Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  incompleteness
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Remarks on the Gödelian Anti-Mechanist Arguments

100%
Raatikainen P.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2020
|
vol. 34
|
issue 1
EN
Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attention are discussed.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Wybór decyzji a subiektywizm w przekształcaniu informacji

100%
Borowik R., Borowik B. E.
Prakseologia
|
2006
|
issue 146
123-137
EN
There is mutual recursive feedback between the decision of a subject and the environment, where the action of making a decision is autonomously changing both the environment (as the result of this decision) and the creators themselves of this action. Every new decision is based on the past experiences of an individual, and by this on his developed cognitive system and axiological structure. While making a decision an individual refers to this axiological structure, which sometimes overweighs a rational evaluation of a given problematic situation. This particularly occurs when decisions concern a social sphere and when the consequences of our actions are entangled with another human being – the problem of subjective feelings and of a individual assigning meanings to particular elements in the process of this recognisable situation will depend on this interior internalised axiological structure. Therefore the imperfection of mathematical algorithms applied in the decision-making process results from the fact that a perception of a reality by human beings is always incomplete and subjective, because it is entangled in a man’s internalised unrepeatable system of cultural and individual values.
3

Incompleteness and the meaning of mystery for scientist and theologian

88%
Magnin T.
Human and Social Studies
|
2012
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
109-138
EN
1. The most incomprehensible thing would be for the world to be comprehensible; 2. An initial decision regarding the scientific approach: the construction of the meaning in the absence of it (d’in-sensé); 3. The condition and the elevation to the universal in E. Weil; 4. The initial tension of the identical and the other in E. Levinas; 5. Richness of the collective attitudes of those confronting with the mystery of knowledge; 6. The act of believing, another way to enter in the mystery of Believe for a Christian; 7. Knowledge through signs; 8. The theology in front of the mystery of God; 9. The negative way; 10. The eminence way; 11. The fascination of the Vatican II council for the unity of contraries.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Gödel’s Philosophical Challenge (to Turing)

75%
Sieg W.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2020
|
vol. 34
|
issue 1
EN
The incompleteness theorems constitute the mathematical core of Gödel’s philosophical challenge. They are given in their “most satisfactory form”, as Gödel saw it, when the formality of theories to which they apply is characterized via Turing machines. These machines codify human mechanical procedures that can be carried out without appealing to higher cognitive capacities. The question naturally arises, whether the theorems justify the claim that the human mind has mathematical abilities that are not shared by any machine. Turing admits that non-mechanical steps of intuition are needed to transcend particular formal theories. Thus, there is a substantive point in comparing Turing’s views with Gödel’s that is expressed by the assertion, “The human mind infinitely surpasses any finite machine”. The parallelisms and tensions between their views are taken as an inspiration for beginning to explore, computationally, the capacities of the human mathematical mind.
5
Content available remote

Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things

75%
Zardini E.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2017
|
vol. 26
|
issue 4
563–581
EN
Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and argue that they fail to dispel López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, bringing out in the process some broader points concerning the use of self-referential sentences in arguments in philosophy of logic.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Is the Past Determined (Necessary)?

63%
Woleński J.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2018
|
vol. 66
|
issue 4
183-196
EN
This paper is inspired by Marcin Tkaczyk’s works and discusses the problem of the necessity of the past (is the past determined?) and its role in the analysis of future contingents. The discussion centers on the statements (accepted by Tkaczyk, but slightly paraphrased)) firstly, that every past state of affairs is determined, and, secondly, that at least some some future states of affairs are contingent. The paper argues that because the first assertion is not justified, the antinomy of future contingents does not arise. The argument uses modal and metalogical devices.
PL
Praca niniejsza jest inspirowana twórczością Marcina Tkaczyka i omawia problem koniecz-ności przeszłości (czy przeszłość jest zdeterminowana?) i jej roli w analizie przyszłych zdarzeń przy¬godnych. Dyskusja skupia się na stwierdzeniach (zaakceptowanych przez Tkaczyka, ale nie¬co spa¬rafrazowanych): po pierwsze, że każdy dotychczasowy stan rzeczy jest ustalany, po drugie, że przynajmniej niektóre przyszłe stany są przypadkowe. Artykuł dowodzi, że ponieważ pierwsze twierdzenie nie jest uzasadnione, nie powstaje antynomia przyszłych zdarzeń przygodnych. Argument korzysta ze środków modalnych i metalogicznych.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.