Search results

1

BOOK REVIEW: Peter A. Redpath, The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas: An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics (St. Louis, MO: Enroute, 2017)

100%

Welter B.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2017

|

vol. 6

|

issue 4

633-637

EN

BOOK REVIEW: Peter A. Redpath, The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas: An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics (St. Louis, MO: Enroute, 2017), pp. 795 ISBN: 978-0-9988940-3-4

2

A proposal for a systematic approach to moral philosophy

100%

Caruana C.

Language. Culture. Politics. International Journal

|

2022

|

vol. 1

181-202

EN

This article gives a methodological overview of three standards against which it is possible to examine the worth of moral theories and to test their true contribution to ethics. These standards or benchmarks are requirements pertaining to metaethics, moral psychology and practical reason. The proposal is that it is only when a theory answers questions raised by these three areas of inquiry together that such a theory can be said to be a substantive theory of morality. While defending the importance of each area I also provide examples on the way to highlight such areas of relevance.

3

Schoolchildren's Games - Purposeless Cooperation, Competition, Bullying?

100%

Klusák M.

Journal of Pedagogy

|

2010

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1

49-63

4

A Response to Brian Welter’s Review of Peter Redpath’s The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas: An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics

88%

Peláez M.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2018

|

vol. 7

|

issue 2

373-389

EN

The main purpose of this response is twofold, to: (1) acknowl-edge and elaborate on aspects of Welter’s review that highlight key points in Redpath’s book, and (2) make some precisions and amplifica-tions so that both authors can be better appreciated for what they offer in their works to contemporary readers.

5

Intuitive Learning in Moral Awareness. Cognitive-Affective Processes in Mencius’ Innatist Theory

88%

Sertdemir İ.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

|

2022

|

vol. 13

|

issue 25

235-254

EN

Mencius, referred to as second sage in Chinese philosophy history, grounds his theory about original goodness of human nature on psychological components by bringing in something new down ancient ages. Including the principles of virtuous action associated with Confucius to his doctrine, but by composing them along psychosocial development, he theorizes utterly out of the ordinary that makes all the difference to the school. In his argument stated a positive opinion, he explains the method of forming individuals’ moral awareness by means of inseparable integrity of feelings and thoughts, saying human being are born innately good. According to Mencius, heart-mind correlation is the motivational complement of inner incentives. Knowledge and virtue, which are extensions of inborn goodness, comprehended intuitively; then affective motives respond to circumstance, what is learned transmits to cognitive process and eventually behavior emerges. Comparing during the years of Warring State period he lived, in western geography Aristotle, who is one of the pioneers of Greek philosophy, argues deductive and inductive methods in mental activity. On the other hand, Mencius uses analogical reasoning throughout his self-titled work. This essay is an attempt to assert that most postulates of developmental theories, which have been considered an integral part of modern psychology, begin with Mencius in early era. Secondly, this study also aims to discuss the main paradigm of Mencius across emotivist-rationalist opposition, which keeps emotion above thought as well as reason above emotion.

6

Rola psychologii w ekonomicznej teorii zachowań ludzkich Gary’ego S. Beckera

88%

Fjałkowski K.

Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu

|

2013

|

issue 4 (25)

54-63

XX

The paper presents an interpretation of G.S. Becker’s “economic approach to human behavior” with regard to relations of this standpoint in economic methodology with psychology. The aim of the paper is to properly identify the role that psychology plays both in works of Becker himself, and in the “economic approach”. Ties of psychology with the “economic approach” are subject to the analysis in the following aspects: Becker’s declarations, practice of his work, as well as in the context of methodological sources of inspiration of the “economic approach”, with the potential of its enhancement towards a more consistent use of findings of psychology. Beckerian methodology is presented in such a way, so as to highlight its historic and methodological roots and inspirations. It is considered as an uncompromised application of situational explanation, Popperian rationality principle, Robbins’ analytical definition of economic science, as well as Freidman’s view about the irrelevance of “realism” of economic model assumptions. The paper indicates that despite inspiration with Bentham’s psychology, the “economic approach to human behavior” fits into anti-psychologist paradigm in economic methodology. In accordance with methodological standpoints of Popper, Robbins and Friedman, Becker replaces “realistic” descriptions of human psyche with axiomatic, “unrealistic” assumptions of maximization and rationality. However, psychological knowledge is very relevant for Becker’s theory because it constitutes an important condition for accurate construction of individual utility functions. Therefore, by the utilization of a question from moral psychology, the paper presents the possibility of the ”economic approach” more deeply rooted in Bentham’s ideas, with potential benefits for explaining human behavior. As indicated by D.C. North, neoclassical economics poses a problem: Why do people comply with social institutions and keep promises under conditions, in which maximizing individual utility would suggest otherwise? A solution to this problem might be assuming the existence of a Beckerian commodity, that could be named moral self-satisfaction. This reasoning may run into criticism related generally to the elaborated methodological concept, with particular role of the “adhocery” accusation of Mark Balug. However, the concept of pleasures and pains bound with moral beliefs is rooted in our psychological, and even biological, knowledge about man, his needs and mind. The approach this paper proposes may be helpful in accomplishing a number of goals. First, the ancient forerunner of the “economic approach” Jeremy Bentham tried to create a comprehensive list of kinds of pleasures and pains. Such a list is increasingly more likely to be created in contemporary times, due to developments in psychology, unknown to Bentham. Secondly, developments in psychology may offer both inspiration and empirical support for particular commodities assumed in Beckerian utility functions,

7

Thinkering through Experiments: Nurturing Transdisciplinary Approaches to the Design of Testing Tools

75%

Francis K. B., Haines A., Briazu R. A.

Avant

|

2017

|

issue 8

EN

In order to assess and understand human behavior, traditional approaches to experimental design incorporate testing tools that are often artificial and devoid of corporeal features. Whilst these offer experimental control in situations in which, methodologically, real behaviors cannot be examined, there is increasing evidence that responses given in these contextually deprived experiments fail to trigger genuine responses. This may result from a lack of consideration regarding the material makeup and associations connected with the fabric of experimental tools. In a twoyear collaboration, we began to experiment with the physicality of testing tools using the domain of moral psychology as a case study. This collaboration involved thinkering and prototyping methods that included direct contact and consideration of the materials involved in experimentation. Having explored the embodied nature of morality, we combined approaches from experimental psychology, moral philosophy, design thinking, and computer science to create a new testing tool for simulated moral behavior. Although the testing tool itself generated fruitful results, this paper considers the collaborative methodology through which it was produced as a route to highlight material questions within psychological research.

8

The Hidden God. Achilles, Aquinas, and Moral Action in an Ordered World

75%

Fitzpatrick D.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2017

|

vol. 6

|

issue 2

197-220

EN

The central goals of this essay are three: (1) to situate St. Thomas’s moral psychology within his cosmology, with special emphasis on the notion of virtual quantity; (2) to illuminate and confirm that moral psychology through an examination of Achilles as Homer present him in the Iliad; (3) to suggest that if St. Thomas’s picture of the psychological landscape can be validated by reference to Homer, then so, too, might his metaphysical portraiture bear more credence than it is typically awarded. Particular attention will be given to Achilles’ anger and the psychological distinctions by which St. Thomas makes such anger and its attendant acts intelligible.

9

Judgment of the morality of an individual responsible for a fatal workplace accident involving subordinates

75%

Paruzel-Czachura M., Dobrowolska M.

Medycyna Pracy

|

2018

|

vol. 69

|

issue 3

261-267

EN

Background The aim of the study was to verify the hypothesis that additional information about the perpetrator responsible for the death of subordinates at the workplace may influence the assessment of morality. The article contains the results of an empirical study conducted among young adult working Silesians (N = 262), who were asked to evaluate the morality of the person responsible for the decision, in line with which miners had started working on 6th October 2014. On that day miners died following an explosion in the “Mysłowice-Wesoła” methane mine in the Polish Silesia region. Material and Methods The study explored the stories’ method (from the moral psychology domain) as well as a short questionnaire. The respondents received information about the behavior of the perpetrator as well as emotions (socially desirable and undesirable) and (socially desirable and undesirable) views in the form of brief descriptions (stories). They were asked to evaluate the perpetrator’s morality. Results The socially desirable views of the evaluated perpetrator (lack of acceptance for the situation) and the socially desirable emotions (guilt) significantly increased the level of morality according to participants. A single piece of information about the socially desirable emotions didn’t significantly increase the perceived level of perpetrator’s morality; neither did a single piece of information about socially desirable views. Conclusions Results indicate the important role of additional information about emotions and views of the perpetrator in the process of assessing morality. It is worthwhile to implement the practical implications of this study in similar crisis situations at the workplace. Med Pr 2018;69(3):261–267

10

Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy

75%

Klenk M.

Diametros

|

2020

|

vol. 17

|

issue 64

36-55

EN

Empirical moral psychology is sometimes dismissed as normatively insignificant because it plays no decisive role in settling ethical disputes. But that conclusion, even if it is valid for normative ethics, does not extend to bioethics. First, in contrast to normative ethics, bioethics can legitimately proceed from a presupposed moral framework. Within that framework, moral psychology can be shown to play four significant roles: it can improve bioethicists’ understanding of (1) the decision situation, (2) the origin and legitimacy of their moral concepts, (3) efficient options for implementing (legitimate) decisions, and (4) how to change and improve some parts of their moral framework. Second, metaethical considerations suggest that moral psychology may lead to the radical revision of entire moral frameworks and thus prompt the radical revision of entire moral frameworks in bioethics. However, I show that bioethics must either relinquish these radical implications of moral psychology and accept that there are limits to progress in bioethics based on moral psychology or establish an epistemic framework that guides radical revision.

11

Thinkering through Experiments: Nurturing Transdisciplinary Approaches to the Design of Testing Tools

75%

Francis K. B., Haines A., Briazu R. A.

Avant

|

2017

|

vol. 8

EN

In order to assess and understand human behavior, traditional approaches to experimental design incorporate testing tools that are often artificial and devoid of corporeal features. Whilst these offer experimental control in situations in which, methodologically, real behaviors cannot be examined, there is increasing evidence that responses given in these contextually deprived experiments fail to trigger genuine responses. This may result from a lack of consideration regarding the material makeup and associations connected with the fabric of experimental tools. In a twoyear collaboration, we began to experiment with the physicality of testing tools using the domain of moral psychology as a case study. This collaboration involved thinkering and prototyping methods that included direct contact and consideration of the materials involved in experimentation. Having explored the embodied nature of morality, we combined approaches from experimental psychology, moral philosophy, design thinking, and computer science to create a new testing tool for simulated moral behavior. Although the testing tool itself generated fruitful results, this paper considers the collaborative methodology through which it was produced as a route to highlight material questions within psychological research.

12

The Concept of Brutishness (Thēriotēs) in Aristo¬tle’s Nicomachean Ethics

75%

Marcinkowska-Rosół M.

Roczniki Humanistyczne

|

2018

|

vol. 66

|

issue 3: Filologia klasyczna - Selected Papers in English

81-117

EN

The Polish version of the article was published in “Roczniki Humanistyczne,” vol. 64 (2016), issue 3. The article deals with “brutishness” or “beastliness” (thēriotēs), a concept introduced by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and defined by him as a negative ethical disposition, different both from vice (kakia) and from incontinence (akrasia), and leading to such pathological behaviours as cannibalism, paedophilia, omophagy, phobias and compulsions. Aristotle’s statements concerning brutishness (VII 1, 1145a15–35, VII 5, 1148b15–1149a24 and VII 6, 1149b23–1150a8) are examined and interpreted in order to clarify the following issues: the essence of thēriotēs as a specific ethical disposition (Sections I–II), its concrete forms and their causes (Section III), the moral-psychological condition of persons with a brutish hexis (Section IV), and their self-consciousness and moral responsibility for their brutish acts (Section V).

13

Some Challenges for Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case Study

75%

McFarlane S., Cipolletti Perez H.

Diametros

|

2020

|

vol. 17

|

issue 64

56-71

EN

In this article, we discuss a number of challenges with the empirical study of emotion and its relation to moral judgment. We examine a case study involving the moral foreign-language effect, according to which people show an increased utilitarian response tendency in moral dilemmas when using their non-native language. One important proposed explanation for this effect is that using one’s non-native language reduces emotional arousal, and that reduced emotion is responsible for this tendency. We offer reasons to think that there is insufficient evidence for accepting this explanation at present. We argue that there are three themes that constrain our current ability to draw firm empirical conclusions: 1) the frequent use of proxies or partial measures for emotions, 2) the lack of a predictive and generalizable theory of emotion and specific emotion-types, and 3) the obscurity of a baseline level of neutrality with respect to participant emotion. These lessons apply not only to research on the moral foreign-language effect, but to empirical research in moral psychology more generally.

14

The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology

63%

Żuradzki T.

Diametros

|

2020

|

vol. 17

|

issue 64

1-5

EN

Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation and processing of moral judgments by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical significance, and brain imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical findings of the ways we make moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. The aim of this special issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw any normative conclusions by discovering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments.

15

Aristotelian Moral Psychology and the Situationist Challenge

63%

Croom A. M.

Polish Psychological Bulletin

|

2015

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vol. 46

|

issue 2

262-277

EN

For some time now moral psychologists and philosophers have ganged up on Aristotelians, arguing that results from psychological studies on the role of character-based and situation-based influences on human behavior have convincingly shown that situations rather than personal characteristics determine human behavior. In the literature on moral psychology and philosophy this challenge is commonly called the “situationist challenge,” and as Prinz (2009) has previously explained, it has largely been based on results from four salient studies in social psychology, including the studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Milgram (1963), Isen and Levin (1972), and Darley and Batson (1973). The situationist challenge maintains that each of these studies seriously challenges the plausibility of virtuous personal characteristics by challenging the plausibility of personal characteristics more generally. In this article I undermine the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology by carefully considering major problems with the conclusions that situationists have drawn from the empirical data, and by further challenging the accuracy of their characterization of the Aristotelian view. In fact I show that when properly understood the Aristotelian view is not only consistent with empirical data from developmental science but can also offer important insights for integrating moral psychology with its biological roots in our natural and social life.

16

Tomasz z Akwinu o radości ze zła, które przytrafia się innym

63%

Płotka M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2023

|

vol. 71

|

issue 1

231-246

EN

The article presents Thomas Aquinas’ concept of pleasure in other’s misfortune (Schadenfreude), i.e. specific joy, the source of which is the suffering of other people. The first part describes the ancient Schadenfreude sources that inspired Aquinas. The second part deals with the concept of hatred that underlies the concept of Schadenfreude. In the third part, it is presented Aquinas’ attempt to distinguish between various cases of the occurrence of Schadenfreude and an attempt of their moral justification.

PL

Tematem artykułu jest Tomasza z Akwinu koncepcja radości, której źródłem jest cierpienie innych osób (Schadenfreude). Pierwsza część obejmuje opis starożytnych źródeł Schadenfreude, którymi inspirował się Akwinata. Druga część dotyczy koncepcji nienawiści, która stanowi podstawę dla Schadenfreude. W trzeciej zaś części jest przedstawiona Tomaszowa próba rozróżnienia rozmaitych przypadków występowania Schadenfreude oraz ich częściowego moralnego usprawiedliwienia.

17

Koncepcja bestialstwa (thēriotēs) w Etyce Nikomachejskiej Arystotelesa

51%

Marcinkowska-Rosół M.

Roczniki Humanistyczne

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 3: Filologia klasyczna

53-88

PL

Artykuł poświęcony jest pojęciu bestialstwa (thēriotēs), wprowadzonemu przez Arystotelesa w VII księdze Etyki nikomachejskiej i zdefiniowanemu przez niego jako negatywna, różna zarówno od nikczemności (kakia) jak i od nieopanowania (akrasia) dyspozycja etyczna, prowadząca do patologicznych zachowań takich jak kanibalizm, pedofilia, omofagia, fobie i kompulsje. W tekście zostaje podjęta próba interpretacji wypowiedzi Arystotelesa dotyczących bestialstwa (EN VII 1, 1145a15-35; VII 5, 1148b15-1149a24; VII 6, 1149b23-1150a8) w celu rozjaśnienia szeregu istotnych dla rozumienia tej koncepcji kwestii, takich jak: istota bestialstwa jako specyficznej dyspozycji etycznej (cz. I-II), jej konkretne postaci oraz ich geneza (cz. III), psychologiczno-moralna kondycja osób dotkniętych bestialską dyspozycją (cz. IV) oraz problem świadomości i odpowiedzialności moralnej tychże osób (cz. V).

EN

The article deals with the „brutishness” or „beastliness” (thēriotēs), a concept introduced by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and defined by him as a negative ethical disposition, different both from vice (kakia) and from incontinence (akrasia), and leading to such pathological behaviours as canibalism, paedophilia, omophagia, phobias and compulsions. Aristotle’s statements concerning the brutishness (VII 1, 1145a15-35, VII 5, 1148b15-1149a24 and VII 6, 1149b23-1150a8) are examined and interpreted in order to clarify the following issues: the essence of the thēriotēs as a specific ethical disposition (Part I-II), its concrete forms and their causes (Part III), the moral-psychological condition of persons with a brutish hexis (Part IV), and their self-consciousness and moral responsibility for their bestial acts (Part V).

18

How to Reverse the Widespread Global Disorder That Nonsensical Principles of Utopian Socialism/Marxism Are Currently Causing

51%

Redpath P. A.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2021

|

vol. 10

|

issue 2

353-384

EN

This article considers the nature of Marxism as a species of Enlightenment Utopian Socialism, the relation of both these to a denial of nature of common sense properly understood. It argues that underlying all species of Enlightenment Utopian Socialism are psychological principles that deny the reality of evidently known first principles of understanding that are measures of truth in all forms of psychologically healthy human knowing and reasoning. In addition, it maintains that, as a result of these essentially anarchic psychological first principles inherent in its nature, any attempt to apply any species of Utopian Socialism to develop healthy social organizations and cultural institutions—such as forms of human communication and educational and political instittions—is doomed to fail. Utopian Socialism will always destroy common sense in whatever it infects with its disordered habits of understanding and reasoning.

19

O strukturze intuicji normatywnych: uniwersalna gramatyka moralna

51%

Próchnicki M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2017

|

vol. 1(14)

102-114

PL

Celem artykułu jest krytyczne scharakteryzowanie nowego, interdyscyplinarnego nurtu badań nad moralnością, określanego jako uniwersalna gramatyka moralna, oraz przedstawienie jego znaczenia dla nauk prawnych. Przedstawiciele tego programu badawczego, tacy jak John Mikhail i Marc Hauser powołują się na uczynioną przez Johna Rawlsa analogię lingwistyczną, tj. porównanie moralności do języka oraz propozycję badania jej w sposób podobny do paradygmatu językoznawstwa generatywnego Noama Chomsky’ego. Zdaniem gramatyków moralnych moralność, podobnie jak język, osadza się na wrodzonych, uniwersalnych kompetencjach poznawczych, wspólnych wszystkim ludziom. Pewne świadectwa na rzecz tej tezy pochodzą z rozmaitych dyscyplin naukowych, takich jak psychologia rozwojowa, neurobiologia, antropologia, czy logika, jednak argumenty te są przez krytyków uważane za słabe i niekonkluzywne. W artykule podjęto próbę oceny, na ile trafna i użyteczna może być analogia lingwistyczna, a także wytyczenia jej granic, m. in. poprzez przedstawienie kilku najistotniejszych elementów teorii N. Chomsky’ego i próby ich adaptacji dla systemów norm społecznych, takich jak moralność, czy prawo. Pierwszym argumentem, który zbliżać ma moralność do języka, jest tzw. niedostatek bodźca (poverty of the stimulus), opierający się na założeniu, że klasyczne mechanizmy uczenia się nie wyjaśniają fenomenu nabywania reguł językowych i moralnych. Wśród innych elementów teorii N. Chomsky’ego przetworzonych na potrzeby analizy moralności, odnaleźć można próbę scharakteryzowania moralności jako systemu zasad i parametrów (principles and parameters), podziału na moralność wewnętrzną i zewnętrzną oraz kompetencję i wykonanie, a także założenie, że istnieje wyspecjalizowany moduł umysłowy, odpowiedzialny za jej realizację. Badania prowadzone w obrębie uniwersalnej gramatyki moralnej mogą mieć istotne znaczenie dla nauk prawnych. Po pierwsze, założenia przyjmowane przez ten nurt badawczy można postrzegać jako próbę konstrukcji nowoczesnej, znaturalizowanej teorii prawa natury, która ma oprzeć się na naukach empirycznych. Co więcej, celem badaczy jest jak najpełniejsze scharakteryzowanie takich pojęć, jak np. wina, czyn, zobowiązanie, czy szkoda, i w efekcie próbę ich schematyzacji w ramach rozwiniętej logiki deontycznej, a także ukazanie źródeł intuicji z nimi związanych poprzez badania dotyczące nie tylko ich podłoża biopsychologicznego, ale również antropologię prawa, czy komparatystykę prawniczą.

EN

The aim of the article is to critically characterize the new, interdisciplinary research program on morality: universal moral grammar, and to describe its meaning for jurisprudence. Its proponents, such as John Mikhail and Marc Hauser, refer to John Rawls’ linguistic analogy, i.e. comparison of morality to language and suggestion to study it similarly to Noam Chomsky’s generative linguistics paradigm. According to moral grammarians morality, like language, settles on innate, universal cognitive capacities, common to all people. Some evidence supporting these claim, come from various scientific disciplines, such as developmental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology or logic, but they are criticised as weak and inconclusive. The article tries to assess to what extent the linguistic analogy is accurate and useful, analyzing some of the most important N. Chomsky’s claims and their adaptations to the systems of social norms, such as morality and law. The first argument is so called poverty of the stimulus, assuming that the classic learning mechanisms cannot explain the phenomenon of acquisition of language and morals. Other elements of N. Chomsky’s theories adapted to analyze morality include characterizing morality as a system of principles and parameters, divisions between I-morality/E-morality and competence/performance, and also an assumption that the specialized mental module for it exists. Research conducted in universal moral grammar program may have substantial influence on jurisprudence. Firstly, assumptions made by moral grammarians can be seen as a construction of a modern, naturalized theory of natural law, based on empirical study. Moreover, the goal of the program is to fully describe concepts such as guilt, act, obligation or damage, and as an effect to schematize it as an advanced deontic logic, and also to discover sources of intuitions regarding them not only through research on their biopsychological foundations, but also through legal anthropology and comparative legal studies.

20

Metateoria historii woli. Rozważania o powstaniu i wczesnym rozwoju pojęcia woli od V w p.n.e. do Maksyma Wyznawcy

38%

Bizoń M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue 3

71-51

PL

W tekście omawiam metateoretyczne uwarunkowania dla historii powstania i rozwoju pojęcia wolnej woli. Punktem wyjścia jest zagadnienie pojęcia spekulatywnego. Ponieważ wola jest pojęciem spekulatywnym, nie ma jednoznacznej definicji tego pojęcia. Dlatego też utrudnione jest badanie jego historii, ponieważ autorzy starożytni operowali różnymi teoriami chcenia i wolności, które nie zawsze były ze sobą kompatybilne. Następnie omawiam teorie chcenia i działania wybranych autorów, które miały istotny wpływ na późniejszy rozwój pojęcia woli. Rozpatruję pojęcie wyboru Platona, pojęcia życzenia i wyboru Arystotelesa, pojęcie przyzwolenia stoików, teorię wolności Epikura, teorię wyboru Aleksandra z Afrodyzji, pojęcie woli Augustyna z Hippony i teorię woli Maksyma Wyznawcy.

EN

In the text, I discuss the metatheoretical aspects of a history of the origins and development of the notion of free will. I begin with the notion of a speculative concept. Since the will is a speculative concept there is no unequivocal definition of this notion. For this reason the study of the history of this notion is particularly difficult, since ancient authors have operated on different theories of willing and freedom, which were not always mutually compatible. Next, I discuss the theories of willing and action of select authors, that had a significant influence on the later development of the theory of the will. I discuss the notion of choice in Plato, the notions of wish and choice in Aristotle, the notion of assent in the Stoics, the theory of freedom of Epicurus, the theory of choice of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the concept of will in Augustine of Hippo, and the theory of will in Maximus the Confessor.

Refine search results

BOOK REVIEW: Peter A. Redpath, The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas: An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics (St. Louis, MO: Enroute, 2017)

A proposal for a systematic approach to moral philosophy

Schoolchildren's Games - Purposeless Cooperation, Competition, Bullying?

A Response to Brian Welter’s Review of Peter Redpath’s The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas: An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics

Intuitive Learning in Moral Awareness. Cognitive-Affective Processes in Mencius’ Innatist Theory

Rola psychologii w ekonomicznej teorii zachowań ludzkich Gary’ego S. Beckera

Thinkering through Experiments: Nurturing Transdisciplinary Approaches to the Design of Testing Tools

The Hidden God. Achilles, Aquinas, and Moral Action in an Ordered World

Judgment of the morality of an individual responsible for a fatal workplace accident involving subordinates

Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy

Thinkering through Experiments: Nurturing Transdisciplinary Approaches to the Design of Testing Tools

The Concept of Brutishness (Thēriotēs) in Aristo¬tle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Some Challenges for Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case Study

The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology

Aristotelian Moral Psychology and the Situationist Challenge

Tomasz z Akwinu o radości ze zła, które przytrafia się innym

Koncepcja bestialstwa (thēriotēs) w Etyce Nikomachejskiej Arystotelesa

How to Reverse the Widespread Global Disorder That Nonsensical Principles of Utopian Socialism/Marxism Are Currently Causing

O strukturze intuicji normatywnych: uniwersalna gramatyka moralna

Metateoria historii woli. Rozważania o powstaniu i wczesnym rozwoju pojęcia woli od V w p.n.e. do Maksyma Wyznawcy