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Přírodní výběr ad usum filosofů

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This article provides a survey of conceptions which, in contemporary, largely naturalistically-orientated, evolutionary biology, broaden or break free of the so-called modern synthesis (here roughly synonymous with “selectionism”) - that is the stand­point according to which natural selection is by far the most important cause of the evolutionary process. Since the 1960’s a competitor has arisen to selectionism in the shape of the so-called “neutral theory” of evolution, according to which many genetic mutations are adaptively neutral and appear in the genome with frequencies that should be put down to chance (genetic drift) rather than to selection. The main stream of evolutionary biology today is coming to a certain compromise between these two approaches: it tends to allow neutralism at the level of molecular evolution, but to recognise the action of selection on mutations evinced at the level of the phenotype. The possibility of the sequencing of whole genomes has opened up the area of comparative genomics which, on one hand, has led to the reinforcement of neutralism especially in multi-celled organisms (Michael Lynch) but, on the other hand, has led to the recognition of the decisive role of the horizontal transfer of genes in microbes in the so-called pre-Darwinian phase of evolution (Carl Woese). This phase is interpreted as mainly non-selective, if not “Lamarckian”, and in each case it certainly entails the demise of the idea of a common ancestor and of evolution by small steps. A further corrective has been the emphasis of the fact that selection draws on material prepared by the duplication of genes or of whole genomes (Susumu Ohno). Beyond any possibility of analytical elaboration in population genetics there still remains the conception of so-called regulatory evolution (S. Carroll, E. Davidson) which, at a certain point, even results in the denial of the possibility of evolution by small steps. A particularly new standpoint, often put forward in direct contradiction to the current mainstream of evolutionary biology, presents a conception which is bound to the formal theory of dynamic systems and methodologically to the mathematical modelling of regulatory networks. It most frequently goes by the name of self-organisation or emergentism. Without denying the important role of selection, it puts constraints on it by pointing to the inner-organisational principles of living beings which, however, ultimately arise from basic physical laws. The principles of self-organisation indicate one path by which greater complexity of organisms and their components may be achieved in evolution. - Selectionism is confronted not only by the pressure of these unorthodox evolutionary approaches, but also by several unanswered internal questions emphasised by professional evolutionists themselves (among them Lewontin and Gould). A heavy penalty has been paid for the constitution of the theoretical basis of evolutionary biology – population genetics, namely the splitting of the individual organism into a genotype and a phenotype and the subsequent atomisation of both into isolated genes and their alleles on the one hand, and the isolated characteristics of the phenotype on the other. From that point of departure - according to the system-oriented authors - the evolutionary emergence of organic mega-complexity as such is rendered an insoluble problem (let alone the emergence of organic proto-subjectivity which, however, is beyond the scope of this survey). Not even long-term evolutionary trends are satisfactorily explained, according to the opinion of many authors. Selectionism is criticised for its facile appeal to “evolutionary just-so stories” which elude all possibility of verification. Overall, (naturalistic) evolutionary biology today recognises three principle evolutionary “mechanisms”: selection, genetic drift and self-organisation. This science is, however, in a state of rapid development and unexpected “emergences” in its own future progress cannot be ruled out - on the contrary. It would be very unwise for philosophers, who thematically draw on an evolutionary-biological base, to put all their faith in natural selection as the single decisive force in organic evolution - that would be to ignore the range and importance of the changes which evolutionary biology has undergone in the last decades.
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Článek podává přehled koncepcí, které v současné, převážně naturalisticky orientované, evoluční biologii rozšiřují či překračují tzv. moderní syntézu (v článku přibližně synonymní k „selekcionismu“), tj. hledisko, podle něhož je přírodní výběr zdaleka nejdůležitější příčinou evolučního procesu. Od 60. let 20. století vyvstal selekcionismu konkurent v tzv. neutrální teorii evoluce, podle níž jsou mnohé genetické mutace adaptivně neutrální a vystupují v genomu s frekvencemi, které jsou způsobovány spíš náhodou (genetickým posunem) než selekcí. Dnešní hlavní proud evoluční biologie směřuje k jistému kompromisu mezi těmito dvěma směry a odkazuje neutralismus na úroveň molekulárně genetickou a působení selekce na mutace, které se projeví na úrovni fenotypu. Možnost sekvenace celých genomů otevřela oblast srovnávací genomiky, která na jedné straně vedla k posílení neutralismu, zvláště u mnohobuněčných organismů (Michael Lynch), na druhé straně však i k poznání rozhodující úlohy horizontálního přenosu genů u mikrobů v tzv. předdarwinovské fázi evoluce (Carl Woese). Tato fáze je vykládána jako převážně neselekční, ne-li „lamarckistická“ a v každém případě znamená konec představy společného předka a evoluce po malých krocích. Další korigující směr zdůrazňuje, že selekce navazuje až na materiál připravený zdvojováním genů nebo celých genomů (Susumu Ohno). Mimo možnosti analytického zpracování v populační genetice zatím zůstává koncepce tzv. regulační evoluce (S. Carroll, E. Davidson), která v určitém bodě vyúsťuje až k popření možnosti evoluce drobnými kroky. Výrazně nové hledisko, často stavěné přímo do protikladu k dosavadnímu hlavnímu proudu evoluční biologie, představuje koncepce, která je vázána na formální teorii dynamických systémů a metodologicky na matematické modelování regulačních sítí, vystupující nejčastěji pod titulem teorie sebeorganizace nebo emergentismus. Aniž by se popírala důležitá úloha selekce, vyhrazují se jí meze (constraints) dané vnitřními organizačními principy živých bytostí, které však koneckonců pramení ze základních fyzikálních zákonitostí. Principy sebeorganizace naznačují jednu z cest, jak by mohlo v evoluci docházet ke zvyšování komplexnosti organismů a jejich komponent. - Selekcionismus je kromě tlaku těchto neortodoxních evolučních směrů konfrontován i s řadou vnitřních nezodpovězených otázek, zdůrazňovaných profesionálními evolucionisty samotnými (mezi jinými Lewontinem a Gouldem). Těžkou daní, která byla zaplacena za vznik teoretické páteře evoluční biologie - populační genetiky -, bylo rozštěpení jednotného organismu na genotyp a fenotyp a následná atomizace obou na izolované geny a jejich alely na jedné straně a izolované znaky fenotypu na straně druhé. Vyjdeme‑li z této výchozí pozice, pak se - podle mínění systémově orientovaných autorů - stává evoluční vznik organické mega-komplexnosti jako takové neřešitelným problémem (nemluvě o vzniku organické proto-subjektivity, která však už vybočuje z rámce tohoto přehledu). Ani dlouhodobé evoluční trendy nejsou podle mínění mnohých autorů uspokojivě vysvětleny. Selekcionismu se vytýká snadné vytváření „evolučních vyprávění“ bez možnosti je ověřovat. ouhrnně řečeno - (naturalistická) evoluční biologie dnes uznává tři hlavní evoluční „mechanismy“: selekci, genetický posun a sebeorganizaci. Tato věda je však v prudkém vývoji a překvapivé „emergence“ v ní samé nejsou v budoucnu vůbec vyloučeny, spíš naopak. Rozhodně nelze doporučit filosofům, kteří tematicky vycházejí z evolučně biologické základny, aby všechno vsadili na přírodní výběr jako na jedinou rozhodující sílu organické evoluce; neodpovídalo by to rozsahu a významu změn, které evoluční biologie v posledních desetiletích prodělává.
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Bioethical justification for human improvement. Reflections on the book of John Harris Enhancing evolution: The author discusses the transhumanist perspective on evolution, and considers Harris’ views in a wider context of the ongoing anthropological and ethical debate. While doing so he addresses some of the crucial issues at the interface of modern technologies, medical progress and bioethical challenges.
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Sztuka i dobór naturalny

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The relation between art and the idea of natural selection makes the key issue of this paper. The author examines how Charles Darwin's conc ept of evolution might have affected the sphere of aesthetics. However, the author arguments against understanding of art as a side product of human progress and takes it as an independent form of human agency. The critique of various evolutionary standpoints laid out in this article holds to the standpoint that we cannot recreate with other means the moments of pleasure delivered by art. Thus it is extremely important to understand art as a form of human creativity and a neces sary part of our existence beyond biological determinism stressed out by many evolutionary thinkers.
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Seks jesienny ptaków i jego konsekwencje

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Many bird species of the temperate climatic zone show in autumn behaviors of a clear sexual character – they engage in sexual display similar to the spring one. Males sing, defend territories, form pairs, and attempt copulation. Some species build nests and on very rare occasions lay eggs. Their testosterone level is very low as compared that during the spring display, but it is sufficiently high to elicit the costly sexual behavior. This raises a question why and in to what way this behavior is favored by natural selection. Birds paired in autumn and supporting territory can start breeding earlier in spring and, consequently, they can lay larger clutches, increase nest survival, and raise more broods in the season. Nests built during the autumn display by birds that are sedentary in winter can be used for roosting at night and thereby reduce the winter mortality of their owners. The autumn display is the first attempt to select a breeding site in the best possible habitat.
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Ethics - evolution - utopia. Remarks on John Harris’ Enhancing evolution: The paper is divided into two parts. The first part justifies the thesis that the project of enhancing evolution presented by Harris, consisting in replacing natural selection with deliberate selection, is based on misunderstanding of the scientifically defined theory of evolution. In the second part, it is shown that Harris’ argument may serve as a classic example of a utopian discourse in which a pseudoscientific narrative is mixed with a quasi-religious belief.
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Thomas Nagel o evoluci mysli

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This article critically examines the arguments against mechanistic neo-Darwinism offered by Thomas Nagel in his recent book Mind and Cosmos. The author argues, in particular, that Nagel’s recognition of teleology in the evolutionary process should make him less sceptical towards a panpsychist understanding of nature.
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This paper combines perspectives from evolutionary biology and linguistics to discuss the early evolution of laughter and the possible role of laughter-like vocalisation as a bonding mechanism in hominins and early human species. From the perspective of evolutionary biology, we here emphasise several things: the role of exaptation, the typically very slow pace of evolutionary change, and the danger of projecting backwards from the current utilities of laughter to infer its earlier function, hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of years ago. From the perspective of linguistics, we examine both the semantics of the word ‘laugh’ and the vocal mechanics of human laughter production, arguing that greater terminological care is needed in talking about the precursors of laughter in the ancient evolutionary past. Finally, we turn to hypotheses about how laughter-like vocalisations may have arisen, long before articulate language as we know it today. We focus in particular on Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis that laughter-like vocalisation, which stimulated endorphin production, might have functioned as a bonding mechanism (a kind of “vocal grooming”) among hominins and early human species. The paper contributes to the special issue theme (Humour and Belonging) by casting a long look backwards in time to laughter-like vocalisation as a distant evolutionary precursor of humour, and to bonding as an evolutionary precursor to cognitively and socially modern forms of “belonging”. At the same time, it cautions against casual theorising about the evolutionary origins of laughter.
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Patrick Matthew’s (1831) prior-publication of the complete hypothesis of natural selection “anticipated” Darwin’s Origin of Species by 28 years and Darwin’s and Wallace’s (1858) Linnean papers on the same topic by 27. Founded on the premise that no naturalist read it before 1860, Darwin’s and Wallace’s claims of duel independent discovery of Matthew’s hypothesis have been accepted by the scientific community. However, the central premise upon which those claims have been accepted — that no naturalist read Matthew’s ideas before 1858 — is a proven fallacy, because the famous and hugely influential naturalist Loudon reviewed Matthew’s book in 1832, commenting that it appeared to have something original to say on “the origin of species”. The fact that Loudon was a naturalist has been totally ignored until now. Furthermore, it is newly discovered that after reviewing Matthew’s book he went on to edit the journal that published two of Blyth’s highly influential papers on organic evolution. Blyth was Darwin’s most prolific and helpful correspondent on the topic. Further new discoveries reveal that, besides Loudon, whose work was well known to Darwin and his associates, six other naturalists read Matthew’s book and then cited it years before 1858. One, Selby, sat on several scientific committees with Darwin, and was a friend of his father. Selby went on to edit Wallace’s famous Sarawak paper on organic evolution. Another, Robert Chambers, a correspondent of Darwin, who met with him, went on to write the influential Vestiges of Creation, which both Darwin and Wallace admitted was an influence on their work. Undeniable potential knowledge-transfer routes did exist before 1858, therefore, between those who read Matthew’s ideas and commented upon them in the literature, and Darwin and Wallace. In light of the fact that influential naturalists, known to both Darwin and Wallace, did read Matthew’s original ideas before 1858, veracity in the history of discovery requires now an investigation into the possibility of cryptomnesia or deliberate pre-1860 plagiarism by Darwin and Wallace. In that regard, the notion of “knowledge contamination” is proposed and presented in a three-fold typology of escalating culpability for replicators of prior published work with citation. Future research in this area should turn to the neglected correspondence and private journal archives of those naturalists known to Darwin and Wallace who read Matthew’s ideas before 1860.
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Human culture is uniquely characterized by the accumulation of knowledge and products that could not be reinvented by each succeeding generation. This process, namely cumulative cultural evolution leads to the emergence of complex adaptations (RICHERSON, BOYD, 2005; TOMASELLO, 1999). The aim of this study is to outline the conditions necessary for human cultural evolution. Memeticists of Dawkins described this phenomenon in terms of biological evolution, but they fell short of explanations when facing serious critiques. Knowledge contents carried by minds and artifacts are not self replicating discrete entities. Not replicators, but rather cognitive interpretive and inferential mechanisms, like schemas and modules stabilize cultural content, making Darwinian theory applicable as an explanatory framework (SPERBER, HIRSCHFELD, 2006; BOYD, RICHERSON, 2005). Population dynamic models applied to cultural evolution lead to the conclusion that in order to increase the fitness of the population, imitation has to increase the fitness of individual learners (ROGERS, 1989). If individuals can effectively choose between imitation and individual learning, making cost and effort estimations their overall fitness increases. Adaptive pressure was on cognitive mechanisms supporting imitative learning. Such mechanisms are theory of mind (RICHERSON, BOYD, 2005), intersubjectivity (TOMASELLO, KRUGER, RATNER, 1993), and human pedagogy (GERGELY, CSIBRA, 2005). A growing body of results by mathematical models, field studies, and laboratory experiments – such as transmission chains, replacement method, and closed group – contribute to our understanding of the emergence and guiding principles of human cultural phenomena.
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Christian de Duve, a Nobel Prize winner who recently has passed away, gave offered a “scientific” perspective on the issue of the negative consequences of the human evolutionary success. He saw the obvious weakness of the human nature, which turns out to be a result of the natural selection modifications and an adapta- tion to changing environmental conditions, as a tendency to auto-destructive behaviours inscribed in our genes. For this purpose he borrowed the Theological term of original sin. This paper presents the natural-science concept of the original sin created by Christian de Duve and evaluates the prospective interest it might have for philosophers and theologians. 
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Christian de Duve, zmarły niedawno laureat nagrody Nobla, podał propozycję „naukowego” spojrzenia na zagadnienie negatywnych konsekwencji ewolucyjnego sukcesu człowieka. Wyraźną słabość ludzkiej natury, która okazuje się być efektem zmian wynikających z działania doboru naturalnego i przystosowania się do zmieniających się warunków środowiskowych, zinterpretował jako zapisane w genach skłonności do zachowań destrukcyjnych. Na ich określenie użył zapożyczonego z teologii pojęcia „grzechu pierworodnego”. W niniejszym artykule prezentujemy przyrodniczą koncepcję „grzechu pierworodnego” Christiana de Duve’a oraz staramy się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy ta propozycja może okazać się intere- sująca dla filozofów i teologów.
Jazykovedný Casopis
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2015
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vol. 65
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issue 2
139-156
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The paper gives a basic characteristic of the methodology and results of quantitative research of the development of noun case homonymy in Slovak and the East Slavonic languages in the comparison with the late Proto-Slavic ground state. The methodology is based on findings in the field of cognitive psychology, according to which a higher degree of ambiguity is linked with a higher level of the interpretative complexity. The paper also includes a proposal of the interpretation of findings of this research, which reveal the operation of principles of positive and negative feedback in the development of the above-mentioned languages morphology. The interpretation is based on the basic assumptions of the natural selection theory, in accordance to which the author proposes to explain the identified trends in the quasi-teleological spirit. The text is inspired by Jakobson's understanding of markedness and language teleonomy.
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The essay shows the main conceptions upon a biological power of a word: the macchiavellian theory/ theory of a lie, the mating mind theory, that means a theory of handicaps, and the social  selection theory  of  S.  Dunbar.  The  author  proposes  a  thesis  that  a  speech  takes  its power from the biological determinants of the origin of a language, and proves it by fusing various contemporary biological concepts. It is a biological evolution that founds the power of words, and also explains the magic of words in the  various types of relations – among society, but also between sexes, generations and finally, among individuals considered in a biological sense. 
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Connected to the 2009 Darwin-anniversaries, the article investigates the influence of anniversaries and commemorations on the production of myths connected to major figures in science. First, the still widespread myth concerning the role of the Darwin-finches in the discovery process of Darwin’s theory of natural selection is examined. Second, the myth that Darwin avoided publishing his theory for many years is scrutinized, together with an analysis of H. E. Gruber’s influential monograph on Darwin on Man. Finally, elements of the received view on Darwin and the reception of his theories in history of science are summarized, and the difference of this image from the public Darwin-image is examined. The reasons for and significance of this difference is explored.
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Prof. dr hab. n. med. MIECZYSŁAW CHORĄŻY – absolwent Akademii Medycznej w Warszawie. Od roku 1952 pracuje w Centrum Onkologii – Instytutu im. Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie, Oddział w Gliwicach, Centrum Badań Translacyjnych i Biologii Molekularnej Nowotworów. Przez 32 lata był kierownikiem Zakładu Biologii Nowotworów. W latach 1973-91 był jednym z pełnomocników dyrektora Instytutu do spraw rozbudowy Centrum Onkologii w Gliwicach. Doktor honoris causa Uniwersytetu Medycznego w Białymstoku i Katowicach. Członek rzeczywisty Polskiej Akademii Nauk, członek czynny Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności. Obszar zainteresowań: biologia i biologia molekularna raka, struktura DNA, mutagenne i uszkadzające chromosomy/DNA działanie zanieczyszczeń powietrza, biologia systemów. Były członek rad naukowych kilku instytutów badawczych, członek krajowych i zagranicznych towarzystw naukowych. Honorowy Obywatel Miasta Biała Podlaska.
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The phenomenon of self-organization of matter is well known in physics and chemistry, and for a few decades, we have had evidences that self-organization is an essential element of building structures and functions in living systems. Presumably the process of self-organization has taken place in shaping the chemical prebiotical structures and then in organizing them and forming in complex systems exhibiting the attributes of life. In this essay the author presents the basic features of self-organization, examples of self-organization on chemistry and biology and the basic elements of the functioning of complex systems, where self-organization is the primary agent of action. The phenomenon of self-organization is a new element in the discussion on the evolution of the living world and poses a challenge for the concept of natural
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In this paper I discuss similarities and differences between a potential new model of language development - lexical selection, and its biological equivalent - natural selection. Based on Dawkins' (1976) concept of the meme I discuss two units of language and explore their potential to be seen as linguistic replicators. The central discussion revolves around two key parts - the units that could potentially play the role of replicators in a lexical selection system and a visual representation of the model proposed. draw on work by Hoey (2005), Wray (2008) and Sinclair (1996, 1998) for the theoretical basis; Croft (2000) is highlighted as a similar framework. Finally brief examples are taken from the free online corpora provided by the corpus analysis tool Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff, Rychly, Smrz and Tugwell 2004) to ground the discussion in real world communicative situations. The examples highlight the point that different situational contexts will allow for different units to flourish based on the local social and linguistic environment. The paper also shows how a close look at the specific context and strings available to a language user at any given moment has potential to illuminate different aspects of language when compared with a more abstract approach.
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Mivart i granice ewolucji

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Autorka przedstawia sylwetkę dziewiętnastowiecznego brytyjskiego przyrodnika George’a J. Mivarta. Omawia jego stanowisko wobec darwinowskiej teorii ewolucji. Mivart był ewolucjonistą. Odrzucał jednak mechanizm doboru naturalnego oraz uznawał istnienie nieprzekraczalnej granicy, jaka oddziela człowieka od zwierząt. Człowiek według niego to wyjątkowa istota, której dusza i umysł zostały stworzone w nadprzyrodzony sposób. Autorka opisuje też reakcje współczesnych mu naukowców oraz Kościoła katolickiego na przedstawiane przez niego poglądy.
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Author presents a profile of nineteenth-century British scientist George J. Mivart. She reviews his attitude towards Darwin’s theory of evolution. Although he was an evolutionist, he rejected mechanism of natural selection and presumed that there is an impassable boundary between human being and animals. In his opinion, human being is an extraordinary entity whose soul and mind were supernaturally created. Author also presents reactions of contemporary scientists and Roman Catholic Church to Mivart’s views.
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Największym wkładem Darwina do nauki jest to, że dopełnił on rewolucji kopernikańskiej, przenosząc na grunt biologii koncepcję natury jako systemu materii w ruchu, który podlega prawom przyrody. Wraz z odkryciem doboru naturalnego Darwin sprowadził zagadnienie pochodzenia i przystosowania organizmów do sfery nauki. Adaptacyjne cechy organizmów można obecnie wyjaśnić, podobnie jak zjawiska świata nieożywionego, jako rezultat procesów przyrodniczych bez odwoływania się do Inteligentnego Projektanta. Rewolucje kopernikańską i darwinowską można postrzegać jako dwa etapy jednej rewolucji naukowej. Wspólnie dały one początek nauce we współczesnym sensie tego słowa, czyli takiej, w której wyjaśnianie polega na odwoływaniu się do praw przyrody. Darwinowska teoria doboru naturalnego wyjaśnia "projekt" i niezwykłą różnorodność organizmów jako rezultat procesów naturalnych - stopniowej kumulacji spontanicznie powstających zmian (mutacji) przesiewanych przez dobór naturalny. Jakie cechy zostaną wyselekcjonowane, uzależnione jest od tego, do jakich zmian dojdzie w danym czasie i miejscu, a to z kolei zależy zarówno od losowego procesu mutacji, jak też od uprzedniej historii organizmów. Mutacje i dobór wspólnie napędzały ten cudowny proces, który - począwszy od mikroskopijnych organizmów - doprowadził do powstania storczyków, ptaków i ludzi. Teoria ewolucji postuluje, że w realnym życiu splatają się ze sobą przypadek i konieczność, losowość i determinizm. Fundamentalnym odkryciem Darwina było to, że istnieje proces, który jest twórczy, chociaż pozbawiony świadomości.
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Darwin’s greatest contribution to science is that he completed the Copernican Revolution by drawing out for biology the notion of nature as a system of matter in motion governed by natural laws. With Darwin’s discovery of natural selection, the origin and adaptations of organisms were brought into the realm of science. The adaptive features of organisms could now be explained, like the phenomena of the inanimate world, as the result of natural processes, without recourse to an Intelligent Designer. The Copernican and the Darwinian Revolutions may be seen as the two stages of the one Scientific Revolution. They jointly ushered in the beginning of science in the modern sense of the word: explanation through natural laws. Darwin’s theory of natural selection accounts for the „design” of organisms, and for their wondrous diversity, as the result of natural processes, the gradual accumulation of spontaneously arisen variations (mutations) sorted out by natural selection. Which characteristics will be selected depends on which variations happen to be present at a given time in a given place. This in turn depends on the random process of mutation as well as on the previous history of the organisms. Mutation and selection have jointly driven the marvelous process that, starting from microscopic organisms, has yielded orchids, birds, and humans. The theory of evolution conveys chance and necessity, randomness and determinism, jointly enmeshed in the stuff of life. This was Darwin’s fundamental discovery, that there is a process that is creative, although not conscious.
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Myślę, że w dzisiejszych czasach większość ludzi wykształconych uważa się za darwinistów. Jeśli tak jest w istocie, dzieje się to za sprawą niedostatecznej wiedzy na temat darwinizmu i tego, o czym on mówi. Mówi on bowiem o wielu rzeczach, które zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do naszego gatunku są w sposób zbyt oczywisty fałszywe, aby ktoś wykształcony, a przynajmniej posiadający zdolność krytycznego myślenia, mógł w nie uwierzyć. Obecnie większość ludzi wykształconych to, oczywiście, darwiniści w tym sensie, że wierzą oni, iż nasz gatunek powstał wskutek ewolucji zwierząt, a nie został powołany do życia aktem boskiej woli. Ale sama akceptacja tego przekonania to za mało, żeby uznać kogoś naprawdę za darwinistę. Z historii biologii wiemy, że wielu przyjmowało ten pogląd na długo przed narodzinami Darwina i powstaniem samego darwinizmu. Aby uznać kogoś za zwolennika danej szkoły myślenia, konieczna jest z jego strony wiara we wszystkie, bądź prawie wszystkie, twierdzenia właściwe dla tejże szkoły i wyznawane przez wszystkich lub przynajmniej najskrajniejszych jej zwolenników. W każdej dużej szkole myślenia znajdzie się mniejszość, przywiązująca szczególną wagę do najbardziej charakterystycznych dla niej twierdzeń. Ludzi z tego kręgu nazywa się „purystami” bądź „ultrasami”. Dla uczynienia kogoś darwinistą konieczna i wystarczająca jest wiara we wszystkie, bądź prawie wszystkie, twierdzenia właściwe darwinistom i przez nich, a przynajmniej przez ultradarwinistów, uznawane. Podaję dziesięć twierdzeń, które są przekonaniami darwinowskimi w sensie, jaki przed chwilą wyszczególniłem. Każde z nich jest bez wątpienia fałszywe: albo bezpośrednio fałszywe, jeśli mówi o naszym gatunku, albo jeśli ma ogólny charakter, jest wyraźnie fałszywe w odniesieniu do naszego gatunku.
EN
Most educated people nowadays, I believe, think of themselves as Darwinians. If they do, however, it can only be from ignorance: from not knowing enough about what Darwinism says. For Darwinism says many things, especially about our species, which are too obviously false to be believed by any educated person; or at least by an educated person who retains any capacity at all for critical thought on the subject of Darwinism. Of course most educated people now are Darwinians, in the sense that they believe our species to have originated, not in a creative act of the Divine Will, but by evolution from other animals. But believing that proposition is not enough to make someone a Darwinian. It had been believed, as may be learnt from any history of biology, by very many people long before Darwinism, or Darwin, was born. What is needed to make someone an adherent of a certain school of thought is belief in all or most of the propositions which are peculiar to that school, and are believed either by all of its adherents, or at least by the more thoroughgoing ones. In any large school of thought, there is always a minority who adhere more exclusively than most to the characteristic beliefs of the school: they are the "purists" or "ultras" of that school. What is needed and sufficient, then, to make a person a Darwinian, is belief in all or most of the propositions which are peculiar to Darwinians, and believed either by all of them, or at least by ultra-Darwinians. I give ten propositions which are all Darwinian beliefs in the sense just specified. Each of them is obviously false: either a direct falsity about our species or, where the proposition is a general one, obviously false in the case of our species, at least.
EN
I analyze J.B.S. Haldane’s view on defining necessary conditions for (evolution by) natural selection. This issue has been recently broadly discussed on the borderline between philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. I put forward a hypothesis that Haldane (like many population geneticists) did not try to formulate a summary of conditions of natural selection applicable to all cases of selection, but he built instead relevant differential mathematical models of natural selection.
PL
W artykule analizuję stosunek J. B. S. Haldane’a do kwestii definiowania koniecznych warunków (ewolucji drogą) doboru naturalnego. Kwestia ta jest ostatnio żywo dyskutowana na pograniczu filozofii biologii i biologii teoretycznej. Stawiam roboczą hipotezę, że Haldane, podobnie jak wielu innych genetyków populacyjnych, nie starał się znaleźć podsumowania warunków doboru, które odnosiłoby się do wszystkich sytuacji jego wystąpienia, ale zamiast tego konstruował modele matematyczne określonych przypadków.
EN
The article analyses the concept of memetic evolution of culture, especially the concept of natural selection assumed by it. The article shows that the replicator-interactor conception of natural selection created by Richard Dawkins requires that the memetic hypothesis includes conditions that are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to meet. This leads to a paradox: from one hand, Dawkins is the father of the concept of Darwinian evolution of culture, from the other hand, he assumes the concept of selection impeding research on this (hypothetical) phenomenon. It is more proper to think about the Darwinian evolution of culture taking as a starting point of the standard approach of natural selection (by Lewontin, Maynard Smith and Endler). I do not state if the Darwinian evolution of culture actually takes place. I examine instead the conceptual framework of reflecting on this subject. Moreover, I consider the related issue: can culture-if it indeed evolves in a Darwinian way-be considered a form of life? I do not state if culture is alive, but analyse the preliminary problems founding a reflection on this subject.
PL
W artykule analizuję memetyczną koncepcję ewolucji kultury pod kątem zakładanego przez nią ujęcia doboru naturalnego. Pokazuję, że zaproponowane przez Richarda Dawkinsa replikatorowo-interaktorowe ujęcie doboru stawia przed hipotezą memetyczną wymagania, które są niezwykle trudne (jeśli nie niemożliwe) do spełnienia. Prowadzi to do swoistego paradoksu: z jednej strony Dawkins jest ojcem koncepcji darwinowskiej ewolucji kultury, z drugiej zaś zakładana przez niego koncepcja selekcji istotnie utrudnia badania dotyczące tego (hipotetycznego) zjawiska. O wiele łatwiej myśleć o darwinowskiej ewolucji kultury biorąc za punkt wyjścia standardowe ujęcie dobru (związane z nazwiskami Richarda Lewontina, Maynarda Smitha, Johna Endlera). Tekst nie rozstrzyga, czy darwinowska ewolucja kultury rzeczywiście ma miejsce, a analizuje jej konceptualne ramy. Ponadto tekst podejmuje problem pokrewny – czy kultura, o ile rzeczywiście ewoluuje w sposób darwinowski, może być uważana za formę życia. Tekst nie rozstrzyga, czy kultura jest ożywiona – wskazuje raczej na pytania, na które muszą zostać rozstrzygnięte przed rozpoczęciem refleksji na ten temat.
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