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1

John Locke on Cognitive Virtues

100%
Karimov A. R.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2017
|
issue 3
221-227
EN
In this paper we interpret and examine critically John Locke’s ideas on cognitive (intellectual) virtues and values presented in his The Conduct of the Understanding (1697). We believe that the cognitive subject’s virtues discussed by Locke are universal. We believe that knowledge and understanding must and can be guided by the pursuit of truth. But this concerns only the motivation component of knowledge, and not its success which is ultimately determined by the epistemic environment.
2

Toward a Critical Synthesis of the Aristotelian and Confucian Doctrines of the Mean

58%
Brien K. M.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2020
|
issue 1
9-35
EN
This paper is the second phase of a project that was begun more than three years ago. The first phase culminated in the publication of a paper working toward a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.1 Therein Aristotle famously argues that human wellbeing (eudaimonia) is constituted by “activity of the soul in accordance with moral and intellectual virtue.”2 This earlier paper brought into focus all the main lines of Aristotle’s theoretical web in the N. Ethics: including the nature of the soul, intellectual virtue, moral virtue, etc. That paper went on to give a developed critique of Aristotle’s theoretical web, and against that background it argued for a very different way of thinking about intellectual virtue, and it prepared the ground for different ways of thinking about moral virtue. This current paper explores the various conceptual understandings of “the mean” in Aristotelian and in Confucian thought. It begins with an explanatory sketch of “the mean” as understood in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and then in a second section goes on to explore “the mean” as presented in classical Confucianism. The third section of this paper offers some reflections oriented toward a tentative formulation of a modified conception of “the mean” as it might be construed from a humanistic Marxist perspective.
3

Toward a Critical Appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for the 21st Century

58%
Brien K. M.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2016
|
issue 4
49-67
EN
This is a working paper that presents the first phase of what will eventually be a huge project, namely a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Early on it provides a sketch of the main strands of Aristotle’s theoretical web in his N. Eth-ics. Following that, the paper offers some critical commentary concerning some of Aris-totle’s main positions: especially his views on moral virtue, the soul, intellectual virtue, and human well-being. The paper then turns to the development of some significantly different ways of construing both intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue. With re-spect to intellectual virtue, I present my own perspective in interconnection with a pro-cess-oriented way of understanding reality, as opposed to Aristotle’s substance-oriented way. With respect to moral virtue, I present my interpretation in relation to a this-worldly understanding of the human spirit/soul, as well as a humanistic-Marxist inter-pretation of human well-being. Toward the paper’s end, I offer some suggestions con-cerning a modified “doctrine of the mean” that would be a sort of critical synthesis of the views of Aristotle and Confucius.
4
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Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

44%
Łukasiewicz E.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2021
|
vol. 69
|
issue 2
5-37
PL
Dlaczego nadzieja nie może być cnotą epistemiczną – o racjonalności nadziei z perspektywy analitycznej Artykuł ma dwa podstawowe cele. Pierwszym jest krytyczna analiza twierdzenia, że nadzieja może być uznana za jedną z cnót epistemicznych czy też intelektualnych, jak to proponuje Nancy E. Snow (2013) w artykule osadzonym w ramach epistemologii regulatywnej. Drugim celem jest rozpatrzenie problemu racjonalności nadziei. Artykuł przedstawia dwie różne interpretacje pojęcia nadziei: jako postawy propozycjonalnej (hope-that p) i jako ogólnej dyspozycji (hope-in x) (część pierwsza). W części drugiej rozpatrywane jest zagadnienie tytułowe: czy nadzieja może być uważana za cnotę epistemiczną. W celu rozwinięcia argumentu przeciwko takiej interpretacji nadziei, przedstawiona jest krótka charakterystyka rozumienia pojęcia cnoty epistemicznej w obrębie epistemologii cnót. W części trzeciej analizowany jest problem racjonalności nadziei (jako postawy propozycjonalnej). Szczególną uwagę poświęcono cechom wspólnym, które łączą racjonalne przekonanie i racjonalną nadzieję. W części tej rozpatrywane jest pytanie o warunki konieczne, które musza być spełnione, aby nadzieję można było uznać za postawę racjonalną i uprawomocnioną. W artykule zakłada się, że skoro przekonanie, że p jest możliwe/ prawdopodobne, jest częścią składową nadziei, że p, kwestia racjonalności nadziei nie może być rozpatrywana zupełnie niezależnie od zagadnienia racjonalności przekonań. Przedstawiona jest argumentacja, dlaczego tzw. stanowisko standardowe co do racjonalności nadziei przedstawiane w epistemologii analitycznej nie spełnia wymagań epistemicznej odpowiedzialności i wymaga skorygowania.
EN
There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.
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