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Kodowanie wartości prawnych w przepisach Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 roku. Perspektywa aksjologicznej wykładni prawa

100%
Kordela M.
Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Językoznawcza
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 1
57-70
EN
The derivative theory of interpretation of law assumes the rationality of the lawmaker according to which the lawmaker is guided in their work by a coherent, hierarchical and relatively stable system of values comprising three categories: legally binding, reference values and universal values. In order to adequately reconstruct the legally binding category, the directives of the axiological interpretation are used. Thus, each word and phrase of every text of a normative act, including the Polish Constitution, can be assigned a function of the carrier of legal values provided that they meet the conditions imposed on them by the appropriate interpretation directives.
2

“Małżeństwo jako związek kobiety i mężczyzny”. O niektórych implikacjach art. 18 Konstytucji RP

88%
Banaszkiewicz B.
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego
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2013
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vol. 22
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issue 3
591 – 656
EN
According to Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 1997 “Marriage, being a union of a woman and a man, as well as family, motherhood and parenthood shall be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland”. As to the substance, the quoted provision means continuation of Polish legal order. The wording „being a community of a woman and a man” is, however, a novelty in the Polish constitutional legislation. The reason for inserting it into the text of the basic law, declared during the Parliamentary constitutional works and the political campaign for confirming the new Constitution in the referendum 1997, was the intention to exclude any legal institutionalization of partnerships between persons of the same sex in the future. Article 18 of the Constitution implicates, inter alia, the guaranty of the legal institution of marriage. The Polish legislator is namely authorized and obliged to establish and maintain just this institution, whose essential attributes are: monogamy (union of only two persons and excluding of coincident staying of the same person in two or more unions); heterosexuality (union of one woman and one man); availability for everyone who is able to marriage according to objective standards, and these shall be sufficiently specialized by statute; basing of the union on personal connection of the two partners in important dimensions of private and intimate life; durability of the union; uniformity of marriage law in Polish legal order; existence of legal norms of property for economic stabilization of the union; official contracting and registration of it. On the other hand, the Constitution does not authorize the legislator to establish legal institutions similar to the marriage (a kind or kinds of “paramarriage”, regardless of the legal name), either for hetero- or homosexual couples (or unions of more persons), such as the French pacte civil de solidarité (for couples regardless of the sex of partners) or the German eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft (for homosexual couples). Considering Article 18 of the Constitution, legal recognition of homosexual couples registered abroad by Polish legal order is excluded too. The constitutional reason for the exceptional legal status of marriage, being a union of one woman and one man, is the close functional and axiological connection of marriage with the other goods protected by Article 18 of the Constitution: family, motherhood and parenthood. Establishing a legal institution of „paramarriage” for persons of the same sex, even under a name different from marriage and with a more modest legal status (as was tried to enforce in the Polish Parliament), would not conform to the Constitution. Besides, the experiences of states in which such a “little step” was made years ago show that the existence of a legal institution of homosexual „paramarriage”, parallelly to the usual legal institution of (heterosexual) marriage, evokes a political and judicial pressure in favor of progressive equating the first with the marriage respect to the – misinterpreted – principle of non-discrimination. The real choice for the Polish legislator is: either maintaining of the standpoint – which is, in the opinion of the author, required by the Constitution – that various forms of non-marital cohabitation are a strictly private matter, and they must not be subjugated under a specific legal institution, or to tread the path that begins at establishing of a “modest” kind of „paramarriage” and ends at full realization of the idea of mariage pour tous, including the right to adopt children by registered homosexual couples. As to the matter in consideration, the Constitution could be changed only in the way of a formal, democratic revision of it, not in the way of an “innovative” re-interpretation of its provisions in force that have been adopted by the National Assembly and confirmed by the Polish people in the constitutional referendum 1997.
3
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Nauka o dobru prawnym i jej rola w badaniu konstytucyjności regulacji prawa karnego

63%
Filipczak M.
Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
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2017
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vol. 102
23-36
PL
W opracowaniu podjęto tematykę zastosowania nauki o dobru prawnym jako narzędzia kontroli zgodności z konstytucją regulacji o charakterze prawnokarnym. Omówiono pojęcie dobra prawnego, które wyznacza zarówno granice zewnętrzne prawa karnego, jak i granice wewnętrzne prawa karnego. Wyjaśniono, że dobro prawne powinno być rozumiane jako wartość społeczna, czyli jak interes. Podjęto również polemikę ze źle rozumianym prawem karnym interesu. Przytoczono nurt tzw. transpozytywnej nauki o dobru prawnym, która wiąże termin dobra prawnego z konstytucją. Z teoretycznego punktu widzenia podniesiono problem tzw. kryterialnej nierozstrzygalności w prawie karnym. Jako konkluzję wskazano, że art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP powinien być interpretowany w kontekście nauki o dobru prawnym.
EN
The issue of this paper is a using of theory of legal good as a tool for constitutional control in criminal law. It discussed a concept of legal good, which designates both the external borders of the criminal law and internal borders of the criminal law. It was explained that the legal good ought to be understand as social value, which means as interest. It was in dispute over a incorrectly understanding of a interest criminal law. It quoted a transpositive theory of the legal good, which assume a connection between the legal good and Constitution. With regards to theoretical point of view, in this paper was raised a criterion undecidable problem in the criminal law. In conclusion was said that art. 31 passage 3 Constitution RP ought to be interpreted in context of the theory of legal good.
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