The judge’s impartiality in all kinds of court procedures, and especially impartiality in penal procedure, is one of the most important trial guarantees. The ideal impartiality that is expressed in eliminating any external elements from the judge’s mental process, is not possible, since any judge, as a human being, is infected with emotions and private views that he is entitled to, which makes it impossible to eliminate external elements, that are not connected with the matter of the case, from his mental process. The interest in impartial and objective hearing of every case, which has a social dimension and cannot be reduced to the judge’s and the parties’ individualized interests, requires unambiguous legal regulations by the State that would eliminate cases of making a ruling by a iudex suspectus. As long as the trial situations, in which it is a priori known that the judge will not be - for he cannot be - impartial, will only constitute circumstances defined as iudex suspectus, and not iudex inhabilis, the impartiality of making a ruling, and hence “the rule of rules” - of the material truth that may never be harmed in the least degree, will at least be exposed to such a detriment.
The judge’s impartiality in all kinds of court procedures, and especially impartiality in penal procedure, is one of the most important trial guarantees. The ideal impartiality that is expressed in eliminating any external elements from the judge’s mental process, is not possible, since any judge, as a human being, is infected with emotions and private views that he is entitled to, which makes it impossible to eliminate external elements, that are not connected with the matter of the case, from his mental process. The interest in impartial and objective hearing of every case, which has a social dimension and cannot be reduced to the judge’s and the parties’ individualized interests, requires unambiguous legal regulations by the State that would eliminate cases of making a ruling by a iudex suspectus. As long as the trial situations, in which it is a priori known that the judge will not be - for he cannot be - impartial, will only constitute circumstances defined as iudex suspectus, and not iudex inhabilis, the impartiality of making a ruling, and hence “the rule of rules” - of the material truth that may never be harmed in the least degree, will at least be exposed to such a detriment.
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