In this paper I analyze Martin Heidegger concept of existence authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit). I attempt to prove that these two modi of being simultaneously constitute an existence and that neither of them can be independent and separate from the second. Consequently, our existence can’t be ‘purely’ authentic or inauthentic but ontological it is always authentic and inauthentic simultaneously. To prove that this reading doesn’t lead to a contradiction, I inscribe these analyzed ways of being in a figure of circle.
Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in an unusual way. He disregards its moral connotations, intending to analyze it as a purely ontological problem intertwined with the concept of nothingness and the forgetfulness of being. A problem with this approach that is frequently commented upon is that it omits the aspect of human responsibility, as it portrays humans merely as passive recipients of fate. The aim of this study is to show that in his 1936 Schelling-Lecture Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in a more complex manner: on the one hand, he portrays evil as a necessary part of being; on the other hand, he leaves a certain space for decision making. This dimension, mostly overlooked in the literature, is highlighted in the study by means of three main steps: 1) analyzing the relevant paragraphs of Heidegger’s Schelling-Lecture; 2) identifying the inconsistencies that emerge in these paragraphs; and 3) offering a coherent interpretation of evil as a real possibility of human freedom.
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