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On the concept of truth in an intended model of the logic of beliefs

100%

Wesserling J., Nieznański E.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

2013

vol. 49

issue 1

135-149

First of all the article looks at the building of an a posteriori logic of beliefs i.e. observation developed on the principle of how, people usually think, what kind of judgments they make about reality and what actually is described by the truth of the judgments under the influences of beliefs. In this situation, we have to depart from the customary practice of a priori semantics of possible worlds in favour of semantics for models intended. Secondly, we find that in practice, human judgments indirectly accept a logic of thinking generally, which leads us - thirdly - to define this logical system as an extension of intuitionistic logic. Fourthly, and finally, our empirically generated logic of beliefs, proves to be logic of hypotheses and suppositions, because judgments made on the basis of intuitionistic logic are not assertive judgments.

W artykule chodzi – po pierwsze – o zbudowanie aposteriorycznej logiki przekonań, czyli wypracowanej na zasadzie obserwacji, jak ludzie zwykle myślą, jakiego rodzaju sądy wydają o rzeczywistości i jakiej rzeczywistości dotyczy prawda sądów, którymi rządzą przekonania. W tej sytuacji musimy odstąpić od zwyczaju uprawiania apriorycznej semantyki światów możliwych na rzecz semantyki modeli zamierzonych. Po wtóre, odnajdujemy, że w praktyce ludzkiego wydawania sądów, pośrednią rolę pełni pewnego rodzaju logika myślenia w ogóle, której metajęzykowy rozbiór skłania nas – po trzecie – do określenia jej jako systemu nadbudowanego nad logiką intuicjonistyczną. A po czwarte, nasza logika przekonań, empirycznie generowana, okazała się być logiką przekonań hipotetycznych i supozycyjnych, ponieważ sądy wydawane na gruncie logiki intuicjonistycznej nie są sądami asertywnymi.

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)

80%

Czernecka-Rej B.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

2013

vol. 61

issue 1

5-22

C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper — apart from presenting LP — also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.

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1 Roczniki Filozoficzne

1 Studia Philosophiae Christianae

1 Czernecka-Rej B.

1 Nieznański E.

1 Wesserling J.

2 2013

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On the concept of truth in an intended model of the logic of beliefs

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)