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1

Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako równość szans w postaci egalitaryzmu trafu

100%

Stoiński A.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2022

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issue 4(171)

141–161

EN

Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland invokes the idea of social justice without specifying its understanding. The present analysis deals with the problems of characterising it as equality of opportunities (possibilities) in the form of luck egalitarianism. Based on hypothetical examples, we have attempted to show that the social justice, which consists in the enforcement of equal rights, whether they are maximalist or merely positive, faces serious theoretical obstacles. The article contains three main theses. The first thesis is that it is impossible to enforce equal rights in maximalist terms. The second thesis states that the luck egalitarian project of equalizing opportunities for the younger generation by redistributing resources seized through the liquidation of inheritances shows the incoherence of the rules of justice. The third thesis is that luck egalitarianism violates the principle of consistency. For the above reasons, such an understanding of social justice as equality of opportunity in the form of luck egalitarianism should be excluded from the interpretation of Article 2 of the Polish Constitution.

2

When do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?

84%

Hyams K.

Diametros

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2017

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issue 53

60-74

EN

Luck egalitarianism is the view that inequalities are justified when and only when a particular condition is met. Recent years have seen considerable debate about the exact nature of the risky choices thought by luck egalitarians to justify inequality. All positions in the debate emphasise the importance of choice, but they differ in the precise details of how choice features in the inequality-justifying condition. The present paper argues for a novel view about the conditions under which risky choices should justify choice in a manner that uncovers ambiguity and flaws in existing positions. It rejects existing accounts and develops a new hypothetical choice based account of inequality-justifying risk.

3

Priority to Organ Donors: Personal Responsibility, Equal Access and the Priority Rule in Organ Procurement

67%

Albertsen A.

Diametros

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2017

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issue 51

137-152

EN

In the effort to address the persistent organ shortage it is sometimes suggested that we should incentivize people to sign up as organ donors. One way of doing so is to give priority in the allocation of organs to those who are themselves registered as donors. Israel introduced such a scheme recently and the preliminary reports indicate increased donation rates. How should we evaluate such initiatives from an ethical perspective? Luck egalitarianism, a responsibility-sensitive approach to distributive justice, provides one possible justification: Those who decide against being organ donors limit the health care resources available to others. As such, a priority rule can be justified by a luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice. Furthermore, a priority rule inspired by luck egalitarianism is well equipped to avoid prominent criticisms of such a procurement system. Luck egalitarianism provides us with reaons to exempt people who are not responsible for their inability to donate from receiving lower priority, provide sufficient information about donation, and mitigate social and natural circumstances affecting people’s choice to donate.

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2 Diametros

1 Przegląd Sejmowy

1 Albertsen A.

1 Hyams K.

1 Stoiński A.

1 2022

2 2017

Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako równość szans w postaci egalitaryzmu trafu

When do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?

Priority to Organ Donors: Personal Responsibility, Equal Access and the Priority Rule in Organ Procurement