. The article is divided into five main parts: an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. Chapter I covers the genesis normative basis of the in dubio pro tributario principle. The author briefly indicates there that the principle has a longer history, but focuses on the history of the principle in the Polish legal system. In Chapter II there are analysis of the content of the provision, in order to obtain the fullest possible knowledge on the application of the regulated principle. The views of doctrine are juxtaposed there and the issues of application of the principle are indicated. Chapter III is a juxtaposition of art. 2a Tax Ordinance with the general principles of tax proceedings selected by the Author and the notion of tax justice. The author's opinion is revealed in the conclusion, where she also determines how the discussed regulation should be applied. This may be the case when, after linguistic, systemic and functional interpretation only, doubts remain as to the content of tax law provisions. The principle is a postulate for reliable establishment and application of tax law. The study uses a dogmatic and legal research method and analysis of the literature on the subject.
EN
The subject of this study is the analysis of the text of Modestinus D. 49.14.10. This is an excerpt rarely interpreted by Romanists. The aim of this analysis is to show its significance for the author, Justinian compilers and contemporary romanists. The implementation of this goal is achieved through the application of the legal-historical and dogmatic analysis of this text. The most important, however, is the analysis of the original location by Modestyn. This will allow showing the meaning that the author gave him. The result of these interpretive procedures is the demonstration that it was a text guaranteeing the freedom of oral and written expression of advocates or trial lawyers in the judicial proceeding against the tax office. Thus, the fragment of Modestinus became an archetype of modern lawyer’s immunity, consisting in the possibility of free discussion and argumentation during court hearings and in legal opinions.
EN
The purpose of this article is to answer the question posed in its title – whether, in a situation where doubts arise as to the content of VAT legislation, it is possible to apply the principle in dubio pro tributario. This principle gives precedence to the linguistic interpretation and respects the EU interpretation only when its application leads to an interpretation more favourable to the taxpayer. However, this is in conflict with the obligation to apply a consistent interpretation to harmonised VAT rules. The research method used consists of an analysis primarily of the CJ ruling in the Herst case, as well as of the Advocate General’s opinion in that case, supplemented by an analysis of other – selected as representative in the case – judgments of the Court in terms of pro-EU interpretation. The study was also enriched by the views of domestic and foreign doctrine in the areas examined. As demonstrated – the question posed in the title should be answered in the affirmative, although this answer requires clarification that this principle, viewed in an objective manner, is only applicable if it is not possible to apply the EU interpretation, and this inapplicability must also be objective in nature. The view presented will, however, be verified in the course of application of the law by administrative courts, as it is the judicature that will determine the limits of application of the principle in dubio pro tributario in VAT.
PL
Celem artykułu jest udzielenie odpowiedzi na zadane w jego tytule pytanie: „Czy w sytuacji wystąpienia wątpliwości w zakresie treści przepisów o podatku od towarów i usług możliwe jest zastosowanie zasady in dubio pro tributario?” Zasada ta daje bowiem pierwszeństwo wykładni językowej, a wykładnię unijną respektuje jedynie wtedy, kiedy jej zastosowanie prowadzi do wykładni korzystniejszej dla podatnika. Pozostaje to jednak w sprzeczności z obowiązkiem stosowania wykładni zgodnej w odniesieniu do zharmonizowanych przepisów o VAT. Zastosowana metoda badawcza polega na analizie przede wszystkim orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości w sprawie Herst, jak również wydanej w tej sprawie opinii Rzecznik Generalnej, uzupełnionej analizą innych – wybranych jako reprezentatywne w sprawie – wyroków Trybunału w zakresie wykładni prounijnej. Badanie wzbogacono również o poglądy doktryny krajowej i zagranicznej w badanych obszarach. Jak wykazano – na zadane w tytule pytanie należy odpowiedzieć twierdząco, aczkolwiek odpowiedź ta wymaga doprecyzowania, że zasada ta, postrzegana w sposób obiektywny, możliwa jest do zastosowania wyłącznie wtedy, jeśli nie jest możliwe zastosowanie wykładni unijnej, przy czym ten brak możliwości zastosowania musi mieć również charakter obiektywny. Zaprezentowany pogląd zostanie jednak zweryfikowany w toku stosowania prawa przez sądy administracyjne, gdyż to właśnie judykatura wyznaczy granice obowiązywania zasady in dubio pro tributario w podatku od towarów i usług.
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