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1
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Professional competencies of probation officers

100%
Grudziewska E.
Praca Socjalna
|
2017
|
vol. 32(3)
39-47
EN
Each person working as a probation officer should have specific personal features and professional competence. Very often, productivity of probation officers is determined by their personal features. The current research aimed to determine, the level of variables mentioned above. The results show that positive interpersonal relationships have the highest importance for probation officers, whereas positive attitude towards oneself is the least important factor As for professional competencies, the one connected with realization was assessed the highest and postulate competence scored the lowest. The perception of probation officers by the charged is determined by their personality predisposition, a system of values, the attitude towards moral norms, communication skills, and the awareness of the servitude of their profession. The profession of the probation officer should not be associated or identified with the control of the inferiors but with the support they should be granting.
2
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Wytknięcie rażącej obrazy przepisów w ustawie z dnia 22 marca 2018 r. o komornikach sądowych

100%
Misztal-Konecka J.
Forum Prawnicze
|
2019
|
issue 1 (51)
38–52
EN
The Act of 22 March 2018 on Court Bailiffs introduced to the system provisions regulating the profession of court bailiffs the institution of reproach for a flagrant violation of the law. This institution derives from the Law on the Organization of Common Courts, but the lawmaker opted for extensive modifications in com- parison to the original source: the ground for issuing a reproach is a flagrant violation of the law by the bailiff, and the only competent authority to issue it is the district court. Even though the imposition of this sanction affects, among other things, eligibility to serve as a bailiff-inspector or member of a disciplin- ary board, has to be disclosed on the roll of bailiffs kept by the National Bailiff Council, is binding in disciplinary proceedings and affects the severity of the penalty imposed in them, the affected bailiff has no legal recourse to challenge the reproach. The opportunity to present the district court with an explanation can hardly be regarded as a sufficient remedy to deal with an unfounded reproach
3
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Legal nature of the Supreme Court resolutions

38%
Kwiatkowski Z.
Ius Novum
|
2020
|
vol. 14
|
issue 2
105-119
PL
Przedmiotem opracowania jest charakter prawny uchwał Sądu Najwyższego. Charakter ten jest sporny w doktrynie. W tym zakresie występują trzy odmienne stanowiska. Według jednego z nich „uchwały Sądu Najwyższego są orzeczeniami”. Drugie stanowisko przyjmuje, iż „uchwały Sądu Najwyższego stanowią odrębną grupę orzeczeń, nie są jednak orzeczeniami sądu, które dotyczą przedmiotu procesu, ponieważ nie rozstrzygają wprost o jego przedmiocie”. Trzeci kierunek głosi, że „uchwały Sądu Najwyższego, wydawane na podstawie art. 441 § 1 k.p.k., rozstrzygające zagadnienia prawne, nie należą do kategorii orzeczeń”. Przeprowadzone rozważania w niniejszym artykule prowadzą zatem do konkluzji, że uchwały Sądu Najwyższego nie stanowią orzeczeń sensu stricto o charakterze imperatywnym, rozstrzygającym o przedmiocie konkretnego procesu, zarówno co do kwestii procesowej, jak i w kwestii incydentalnej, lecz są decyzją procesową Sądu Najwyższego, rozstrzygającą zagadnienie prawne, wymagające zasadniczej wykładni ustawy lub rozstrzygają zagadnienia prawne w sytuacji, gdy zostały powzięte wątpliwości co do wykładni przepisów prawa będących podstawą wydanego rozstrzygnięcia.
EN
The article presents the issue of the legal nature of the Supreme Court resolutions. The nature is a matter of argument in the doctrine. There are three diverse viewpoints on this issue. According to one of them, ‘the Supreme Court resolutions are judgments’. Another stance is that ‘the Supreme Court resolutions constitute a separate group; however, they are not court judgments that concern the subject matter of a trial because they do not adjudicate directly on its subject matter’. The third opinion is that ‘the Supreme Court resolutions passed in accordance with Article 441 § 1 CPC and resolving legal issues do not belong to the category of judgments’. The analysis conducted in the article results in a conclusion that the Supreme Court resolutions do not constitute judgments in the precise sense, that are imperative in nature, that adjudicate on the subject matter of a particular trial with regard to both procedural and incidental issues, but they are the Supreme Court’s procedural decisions that resolve a legal issue requiring fundamental interpretation of a statute or resolve a legal issue in a situation when doubts have been raised concerning the interpretation of provisions of law being grounds for issued judgments.
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