Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  modern warfare
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
For the purposes of this article it has been assumed that the army should not become an autonomous constituent of the state’s structure, since this would pose a threat of taking over a dominant position by this specific formation. The aim of the article is to analyze the modification of the reasons for the outbreak of war, and the means of conducting it. The ongoing changes in the security environment, both in national and worldwide scale, as well as the proceeding national interests of our country imply increasingly advanced tasks for the army and considerably extend their range. The process of transformation in the Polish army is being continued. Further changes are targeted at increasing operational capability in order to enable efficient accomplishment of domestic tasks and performing missions outside its borders. In the contemporary international reality there is a prevailing conviction, that the threat of the outbreak of a global-scale war is rather unlikely. However, other jeopardies and risks have recently come to the fore.
EN
The end of the twentieth century wars initiated a paradigm shift. Conflicts that emerged at the end of the last century and developed in the early 21st century revealed new aspects of the armed struggle. The classic perception of war has been blurred. In place of the bipolar symmetry appeared asymmetric threats. The former state monopoly on the use of force was lost. Some new members of armed conflict appeared, traditional battlefield setting disappeared and progressive imbalance between the parties for the disposition of potential violence leads to inequality and instability in the world. Asymmetry became a main factor in determining the image of modern warfare.
EN
The intention of this paper is to clarify how state patrons control non-state proxy forces fighting on their behalf. In order to address the subject matter thoroughly, specific attention was paid to a number of questions including a) the criteria determining patronproxy relations, b) factors influencing the selection process of proxy forces, and c) principles governing the maximisation of potential benefits of using proxies, whilst simultaneously reducing risks and associated costs. The author applied a neo-realistic research paradigm to his work. Patron-proxy relations were presented in the context of the principal-agent theory, as well as through detailed analysis of ongoing scenarios involving Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and the Donbass separatists, Pakistan and Kashmiri militias, the US and Syrian rebels. The essence of war by proxy is to influence the strategic result of an armed conflict without direct, full-scale, military intervention. The use of non-state proxy, external actors is aimed at maximising their political goals and strategic interests whilst maintaining “plausible deniability”. By supporting non-state proxies, indirectly or by providing limited direct assistance, sponsors operate below the threshold of war. Empirical analysis of proxy war cases proves that such models may both guarantee “strategic victory” or become a “double-edged sword”. One of the key challenges for external powers engaged in war by proxy is to avoid unintended consequences (blowback). The author argues that elements such as ideology, ethnicity or religion do not necessarily ensure control over proxies, whilst the range of common goals and interests, and the level of the proxy’s dependency, are crucial.
PL
Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie genezy i głównych założeń rosyjskiej koncepcji wojny nowej generacji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem znaczenia walki informacyjnej, roli sił specjalnych oraz wykorzystania nowoczesnych technologii w działaniach wojennych. Zamiarem autora jest także próba udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytania: czy założenia koncepcji wojny nowej generacji, zwanej na Zachodzie wojną hybrydową, są rzeczywiście założeniami nowatorskimi oraz czy znajdują odzwierciedlenie we współczesnej rosyjskiej praktyce wojskowej. Rosyjska koncepcja wojny nowej generacji – utożsamiana na Zachodzie z wojną hybrydową – jest syntezą rozwiązań znanych w przeszłości, a wyrażonych w myśli wojskowej powstałej w kręgach rosyjskiej białej emigracji i w ZSRR. W tym kontekście nowatorskiego charakteru wojny nowej generacji należy upatrywać jedynie w wykorzystaniu nowoczesnych środków techniki, co przyczyniło się do wzrostu znaczenia walki informacyjnej, sił specjalnych oraz tzw. wojny bezkontaktowej.
EN
The article is aimed at presenting the genesis and main assumptions of the Russian concept of modern warfare, taking into account the significance of information warfare, the role of special forces and the use of modern technologies for warfare activities. 68 J. Darczewska, Rosja zbroi się do „wojny informacyjnej” z Zachodem, „Biuletyn Kwartalny Rządowego Centrum Bezpieczeństwa” 2014, nr 9, s. 3. I. ARTYKUŁY I ROZPRAWY 39 The author also tries to answer the question: is the concept of “modern warfare”, in the West known as the hybrid warfare, a new idea indeed and whether it is really applied in modern Russian military policy. The Russian concept of the modern warfare – in the West identified with the hybrid warfare – is the synthesis of concepts already known in the past, exposed by the military thoughts within the circles of white Russian emigration and in the Soviet Russia. Hence, within the given context, the concept of modern warfare should be seen as the use of modern technology, which itself increased the importance of information warfare, special forces and the so-called no-contact warfare activities.
EN
Nowadays, there are a lot of dangers, not only those related to the military. Particular attention should be paid to the threat of guerrilla activity. Therefore, the aim of this article is to indicate the essence of contemporary guerrilla operations in conflicts, and their methods of operation that allow them to achieve their goals. It was also assumed that the modern crisis response operations, and especially COIN (counterinsurgency) operations, constitute a comprehensive approach to counteracting guerrilla activity.This article uses theoretical methods. Using the analysis and synthesis of materials and studies, the most important conclusions were pointed out. The leading role in prevention insurgency activities lies with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their crisis response operations. In the Strategic Concept NATO 2010 specialists are putting more attention to conducting counterinsurgency operations (COIN). COIN operations are nowadays the most comprehensive tool for combating guerrilla activity, which mainly hits the civilian population. The concepts of using the assumptions of anti-Partisan operations should be implemented on a full scale, including in the armed forces of the Republic of Poland. Particular attention should be paid to the threat of the guerrilla activity in conflicts. These problems are complex and they deal with many aspects (social, economic, cultural, political and many others). Moreover the partisans activities are irregular and they are often targeted at civilians. This article indicates the methods and techniques used by insurgents in the fight against the state / government. Reference has also been made to the activities that inhibit their activity - complex counterinsurgency operations.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.