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EN
The subject of this analysis is the legal basis for cooperation between police services and informers. This form of operational and reconnaissance activities plays a key role in the system of activities aimed at combating crime. The issues raised herein have an important theoretical and practical significance because all police services cooperate with informers, and the collected information often cause seemingly imperceptible but far-reaching legal effects. In the Polish legal system, this cooperation has been unregulated for many years, which results in a constant decrease in its effectiveness and is a serious threat to the legal security of officers who conduct this kind of activities. Thus it is necessary to regulate many important problems related to this cooperation in the competence acts of the police services.
EN
The subject of this analysis is the legal basis for cooperation between police services and informers. This form of operational and reconnaissance activities plays a key role in the system of activities aimed at combating crime. The issues raised herein have an important theoretical and practical significance because all police services cooperate with informers, and the collected information often cause seemingly imperceptible but far-reaching legal effects. In the Polish legal system, this cooperation has been unregulated for many years, which results in a constant decrease in its effectiveness and is a serious threat to the legal security of officers who conduct this kind of activities. Thus it is necessary to regulate many important problems related to this cooperation in the competence acts of the police services.
EN
The aim of the article is to examine the constitutions contained in the Theodosian Code dating to the first half of the 4th century, and related to the phenomenon of fiscal denunciation (C. Th. 10,10,1–8). For years, controversy among the authors has been aroused by the first two constitutions of this title and their reference to issues related only to either criminal procedure or fiscal procedure, or both. The first issue addressed by the presented article is therefore the question of the nature of delationes, referred to in C.Th. 10,10,1 and 2. The second problem, formulated and subjected to scrutiny, is the question of the nature of the ban on reporting activities in fiscal matters – whether it was of a general nature or related only to certain forms of denunciation. It seems that, in the light of the last constitutions within our scope, it is not possible to assume that all forms of providing information in fiscal matters were severely punished.
EN
The still unimplemented EU Directive 2019/1937 of October 23, 2019 (known as the Whistleblower Directive) in Poland imposes a series of obligations on businesses related to the protection of whistleblowers, including the establishment of secure channels for reporting irregularities. According to ACFE reports, whistleblowers are the most important source of information about fraud, making their protection particularly significant. In addition to a sense of security, an additional motivator for whistleblowers to report abuses and fraudulent activities could be financial rewards, which is a common practice in the USA, where whistleblowers receive compensation for information that leads to a SEC investigation and the imposition of fines. In Polish subject literature there is little discussion about whether introducing financial rewards for whistleblowers would improve the effectiveness of combating a wide range of financial irregularities and fraudulent activities, not only internal ones but also in the financial market and other industries. The aim of the article is to address the issue of the rationality of rewarding whistleblowers financially, using a survey-based study. The conclusion outlines recommendations arising from the study.
PL
Wciąż niewdrożona w Polsce dyrektywa UE 2019/1937 z 23 października 2019 r. (zwana „dyrektywą o sygnalistach”) nakłada na przedsiębiorstwa wiele obowiązków związanych z ochroną sygnalistów (ang. whistleblowers), w tym stworzenie bezpiecznych kanałów przyjmowania zgłoszeń o nieprawidłowościach. Według raportów ACFE sygnaliści są najważniejszym źródłem informacji o nadużyciach, dlatego ich ochrona jest szczególnie istotna. Dodatkową motywacją do raportowania (sygnalizowania, ang. whistleblowing) nadużyć mogłaby być dla nich, oprócz poczucia bezpieczeństwa, także nagroda pieniężna – powszechnie praktykowana w USA, gdzie sygnalista otrzymuje wynagrodzenie za informację, która doprowadzi do wszczęcia przez SEC dochodzenia oraz nałożenia grzywny. W polskiej literaturze przedmiotu brakuje dyskusji o tym, czy wprowadzenie wynagrodzenia dla sygnalistów poprawiłoby skuteczność walki z szeroko rozumianymi nadużyciami – nie tylko w ramach nadużyć wewnętrznych, ale także na rynku finansowym czy w innych branżach. Celem artykułu jest omówienie problemu racjonalności finansowego wynagradzania sygnalistów w kontekście przeprowadzonego badania ankietowego. W podsumowaniu nakreślono rekomendacje wynikające z badania.
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