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EN
Congenital aphantasia, or the complete absence of mental imagery, is a topic that has recently aroused the interest of researchers in many fields including philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences. While it is generally supposed that we all have rich mental lives full of imaged representations, estimates suggest 2-3% of the population may have never formed an image or seen ‘in the mind’s eye.’ This paper aims to address the scepticism surrounding aphantasia, the challenges in communicating about mental imagery, and the research methods used in cognitive sciences today through the lens of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The paper argues that 1) communicating about mental imagery involves language games that persons with aphantasia may not be able to play (i.e., makes reference to expressions and concepts that are meaningless for them, such as ‘visualise,’ ‘form an image,’ etc.); 2) that as a consequence aphantasia, in present research, is only describable negatively (as lack or incapacity); 3) that rather than a cognitive or a psychological issue, aphantasia should be understood as a grammatical one; and 4) that we need to invent new language games in order to come to a better understanding of conditions such as aphantasia, and to be able to appreciate the rich diversity and variability of human experience.
Avant
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 2
EN
The aim of this paper is to suggest a novel account of mental imagery according to which mental images are not a-temporal picture-like representations, but processes characterized by their spatio-temporal continuity. Evidence based in particular on recent advances in understating the functional role of the hippocampal formation in cognition and spatial coding is provided. Under this account, mental images are a pervasive form of cognition that is supported by the complex interaction of the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex, encompassing cognitive functions such as navigation, episodic memory, as well as mental rotation and scanning. The functional role of the hippocampus is twofold: it forms elements of spatio-temporal continuity and re-combines them in novel ways in the process of scene reconstruction that underpins various forms of spatial cognition.
Avant
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2019
|
vol. 10
|
issue 2
EN
This paper aims to explore and expand on Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of mental imagery. Despite some rather cryptic passages and obvious objections, his notion of mental imagery as possessing a constitutive (and not merely added) element of expressive thought and conceptuality offers critical insights linking perceptual capacities with our shared practices. In particular I seek to further develop Wittgenstein’s claim that perceptual impressions presuppose a “mastery of a technique.” I argue that this sense of technique, understood as acquired conceptual capacities, can explain and capture the rich and varied spectrum of expressive visual content that can be accessed by human beings initiated and embedded in a variety of shared practices. Using Gilbert Ryle’s account of dispositions, I cash out the notion of acquired conceptual capacities as spanning a wide latitude of responsive dispositions from mere “blind” visual habits to more normatively-guided, intelligent, and deliberately-trained visual “skills.” Visual impressions construed as such are hardly perceptually (nor representationally) univocal and instead exhibit a dynamic and reflexive plurivocity manifested through one’s initiation into shared practices and forms of life. This plurivocity makes possible a rich array of visual affordances that would otherwise not be accessible outside the context of a shared practice. This suggests that human beings possess a distinctive kind of expressive and responsive intelligence which picks out visual affordances determined not so much by a merely receptive perceptual faculty but by the subject’s skillful, active, and responsive engagement with the world.
Avant
|
2019
|
vol. 10
|
issue 2
EN
Nanay (2017) argues for unconscious mental imagery, inter alia based on the assumption that successful performance in imagery tasks requires the manipulation of mental imagery. I challenge this assumption with the help of results presented in Shepard and Metzler (1971), Zeman et al. (2010), and Keogh and Pearson (2018). The studies suggest that imagery tasks can be successfully performed by means of cognitive/propositional strategies which do not rely on imagery.
5
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Imaginativní schopnosti a tvořivost

85%
EN
The article focuses on theoretical context of the relationship between imaginative abilities and creativity. The existence of such a relationship has been alleged by many authors; however, empirical surveys have not yet arrived at unambiguous conclusions. Despite growing number of both experts and surveys in this field, the findings do not show expected integration of information into a comprehensive overview. The paper brings in results of the surveys aimed at detecting variables which influence phenomena of imagination and creativity. In dealing with the topic of their mutual relationship, the paper attemps to find connecting links which would convey this relationship. The issue of relation of imagination and creativity to hemisphere activity is also discussed. The author adverts to two standpoints accepted within empirical research. The first one focuses on individual differences and concentrates on hypothetical relation between proband´s statement about mental imagination and measurement of divergent thinking. This approach has a long history and prevails in the study area. Second approach focuses on imagery process and tries to catch the creative impulse. Measurement analyses are based primarily on the premise that individual differences in mental imagery, detected by the method of self-reported mental imagery, correlate with subtests of divergent thinking; the second premise states that closer relations appear when interceding variables (e.g. intelligence, cognitive style) are taken into account.
CS
Článek je zaměřen na teoretické souvislosti vztahu imaginativních schopností a tvořivosti. Existence vztahu byla proklamována mnohými autory, avšak empirické studie nepodaly jednoznačné závěry. Přestože narůstá jak počet odborníků věnujících se systematicky této problematice, tak počet výzkumů zaměřených na toto téma, výsledky nepřinášejí očekávané ucelení informací a získání komplexního přehledu. Práce uvádí výsledky výzkumů, směřujících k zjištění proměnných, které ovlivňují fenomén imaginace i tvořivosti. Věnujeme se tématu jejich vzájemného vztahu a pokoušíme se ve výzkumech mnoha autorů a různých teorií najít pojítka, která by mohla tento vztah zprostředkovat. Diskutujeme i otázku vztahu imaginace a kreativity k aktivitě hemisfér. V článku poukazujeme na skutečnost, že v empirickém výzkumu byla přijata dvě stanoviska. První z nich se soustředí na individuální odlišnosti, zaměřuje se na hypotetický vztah mezi výpovědí probanda o mentální imaginaci a měřením divergentního myšlení. Tento přístup má dlouhou historii a ve výzkumu převažuje. Druhý přístup se zaměřuje na proces generování představ a snaží se během tohoto procesu zachytit tvořivý impuls. Analýzy měření jsou tedy založeny v první řadě na předpokladu, že individuální odlišnosti v úrovni mentální imaginace, zjišťované metodou výpovědi probanda o představivosti (self-reported mental imagery), korelují se subtesty divergentního myšlení, a druhým předpokladem je, že těsnější vztah se projeví, vezmeme-li v úvahu intervenující proměnné (inteligenci, kognitivní styl aj.).
EN
The article presents the analysis of the mental images of human desires and their verbalization techniques involved in Bertrand Russell's Nobel lecture delivered in 1950. Human desires are non-material mental constructs that are not clearly dened in the dictionaries, their verbalization being complicated by the issues related to rationality, psychology of thinking, objectivity, and the variability of individual behavioral reactions. The results of the research suggest that the verbalization of desires is essentially complicated by social and cultural stereotypes. It has been noted that storytelling can be applied as one of the most eective techniques to create the required mental imagery of desires in the recipient's mind. B. Russell's unique manner of dening such politically important desires as acquisitiveness, vanity, glory, love of power, excitement is carefully analyzed. The use of gurative language as well as conceptual and stylistic metaphors that facilitate the process of shaping mental images of desires have also been the focus of my attention. Special consideration has been given to the analysis of the verbalization means of the politically important desires.
EN
The paper focuses on the Argentine picture book for children by Amalia Boselli and Vero Gatti titled Los indomables pensamientos del Señor O from 2013. It is suggested to analyze the text with respect to Rousseau’s philosophical reflections on time and dreaming as seen by Poulet, and on the basis of the future orientation paradigm and the concept of daydreaming studied from the psychological perspective. The research revolves around the relationship between the main character’s mental imagery and his perception of the future, with regards to actions he undertakes. Over time, Mr. O’s thinking process becomes dominated by the anticipatory imagination which deprives him of boundless creativity experienced in childhood. Eventually the protagonist’s journey ends with the triumph of creative imagination. It is through numerous references to the emotionality and sensuality - present at both verbal and visual levels - that the text by Boselli and Gatti intensifies a singular reading experience. Thus, despite several simplifications and generalizations, it opens up to the individualized (child and adult) reader response.
PL
Praca poświęcona jest analizie argentyńskiej książki obrazkowej dla dzieci Amalii Boselli i Vero Gatti pt. „Los indomables pensamientos del Señor O„ („Nieposkromione myśli Pana O”) z 2013 roku. Proponuje się odczytanie historii tytułowego bohatera w odniesieniu do refleksji filozoficznych Rousseau na temat czasu i marzenia w interpretacji Pouleta, a także w oparciu o paradygmat orientacji temporalnej i wizję marzenia dziennego z perspektywy psychologicznej. Artykuł bada związek między obrazami mentalnymi głównego bohatera a jego postrzeganiem przyszłości i podejmowanymi działaniami. W miarę upływu czasu w procesie myślenia Pana O dominować zaczyna wyobraźnia antycypacyjna, przesłaniająca mu potencję nieograniczonej kreatywności z czasów dzieciństwa. Celem podróży postaci jest zwycięstwo wyobraźni twórczej. To poprzez liczne odwołania do emocjonalności i zmysłowości – zarówno w warstwie werbalnej jak i wizualnej – tekst Boselli i Gatti intensyfikuje towarzyszące każdej lekturze sensualne czytelniczego doświadczenie. Tym samym, pomimo obecnych w opowieści uproszczeń i generalizacji, otwiera się na zindywidualizowany odbiór, dziecięcy czy dorosły.
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