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Logika racjonalności. W stronę modalnego platonizmu matematycznego

100%

Wilczek P.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

2011

issue 49

98-122

In this article Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics is characterized as a Structural Second-Order Platonism and it is demonstrated that the Whiteheadian ontology is consistent with modern formal approaches to the foundation of mathematics. We follow the pathway taken by model-theoretically and semantically oriented philosophers. Consequently, it is supposed that all mathematical theories (understood as deductively closed set of sentences) determine their own models. These models exist mind-independently in the realm of eternal objects. From the metatheoretical point of view the hypothesis (posed by Józef Życiński) of the Rationality Field is explored. It is indicated that relationships between different models can be described in the language of modal logics and can further be axiomatized in the framework of the Second Order Set Theory. In conclusion, it is asserted that if any model (of a mathematical theory) is understood, in agreement with Whitehead’s philosophy, as a collection of eternal objects, which can be simultaneously realized in a single actual occasion, then our external world is governed by the hidden pattern encoded in the field of pure potentialities which constitute the above mentioned Field of Rationality. Therefore, this work can be regarded as the first step towards building a Logic of Rationality.

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)

80%

Czernecka-Rej B.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

2013

vol. 61

issue 1

5-22

C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper — apart from presenting LP — also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.

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1 Roczniki Filozoficzne

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1 Czernecka-Rej B.

1 Wilczek P.

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Logika racjonalności. W stronę modalnego platonizmu matematycznego

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)