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Interpretacja konstytucji: warianty teorii i praktyki na przykładzie Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku

100%
Szymanek J.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2017
|
issue 6(143)
151–176
EN
The author examines the complex issue of interpretation of the constitution, based on the assumption that only the interference of the content of the constitution in practice creates a constitution. As Michel Troper pointed out , there is no constitution without interpretation, but only its text which provides the starting point for various interpretative actions aimed at deriving specific norms from the literal directives of the basic law. Interpretation is an obligatory element in the application of the constitution, without which the constitution may only be in force, but cannot be applied. There are many forms of interpretations of the constitution, but in practice the basic two include the judicial and political (practical) ones. The first one is the expression of the operation of the courts, and especially the constitutional tribunals which naturally interpret the constitution, detailing the meaning of the provisions contained therein. It may have the status of passive interpretation, where the tribunal moderately develops the text of the constitution, or the status of active interpretation, where the role of the constitutional court is more creative, and the court itself becomes at least a co-author of the system of government. Political interpretation is made in practice, and it is made by entities applying the constitution, it can have different variants, sometimes considerably departing from the content of the constitution or the intentions of its creators. Each interpretation modifi es the original text of the constitution, which can be proved by examples with reference to the Polish constitution of 1997. The most meaningful example of the corrective way of reading the text of the constitution is the interpretation of Article 125, regarding the so-called referendum on matters of particular importance to the state. The original intention of introducing this referendum was to „detach” it from the mode of amending the constitution, specifi ed separately in Article 235. In the practice of the application of the constitution, the separation of the referendum on matters of particular importance to the state from the constitutional referendum was unsuccessful, as manifested by various initiatives to use Article 125 with the assumption that this would lead to a change (partial or total) of the current Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
2
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Sprawiedliwość a wykładnia postanowień konstytucyjnych. Dylematy sędziego jusnaturalisty

88%
Łącki P.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2022
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issue 5(172)
129–148
EN
Nowadays, constitutional courts, by applying constitutional provisions, resolve disputes involved in the most controversial moral and social issues and thus change legal orders. This happens not only on the basis of provisions directly protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (human rights), but also on the basis of other constitutional provisions containing evaluative concepts. Given the axiological openness or aspiration of constitutional acts, one may ask whether the adoption of a position affirming (I) the existence of natural law and affirming (II) the requirement of the compatibility of positive law with natural law, has consequences for the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions. In particular, whether – in the light of natural law – a judge of a constitutional court, when interpreting a constitutional act, may refer directly to moral reasoning and his/her own understanding of natural law. In seeking the answer to this question, the author distinguishes three model theoretical positions: (1) a moral reading of the constitution; (2) a positivist reading of the constitution, and (3) an intermediate position. These positions can be illustrated by the jurisprudence of constitutional courts regarding the permissibility of abortion. While asserting the advantages of the positivist model, the author raises doubts about the feasibility of its implementation. For it may turn out that judges are confronted with the abstract terminology of the constitutional act and, at the same time, with the practical impossibility to precisely reconstruct the axiology of the constitution-maker underlying this terminology with the help of analytical legal tools.
3
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Models of national referenda in Hungary – an overview starting from the change of political regime to the present day

75%
Erdős C.
Central European Papers
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2018
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vol. 6
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issue 2
37-55
EN
The aim of this paper is to identify the trends and direction of Hungarian referenda-related legislation and their interpretation. The paper tries to determine the beneficiaries of the different models – for example the political elite (governmental or opposition parties), emerging political groups, or voters as non-professional (occasional) partakers of politics. The paper relies on the methodology of the science of constitutional law and it applies temporal comparison: it gives an overview of the changes in the regulation of national referenda in Hungary since the change of political regime. During three decades of the Third Hungarian Republic, the national referendum’s constitutional role and model changed several times owing to the amendment of the relevant legislation and the changes in the Constitutional Court’s and the Hungarian Supreme Court’s – called Curia – jurisprudence. A clear trend may be identified from the regulation of referenda: the clearly “referendum-friendly” 1989 rules were amended to become mainly “parliament-friendly”. It must be noted, that while the Hungarian constitutional system (unlike German or US system) still contains the institution of national referendum, the citizen-initiated “referendum threat” is decreasing tendentiously. Meanwhile, the political elite, especially the Government and the strongest parties have the greatest chance of organizing a successful referendum. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the Curia did not follow such a clear trend as the regulation. Both these bodies’ jurisprudence contains decisions in favour of referenda and against this form of direct democracy, so their jurisprudence is in a constant flux.
4

Teorie praw podstawowych i ich rola w wykładni konstytucji

63%
Jakuszewicz A.
Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Finansów i Prawa w Bielsku-Białej
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2014
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issue 4
104-135
PL
Postanowienia konstytucji regulujące prawa podstawowe charakteryzują się znacznym stopniem nieokreśloności. Z tego względu wymagają wykładni konkretyzującej, polegającej w dużej mierze na wypełnianiu ich ram normatywną zawartością. Ponieważ tradycyjne metody wykładni okazują się niewystarczające, interpretator przy realizujący to zadanie odwołuje się do określonych teorii praw podstawowych. W niniejszym opracowaniu przedstawiono najbardziej wpływowe teorie praw podstawowych oraz dokonano analizy skutków ich wykorzystywania w procesie wykładni konstytucji. Ponadto zasygnalizowano potrzebę sformułowania wiążącej interpretatora teorii praw podstawowych właściwej dla danej konstytucji, wyprowadzanej z całokształtu jej postanowień.
EN
Constitutional provisions stipulating the fundamental rights are to a great extent of an indefinite character. That is why their interpretation consists in their concretization, i.e. of their filling with normative substance. Since this cannot be done solely by means of traditional methods, an interpreter resorts to a theory of fundamental rights, which has a decisive impact on the outcome of the interpretation. The article discusses the most influential theories of fundamental rights and analyzes their implications for the interpretation of the constitution. Furthermore, the author indicates the need to draw up a theory of fundamental rights proper to the constitution in force, i.e. inferred from its provisions, that would be binding on an interpreter.
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