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Vox Patrum
|
2011
|
vol. 56
147-167
EN
The old age in the ancient culture of Greece and Rome, in contrast to popular opinion, appears not to be held in high esteem by everyone. This observation can be illustrated by a lot of sources in the Greek and Roman literature. The old age has been considered as dif­ficult and troublesome both for persons, whose were afflicted by this age, and for their fam­ily, friends and all attendants. This period of human life has been exposed to illness and the other afflictions – weakness of body and mind, less intense clarity and precision of thought. Consequently, the old people would take active part in the social and political life only in this case, when they were in good health, in good physical and mental condition. Because of this in Greek and Roman literature can be found a lot of lamentations and complaints of the old age. Only Plato and representatives of new stoic school – Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius formulated opposite theories about the old age. According to Stoics’ perceiving of the world and the time and cyclical changes of them, the man’s nature and condition from his birth directs inevitably to his death. The whole world is ruled by God and nothing in it happens without his will. So the good and wise man will accept everything, as well the old age, and all its disadvantages. This acceptance off all that happens will bring man peace of mind and protection against whatever he may suffer. The old age – for a lover of wisdom is an occasion to develop and grow up his moral virtues and to improve his character. This intellectual and ethical process issues from human reason, which is a part of divine reason, pervasive all things in the world and all men. The Stoics warn against a danger of a moral decline and in the old age. This corrup­tion would be caused by direction of man’s attention to the shortness of life instead of the improving his character. The number of years of human life appears not to be important for Stoics. They condemn an aim for long life, if it not connected with an aspiration for wisdom.
EN
This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same opposition. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby rendering the procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of championing a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress.
EN
Essentially, the groundwork for democratic societal development and the fulfilment of man’s humane mission is laid by ethically guided education. Both in Masaryk’s and in Comenius’ thought, humaneness is a concrete expression conceptualised as a relational category. They both perceive its positive aspects, which are in complete contrast to selfish egoism. Their humaneness lacks the background of hate and hostility. Such a conception of humaneness might be construed as conciliation and resignation, yet the opposite is true. Positive humaneness is effective through its activeness, through its endeavour to help someone and make something happen. It is a societal category fostering the ground for new human coexistence, wise thought and competent handling of human affairs.
PL
Some comments on the polemics of Plutarch with Stoics The purpose of this article is to briefly discuss several key anti-stoic arguments presented in Plutarch’s polemical texts - De stoicorum repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis adversus stoicos. The paper argues that the polemic against Stoicism is rather ill-disposed and that the presented arguments, despite their rhetorical power and elegancy in language, show an insufficient understanding of the criticised doctrine.
EN
The article presents one of the components of the intellectual legacy of Polish positivism, a philosophical position which proposed a new attitude towards ethical issues. Its representatives put forward the notion of scientific ethics, reducing moral philosophy to it. They strongly emphasized their critical attitude towards traditional ethics, for which there was no place in the positivist model of science, and proposed a distinction between theoretical and practical ethics. Their project was motivated by an ambition to make ethics into jurisprudence, a discipline whose accuracy would make it similar to other sciences. Their efforts were consistently motivated by the idea of making ethics into an empirical and applied science. This scientific ethics would fulfill the important task of forming a set of moral requirements, which, by referring to moral knowledge (“ethology”), would have a chance of influencing the conduct of individuals and society. The new ethics was expected to contribute to the change in social morality and thus greatly support moral progress, an issue which was hotly debated. All positivists subscribed to the idea of progress, including that of morality; however, some differences can be discerned in how they defined progress. Some defined it in realistic categories, while others focused on optimistic visions of the future. Among the first advocates of scientific ethics and of the idea of moral progress, differences notwithstanding, were Aleksander Świętochowski, Julian Ochorowicz, Feliks Bogacki, Władysław Kozłowski, and Bolesław Prus. The article gives an overview of some of their views.
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