Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.
Our objective with this study is to present the specific nature of semantic connotations understood as such characteristics of lexical items which evoke affective, emotional, evaluative or cultural associations in the users of any language. We would like to present a few of the many classifications and propose our own typology. This procedure will permit us to demonstrate that these hidden meanings are in many cases individual, but some of them can be disseminated and decoded in the same way by large groups of speakers. Furthermore, we would like to stress that these connotative attributes have highly complex structures and it is difficult to establish a fixed framework in which we could encompass them.
The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.
The article introduces theories of epistemic justification to the problems of under-standing in communication. Two dominant approaches in contemporary epistemolo-gy—foundationalism and coherentism—are applied in intercultural discourse. Since the intended meaning of utterances in communication is reached through inference, beliefs about the intended meaning are justified with respect to the evidence of communicative behaviour and context. Tracing the difficulties of intercultural dialogue, the article ar-gues that the coherentist method of justification is more useful than foundationalist one. Coherentism is consistent with the open-mindedness and unprejudiced reasoning, both of which are crucial parts of intercultural competency.
The author first reconstructs standpoints adopted by the scholars from the Poznan-Szczecin schoolof legal theory regarding the linguistic meaning of a legal norm. This reconstruction allows certaindilemmas related to the adoption of analytic philosophy in the theory of law to be visualized. Inthe next section of the article, attention is paid to the influence of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophyon the understanding of linguistic meaning within the School. The problem of linguistic meaning may be explained by the definition of equivalence, the core of which is a set of directivesof a specific language. Finally, the author comments on the theses of Robert B. Brandom’s analyticpragmatism and the application of the latter to legal theory of Maciej Dybowski. Analytic pragmatismextends semantic research through an attempt to understand practice-related conditions.
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Autor rekonstruuje stanowiska przyjmowane w ramach tzw. poznańsko-szczecińskiej szkoły teorii prawa (Szkoła) dotyczące znaczenia językowego normy prawnej. Pozwala to na unaocznienie pewnych dylematów związanych z przyjmowaniem założeń filozofii analitycznej w teorii prawa. Następnie zwrócono uwagę na wpływ filozofii Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza na pojmowanie znaczenia językowego w Szkole. Problem znaczenia językowego może zostać wyjaśniony przy użyciu definicji równoznaczności, której rdzeń stanowi zbiór dyrektyw danego języka. W ostatniej części tekstu omówione zostały natomiast tezy pragmatyzmu analitycznego Roberta B. Brandoma i sposób jego aplikacji do teorii prawa przez Macieja Dybowskiego. Pragmatyzm analityczny poszerza badania semantyczne o próbę zrozumienia uwarunkowań praktycznych.
The review article refers to the book by Mark Johnson of 2007 which has been translated by Jarosław Płuciennik. The book is worth noting as it analyses the basic notion of the theory of cognitive linguistics – i.e. embodied meaning.
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Artykuł recenzyjny dotyczy pracy Marka Johnsona z 2007 roku, którą przetłumaczył Jarosław Płuciennik. Książka jest godna zainteresowania, rozpatruje bowiem podstawowe pojęcie w teorii lingwistyki kognitywnej, mianowicie znaczenie ucieleśnione.
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was mainly a mathematician who wanted to reinforce this discipline on philosophical ground. The starting point was the analysis of the language of mathematics, but his interests focused on natural language. Nowadays he is not famous as mathematician but rather as a philosopher of language, and he deserves the title of the father of this discipline. His writings are widely recognized by philosophers and linguists as seminal papers in philosophy of language His achievements were appreciated mainly by British analytic philosophers who dealt with the analysis of language. In the paper I focus on the part of Frege’s legacy that is still vivid in philosophy of language and modern linguistics. I particularly analyze mathematical inspiration of Frege’s semantics and the consequences of its application to natural language. Then I focus on the relation of semantic notions introduced by Frege with a rather unclear notion of linguistic meaning, and indicate the problems that appear if Frege’s semantics is to be applied to natural language. I briefly present the current directions in the natural language analysis that tend to overcome the problems generated by Fregean theory.
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Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) był głównie matematykiem, który chciał wzmocnić tę dyscyplinę na gruncie filozoficznym. Punktem wyjścia była analiza języka matematyki, jednak jego zainteresowania skupiały się na języku naturalnym. Dziś zasłynął nie jako matematyk, ale raczej jako filozof języka i zasługuje na miano ojca tej dyscypliny. Jego pisma są powszechnie uznawane przez filozofów i lingwistów za przełomowe prace z zakresu filozofii języka. Jego osiągnięcia docenili głównie brytyjscy filozofowie analityczni zajmujący się analizą języka. W artykule skupiam się na tej części spuścizny Fregego, która jest wciąż żywa w filozofii języka i nowożytnym językoznawstwie. W szczególności analizuję matematyczne inspiracje semantyką Fregego i konsekwencje jej zastosowania w języku naturalnym. Następnie skupiam się na związku pojęć semantycznych wprowadzonych przez Fregego z dość niejasnym pojęciem znaczenia językowego oraz wskazuję problemy, jakie pojawiają się w przypadku zastosowania semantyki Fregego do języka naturalnego. Pokrótce przedstawiam aktualne kierunki analizy języka naturalnego, które zmierzają do przezwyciężenia problemów generowanych przez teorię Frege'a.
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