Search results - CEJSH

1

Review: "What is it Like to be Conscious? Analytical Theories of Mind and the Problem of Consciousness," by Jozef Bremer

100%

Janusz R.

Forum Philosophicum

|

2006

|

vol. 11

288-289

XX

The article reviews the book Jak to jest być świadomym? Analityczne teorie umysłu a problem świadomości [What is it Like to be Conscious? Analytical Theories of Mind and the Problem of Consciousness], by Józef Bremer.

2

Duše a mysl aneb cesta tam a zase zpátky

100%

Machula T.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2011

|

vol. 59

|

issue 5

645-663

EN

This article compares the pre-Cartesian concept of soul with the concept of mind current in analytical philosophy. The dividing line between these two ways of thinking is Descartes’ philosophy. While in antiquity and medieval times the soul was thought to encompass vital activities, with the mind being treated as the highest part of the soul that is the intellectual part after Descartes a concept of mind became prevalent which combined, in itself, the sensory and reasoning aspects of knowledge. Hylemorphism offers a possible way in which contemporary discourse in analytical philosophy might be enriched (at least for those who are not fundamentally opposed to metaphysics) by a medieval elaboration of the concept of the soul in antiquity.

3

Odmienność zwierzęcej inteligencji

85%

Sarosiek A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

|

2018

|

issue 65

EN

Book review: Recenzja książki: Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2016, ss. 473

PL

Recenzja książki: Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2016, ss. 473; polskie wydanie: Bystre zwierzę: czy jesteśmy dość mądrzy, aby zrozumieć mądrość zwierząt? tłum. Ł. Lamża, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków, 2016, ss. 438.

4

Mimo woli i mimowolnie jako wykładniki relacji umysł-ciało

80%

Żochowska N.

Linguistica Copernicana

|

2014

|

issue 11

87-98

EN

The subject matter of this article is the adverb mimowolnie, which I compare with such expressions as mimo woli and odruchowo. However the aim of the discussion is to establish the semantic difference between these adverbs. In the article, I attempt to justify the hypothesis that the semantic relation between them is similar to the one noticed by A. Wierzbicka, in her work from 1969, where she ephasizes the non-identicaliyu of subjects in such sentences as Adam waży 70kg. and Adam jest dobry. (Wirzbicka 1969: 62, 63). In order to prove the hypothesis proposed, I demonstrate the semantic restrictions imposed by the lexical unit mimowolnie on verbs (e.g. perceptual verbs), and then I try to explain what they stem from. At the end of the article, I put forward the thesis that the adverb mimowolnie contains, in its semantic structure, an explicitly specified object of activity, which is one's own body and that it designates the agent's attitude toward his or her body that is performing the given activity.

5

Mysl a druhý

80%

Karásek J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2009

|

vol. 57

|

issue 1

61-68

EN

The essay emphasises Berkeley’s importance in the context of the history of the problem of other human minds. He raised the question of how “spirits” know each other. His answer begins with observation of the behaviour of the (potential) other human mind. His approach can therefore be seen as an anticipation of the kind of the solution of the problem which is also common in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

6

Linguistic meaning as a part of the conceptual model of the world

80%

Maciejczak M.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

|

2020

|

vol. 56

|

issue S1

147-164

EN

The paper deals with the concept of the model of the word. It concerns a pre-linguistic stage of language acquisition, descriptive content of proper names and interpretation by means of a conceptual system. The model of the world comprises all aspects of being conscious. It is a system, a unity, a background of our conscious life; perception, language, notions, concepts, are its aspects. The more we know about cognitive processes, functions and structure of the mind, the be$er we understand the nature of language; the more we know about language, the better we understand the nature of the mind. Linguistic meaning as it was shown by the studies of language and categories acquisition, has its origin in the aforementioned model. That is why linguistic meanings are not ready-made contents, ideas, semantic entities, etc. but rather systems of procedures that constitute sense of speech acts. The approach to linguistic meaning as a part of an individual conceptual system, a system of information that mirrors cognitive, linguistic and non-verbal experience of an individual, is much of help in understanding efficacy of language, forming of beliefs, convictions, and also introducing new meanings.

7

Cartesian Common Sense?

80%

Glombíček P.

Acta Comeniana (International review of Comenius studies and early modern intellectual history)

|

2010

|

vol. 24

133-141

EN

The paper considers the question of what role the notion of common sense plays in Descartes’ philosophy. What I’d like to draw attention to is not the Aristotelian concept of koiné aisthésis or the sceptical method applied in Meditations, but Descartes’ usage of the concept of good sense (le bon sens or bona mens) as we can find it e.g. at the beginning of Descartes’ first published work, Discourse on the method. The paper presents an overview of occurences of the term in Descartes’ works since the remains of his youthful writing, known under the title Studium bonae mentis to the preface to the French edition of the Principles. The paper states some reasons for interpreting Cartesian mind in the vein of this le bon sens. Distinguishing between mens and anima, we can come to an interpretation of Descartes’ writings on first philosophy more as writings in logical semantics. And in the end possible source of the concept is located in Seneca’s writings.

8

Symbolic Expressions of the Human Cognitive Architecture

80%

Ilario E., Pereira Jr. A., Gonzalez Paixão Jr. V.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2016

|

issue 1

107-120

EN

We briefly review and discuss symbolic expressions of the cognitive architecture of the human mind/brain, focusing on the Quaternion, the Axis Mundi and the Tree of Life, and elaborate on a quaternary diagram that expresses a contemporary worldview. While traditional symbols contain vertical and horizontal dimensions related to transcendence and immanence, respectively, in the contemporary interpretation the vertical axis refers to diachronic processes as biological evolution and cultural history, while the horizontal axis refers to synchronic relations as the interactions of individuals in society. In spite of these differences, we claim that old and new symbols are similar, expressing the cognitive architecture of the human mind/brain in the world of experience.

9

The Daniel Dennett’s New Mind: Darwin, Turing but no Bach

80%

Krzanowski R.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

|

2018

|

issue 64

209-213

EN

Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.

10

Na obranu mysli: odpověď Tomáši Machulovi

80%

Hill J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2012

|

vol. 60

|

issue 4

575-584

EN

This discussion piece responds to the recent criticisms of the analytical concept of mind offered by Tomáš Machula and questions his recommendation that we return to the Thomist concept of the rational soul. In particular, it is argued that Machula overlooks the central role of consciousness both in his criticisms of Descartes’ concept of the mind and of recent analytical philosophy of mind. In addition, it is argued that Machula ignores the work of dual-attribute theorists in his mapping of contemporary theories of mind, and that his critique of physicalism, while it may be effective against identity theory, fails to properly address functionalism, the most popular form of physicalism since the 1960s. It is also argued that the Thomist rational soul – no less than the Cartesian mental substance – creates serious difficulties for an account of human evolution. In this latter context doubt is raised about Machula’s claim that the Thomist concept of soul can be understood and appreciated independently of the theological framework in which it was developed.

CS

Tento diskusní příspěvek odpovídá na nedávné kritiky analytického pojmu mysli nabídnuté Tomášem Machulou a zpochybňuje jeho doporučení, abychom se vrátili k tomistickému pojetí racionální duše. Autor se snaží ukázat, že Machula ve svých kritikách jak Descartova pojmu mysli, tak současné analytické filosofie mysli přehlíží ústřední roli vědomí. Dále upozorňuje, že Machula při svém mapování současných teorií mysli opomíjí přístup teoretiků duálního atributu a že jeho kritice fyzikalismu, jakkoli může být účinně uplatňována proti teorii identity, se nedaří vyrovnat se s funkcionalismem, který je od 60. let 20. století nejrozšířenější formou fyzikalismu. Autor se také pokouší ukázat, že pojetí tomistické racionální duše – o nic méně než pojem karteziánské myslící substance – s sebou přináší závažné obtíže z hlediska vysvětlení lidské evoluce. V této souvislosti autor zpochybňuje Machulovo tvrzení, že tomistický pojem duše může být pochopen a oceněn nezávisle na teologickém rámci, ve kterém vznikl.

11

Signiﬁcatum propositionis i dojście do wniosku u Grzegorza z Rimini

80%

Głowala M.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

|

2006

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1

101-114

EN

The paper focuses on the discussion of significata propositionum, the proper semantic correlates of sentences, as the alleged objects of mental act of arriving to a conclusion, as developed in Gregory of Rimini’s Prologue to his commentary to the Sentences. After a brief account of arriving to a conclusion presented by Gregory as some kind of mental act, I present his arguments for the thesis that neither the actual thing the conclusion is about, nor the actually formulated conclusion itself as some actuality in the mind, are direct objects of that mental act (I). Then I present Gregory's account of what kind of entities are the significata propositionum: that no kind of actuality (neither in thought, nor in extramental reality) can be ascribed to them, and so they have to considered as entities in some special sense (II). In (III) I show that: (1) this sense needs further elucidation; (2) it is possible to demonstrate the way this sense is connected with the actuality in mind and actuality of a thing the conclusion is about; and (3) the activity of arriving to a conclusion needs to be investigated. A possible line of investigation is demonstrated by showing why Gregory’s arguments in (I) are invalid.

12

Brain, mind and education – we have found the way, whether we are wandering along the wilderness?

80%

Pawlak B.

Człowiek - Niepełnosprawność - Społeczeństwo

|

2020

|

vol. 48(2)

59-68

EN

In recentyears, we have witnessed an intensive development of many New areas of research and scientific research, to chich undoubtedly belong those referred to as neuroscience, thatis, focusing on the study of the human brain and nervous system. In my speech I would like to review opinions on possibile attempts to relate brain research results to school conditions as well as teaching and learning concepts. The following concepts will be analyzed: neurodidactics, neuropedagogy and neuroeducation. I will also present my proposition of under standing neuroeducation as anactivity focused on: 1) development of cognitive processes of learners and awareness of the existence of these processes; 2) education of learning process management, 3) getting to know and better understanding of the learning process through the prism of functioning: brain, mind and education. Neuroeducation understood in this way is, in my opinion, a chance for a new perspective of in sight into learning processes and, in the longer term, teaching. It can therefore be addressed to pupils and students, but also to teachers. The direction of neuroeducation thought outlined in the article, in my opinion, fits in with the thinking about constructivist variation, objectivist today (according to Dorota Klus-Stańska) paradigm of neurodidactics.

13

The Role of Memory in Penal Sciences

80%

Romanowska A.

Jednak Książki. Gdańskie Czasopismo Humanistyczne

|

2021

|

issue 13

99-105

EN

The ancient Greeks believed that memory was a gift from the beautiful goddess Mnemosine, daughter of Uranus and Gaia, belonging to the first generation of titans and a titanide. Nowadays memory is understood and defined in many different ways, sucha as multi-stage process consisting of the ability to register and recall data information. Memory processes are undoubtedly very closely related to emotions. They differ depending on the duration of the memory trace, as well as the type of information and the degree to which we are consciously involved in the process of remembering and recreating information. The aim of this paper is to show the importance of human’s memory in penal science. Memory allows to recreate a so- -called memory portrait with the help of a qualified police cartoonist or a computer program, the perpetrator of which the witness or the aggrieved person saw only for seconds. Such portraits are published through various means of communication, such as the press, the Internet, and television. They often cause the quick identification and apprehension of the perpetrator.

14

Opowieści niesamowite ze świata kruków

71%

Sarosiek A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

|

2018

|

issue 65

EN

Book review: Bernd Heinrich, Umysł kruka. Badania i przygody w świecie wilczych ptaków, tł. Michał Szczubiałka, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec, 2018, ss. 504.

PL

Recenzja książki: Bernd Heinrich, Umysł kruka. Badania i przygody w świecie wilczych ptaków, tł. Michał Szczubiałka, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec, 2018, ss. 504.

15

Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge

70%

Stokes D.

Avant

|

2019

|

vol. 10

|

issue 2

EN

One distinct interest in self-knowledge is an interest in whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one’s veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given the robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: “Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?” After critical analysis of the application of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne [2010], following Evans [1982]) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive sensory-access account of Carruthers [2011]). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind.

16

What Is Thinking with Images?

70%

Kozak P., Bielecka K., Matyja J.

Avant

|

2019

|

vol. 10

|

issue 2

EN

When one calculates whether a table will fit into the space between a wall and a cupboard, it is likely that a calculation of this sort will be carried out by forming a mental image of the table, the wall, and the cupboard. If I think about my beloved, it is quite plausible that I will bring up a mental image of the one I love. […]

17

Problem umysł-ciało-ciało

70%

Thompson E., Hanna R.

Avant

|

2012

|

vol. 3

|

issue T

14-37

EN

Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson offer a solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem. The solution, in a nutshell, is that the living and lived body (Leib) is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one’s consciousness, on the one hand, and one’s corporeal being (Körper), on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one’s lived body. One’s living and lived body can be equated with one’s being as an animal; therefore, this solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem amounts to an “animalist” version of the dual aspect theory.

18

A Universal Theory of Wisdom. A Mind-Oriented Approach

70%

Krawczyk H., Targowski A.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2020

|

issue 1

191-207

EN

The purpose of the paper is to synthesize the issues of human wisdom in terms of minds which create knowledge-based judgment. We form a transdisciplinary, bigpicture view of the wisdom of humans. Findings: Wisdom is the right judgment and choice in the context of the art of living. Practical implications: Wisdom can be developed within the set of minds. Social implications: To pursue wisdom in thinking and action, one must extend education to embrace more knowledge and practicing gaining better skills in decision-making. Originality: This approach offers a new understanding of the wisdom of humans, which cannot be identified as a synonym of knowledge.

19

The Problematic Nature of Gödel’s Disjunctions and Lucas-Penrose’s Theses

70%

Avron A.

Studia Semiotyczne

|

2020

|

vol. 34

|

issue 1

EN

We show that the name “Lucas-Penrose thesis” encompasses several different theses. All these theses refer to extremely vague concepts, and so are either practically meaningless, or obviously false. The arguments for the various theses, in turn, are based on confusions with regard to the meaning(s) of these vague notions, and on unjustified hidden assumptions concerning them. All these observations are true also for all interesting versions of the much weaker (and by far more widely accepted) thesis known as “Gö- del disjunction”. Our main conclusions are that pure mathematical theorems cannot decide alone any question which is not purely mathematical, and that an argument that cannot be fully formalized cannot be taken as a mathematical proof.

20

Meeting on Neutral Ground. A Reflection on Man-Machine Contests

70%

Visser A.

Studia Semiotyczne

|

2020

|

vol. 34

|

issue 1

EN

We argue that thinking of the man-machine comparison in terms of a contest involves, in a reasonable scenario, a criterion of success that is neutral. This is because we want to avoid a petitio principii. We submit, however, that, by looking at things this way, one makes the most essential human things invisible. Thus, in a sense, the contest approach is self-defeating.

Refine search results