The protection of officials is aimed at ensuring the functioning of the state which is a common good of all citizens. Protection based on criminal law regulations is a special kind of protection. In the lands of the former Russian partition after 1918, until the adoption of the Polish criminal code in 1932, it was granted on the basis of the provisions contained in Part Six of the Russian Criminal Code of 1903 (the so-called Tagantsev code). It was not straightforward because the Russian code was characterized by excessively detailed regulations which created problems with its application in practice. The application of this code required adapting its old content to new conditions. Providing protection to civil servants was, however, one of the main tasks of the revived Polish state.
The issue of criminal responsibility for the crime of state treason committed during the First World War in the territory of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland was one of the problems which the Polish judicial system faced in the first years after restoring independence in 1918. The present paper is an attempt at demonstrating that in the judicial practice concerning such cases, the Supreme Court did not actually adhere to the laws in effect. The Supreme Court interpreted those laws in an incorrect and sometimes contradictory manner in order to establish the possibility of condemning the persons who were deemed guilty of treason against Poland. In fact, the Supreme Court aimed at satisfying the social sense of justice which demanded responsibility of persons who acted against the interest of the Polish cause in the particularly difficult time of the fight for independence.
PL
Kwestia odpowiedzialności karnej za przestępstwo zdrady kraju popełnione podczas I wojny światowej na ziemiach byłego Królestwa Kongresowego była jednym z istotnych problemów, przed jakimi stanęło sądownictwo polskie w pierwszych latach po odzyskaniu niepodległości w 1918 r. Artykuł stanowi próbę dowiedzenia, iż orzekając w tego typu sprawach, Sąd Najwyższy nie kierował się w istocie obowiązującym prawem – które interpretował w sposób błędny i niekiedy wewnętrznie sprzeczny, w celu wykazania możliwości skazania winnych zdrady Polski. W rzeczywistości chodziło mu bowiem o uczynienie zadość społecznemu poczuciu sprawiedliwości, nakazującemu pociągnięcie do odpowiedzialności osób działających na niekorzyść sprawy polskiej w szczególnie trudnym okresie walk o niepodległość.
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