When in 1719 Augustus II of Poland made an attempt to emancipate himself from the influence of the Russian emperor, the latter entered into alliance with the Prussian king, with the intent of preventing emancipation of the monarch and his country. The alliance concluded by Tsar Peter the Great with King Frederick William I of Prussia expressed the substantial interests of both monarchies. It was all about keeping watchful oversight of political and military weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and rendering the country isolated in the international arena. The programme established by Petersburg and Berlin remained valid until the end of the eighteenth century and the final, third, partition of Poland. The monarchs guaranteed that they would do everything possible to prevent the Polish constitutional system from altering (keeping the king’s rights restrained against the liberties maintained – primarily the liberum veto and free election of monarch), and treasury and military reforms from implementing. The preponderance over the Commonwealth implied the participation of Russia in what is termed the concert of the European powers. For the country of the Hohenzollerns, the debilitation of the nobility-based republic was, in turn, an opportunity for increasing the its territory, which had been policy energetically pursued since the Great Elector Frederick William’s reign (1640–88). For these reasons, the whole series of Russo-Prussian alliance treaties (1726, 1729, 1740, 1743, 1764, 1769, and 1772) comprised provisions regarding Polish affairs. The range of the issues covered by these bipartite agreements was ever-broadening, extending to the dissenters’ affair, among other things. Other reasons stood behind the inclusion of clauses related to the Commonwealth in Russian-Austrian treaties. Of substantial importance was the antagonism prevalent in the Reich between Austria and Prussia, which from 1740 onwards turned into acrimonious hostility. The Viennese Burg, which solicited favour from Petersburg, endeavoured to persuade its Russian ally that it was ready and willing to replace the Prussian partner in Poland-related matters of importance to Russia (cf. the treaties of 1726, 1730, 1733, 1746). Discussed is also a never-ratified tripartite agreement of 1732 – the so-called Löwenwolde’s treaty – which was momentous for the designs of the contracting parties, as well as the partition treaties of 1772.
Przed ponad półwieczem przyjęto ponad wszelką wątpliwość w polskiej historiografii, że autorem pierwszego praktycznego zastosowania instytucji liberum veto został Władysław Siciński podczas sejmu zimowego 1652 r. Utrwaliło się także stanowisko przedstawione przez nestora polskich badaczy parlamentaryzmu połowy XVII w. Ludwika Kubalę na temat przyczyn, które spowodowały zerwanie omawianego sejmu. Wskazywano na działalność Janusza Radziwiłła, który miał wykorzystać Sicińskiego dla własnych rozgrywek politycznych. Od ponad stu lat nie podważono stanowiska prezentowanego przez Kubalę, pomimo, że nie posiada ono dostatecznej argumentacji w źródłach. Nie można wykluczać, że dotychczas obowiązująca hipoteza jest trafna, ale należy również przyjrzeć się innym możliwym powodom, które mogły doprowadzić do precedensowego zastosowania liberum veto.
EN
More than half a century ago, it has been proven that the author of the first practical application of the liberum veto institution was Władysław Siciński during the Winter Sejm of 1652. The opinion presented by the senior Polish parliamentarian researcher of the mid-17th century, Ludwik Kubala, about the reasons of the breakdown of the discussed Sejm has been fixed. It was pointed out to Janusz Radziwiłł’s activity, which was to use Siciński for his own political games. For over a hundred years, the position presented by Kubala has not been challenged, even though it does not have sufficient reasoning in the sources. It can not be ruled out that the current hypothesis is correct, but it is also necessary to look at other possible reasons for the precedential application of the liberum veto institution.
Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski was one of the most prominent politicians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the 17th century. The son of a rebel, Jerzy Sebastian, he was holding one of the most important positions in the country for over 25 years and was active on the political stage, remaining almost all the time in the opposition against the royal court. Besides the political activities he was one of the leading publicist of the epoch. S.H. Lubomirski’s political writings occupy a high position in his output. As a keen observer, as well as a participant of the political life of the Republic, he described the deficiencies of the state in his works: Rozmowy Artaksesa z Ewandrem, Genii veridici, Devanitatae consiliorum. They mostly did not include any specified reforms program (with the exception of Genii veridici), being limited only to expounding defects of the political system. The last work of Lubomirski – De vanitate consiliorum, was a recapitulation of his political views and publicist’s activity. It showed the hopeless condition of the state, for which the author saw no way out. The nihilistic and apathetic attitude made a characteristic ‘road-sign’ determining the route to be followed by Polish state philosophers in the 18th century, helpless in the presence of the paralysis of state institutions and the degrading mother country.
Józef Andrzej Załuski, bishop of Kiev and the alleged author of Opisanie krótkie niektórych interessów wewnętrznych Najjaśniejszej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w roku 1762 (Brief description of some internal interests of the Eminent Polish Nobiliary Republic in 1762), tried to survey a series of opinions and reflections on the constitutional system of Poland at the decline of the reign of August III of Vettin dynasty and the beginning of reign of Stanisław August Poniatowski. The major element of Załuski’s analysis is his attitude toward liberum veto which was one of the most crucial elements of the Polish constitutional system. While perceiving the negative aspect of the abuse arising from the liberum veto, Załuski considered the latter to be the immanent part of the Polish constitution. He therefore regarded the liberum veto as something unavoidable and as something what produced a counterbalance vis-à-vis the voting by majority, the latter being applied in England, Sweden and Denmark. It is easy to observe that Załuski was a firm opponent of the majority vote system. What – in his opinion - was detrimental to the Polish Republic was the absence of the effective implementation of good laws. As a result he did not see any need for the introduction of new constitutional devices. The volume published by the bishop of Kiev assumed, to a large extent, also the shape of polemics conducted by him with Stanisław Konarski and with the treaty of the latter On the Effective Advice.
Łukasz Opaliński, known as younger, represented one of the most powerful magnate clans in Wielkopolska and Poland in the 17th century. Holding a high senatorial office, that of the Court Marshal of the Crown – he made himself known as a writer and philosopher of the political system, and also as a superb politician. Older historiographic works perceived him as a monarchist and adherent of the successive courts. These were only the studies by Władysław Czapliński that portrayed him as a politician who was an apologist of the political system of the Commonwealth of Poland–Lithuania. In fact, Opaliński was a political maverick, and his views – expressed both in his writings and political actions – resulted from the correlation of an attitude of an enlightened magnate of mid-17th century, caring mostly about the interest of his clan, and further – that of the state, certainly proud of the political system of his country, yet perceiving also its erosion. Opaliński’s works in philosophy of state, notably Rozmowa plebana z ziemianinem, Obrona Polski, and Coś nowego?, prove the broad horizon of his thoughts. The dignitary’s concepts are innovative, and more importantly in no way unrealistic. The magnate found the system of the Commonwealth the standard, and considered the “golden liberty” of nobility the most perfect social system, in which he was seconded by other writers of the time. Yet, Opaliński was aware of the shortcomings resulting from the accruing “exorbitancy”, and especially from the anarchisation of the Polish parliamentary movement. He perceived the existence of liberum veto as a necessity, however proper, yet was afraid that inappropriate people could exploit it, hence he postulated its use only in matters of state importance.
PL
Łukasz Opaliński zwany młodszym reprezentował jeden z najmożniejszych rodów magnackich w Wielkopolsce i całej Rzeczpospolitej w XVII w. Piastując wysoki urząd senatorski – marszałka nadwornego koronnego, dał się przede wszystkim poznać jako publicysta i filozof ustroju, a także nieprzeciętny polityk. Starsza historiografia widziała w nim regalistę i poplecznika kolejnych dworów. Dopiero studia Władysława Czaplińskiego ukazują go jako polityka będącego apologetą ustroju państwa polsko-litewskiego. W rzeczywistości Opaliński był politycznym lawirantem, zaś jego poglądy wyrażane zarówno w publicystyce, jak i w działaniach politycznych były korelacją postawy oświeconego magnata połowy XVII w. dbającego głównie o interes swojego rodu, w dalszej kolejności państwa, na pewno dumnego z ustroju Rzeczpospolitej, ale dostrzegającego jego wynaturzenia. Dzieła Opalińskiego z zakresu filozofii państwa, takie jak Rozmowa plebana z ziemianinem, Obrona Polski, czy Coś nowego?, wykazują szerokie horyzonty w myśli marszałka nadwornego i jego nieprzeciętne zdolności publicystyczne. Pomysły, jakie wykazuje Opaliński w swoich pracach, są nowatorskie, a co najważniejsze realne, nie oderwane od istniejącej rzeczywistości. Ustrój Rzeczpospolitej był dla magnata wielkopolskiego wzorem. „Złotą wolność” szlachecką uważał za najdoskonalszy ustrój społeczny, w czym wtórowali mu inni publicyści epoki. Opaliński był jednak świadomy niedomagań wynikających z nawarstwiających się „egzorbitancji”, a w szczególności z anarchizacji polskiego parlamentaryzmu. Instytucję liberum veto odbierał jako słuszną konieczność, natomiast obawiał się jego korzystania przez nieodpowiednie osoby, stąd postulował stosowania jej wyłącznie do spraw wagi państwowej.
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