This paper states, in a provocative way, the main objections against the possibility of the justification of knowledge. It may be loosely divided into two parts. The first one (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) attacks so called argumentative strategies of justification, i.e. arguments—including reductio ad absurdum argumentswhich are found to be futile in justifying our knowledge owing to their commital of the petitio principii fallacy, and also owing to the infinite regress of attempts at justification. The second part (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) attacks so called non-argumentative strategies of justification, such as direct verification and inductive support. Although it is often claimed that the last strategy is a special case of inductive logic, the paper tries to explain why it also fails to justify our knowledge. The conclusion thus reached is indeed a radical one: there are no good reasons for our knowledge, whether conclusive or inconclusive ones. However, there is room for rationality, because, as David Miller puts it, reason nowhere depends on reasons. To behave rationally means to criticize our supposed knowledge. In this case deductive reductio ad absurdum arguments may be fruitful, but only for the criticism of their own premises. Moreover, at end of Chapter 3 we explain why it is useful to defend (but not to justify) our knowledge against potential criticism. Our knowledge is thus formed by unrefuted conjectures. There is no justified knowledge. And argumentation consists of defensive and critical (deductive) arguments. There is no room for any justificatory arguments, be they deductive or inductive. Anyone who disagrees with these conclusions is invited to criticize them.
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