Search results

1

Uwagi o Alvina Plantingi rozumieniu konieczności

100%

Czernecka-Rej B.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2010

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issue 47

109-133

PL

Alvin Plantinga’s understanding of necessity is discussed. The kinds of necessity, as seen by Plantinga, are indicated, and concepts are described which are sometimes identified with the concept of necessity. The distinction between de dicto necessity and de re necessity is the principal matter for Plantinga. After their short characteristic, the attempts of the de re necessity rejection, undertaken by some authors, are presented. In the final part of the paper Plantinga’s argumentation aiming at defense of the de re necessity is discussed. Critical remarks, concerning the presented material, are a part of the paper.

2

Why Is Plato’s Good Good?

80%

Nathan A. R.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2022

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vol. 13

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issue 1

125-136

EN

The form of the Good in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic seems, by our standards, to do too much: it is presented as the metaphysical principle, the epistemological principle and the principle of ethics. Yet this seemingly chimerical object makes good sense in the broader context of Plato’s philosophical project. He sought certain knowledge of necessary truths (in sharp contrast to the contingent truth of modern science). Thus, to be knowable the cosmos must be informed by timeless principles; and this leads to teleology and the Good. The form of the Good, it is argued, is what makes the world knowable insofar as it is knowable. This interpretation plugs a significant gap in the scholarship on the Good and draws attention to a deep connection between Plato’s epistemology and his teleological understanding of the cosmos.

3

Proto-Humean Strains in Leibniz’s Analysis of Causal Relation

80%

Palkoska J.

Acta Comeniana (International review of Comenius studies and early modern intellectual history)

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2012

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vol. 26

141-159

EN

My aim in the present paper is to challenge an established doctrine according to which Leibniz conceives of causation – in sharp contrast to Hume – in terms of a sort of the so-called hypothetical necessity, to the effect that causation involves a hypothetical necessitation a parte rei explicable in terms of purely conceptual connections. I argue that as far as one can tell from the direct textual evidence, Leibniz's concept of causation can be interpreted as coming surprisingly close to an essentially Humean view according to which far from implying any necessities a parte rei, conceptual connections impose necessity only on our thought while in reality causation involves only regularities in the conjunction of contiguous objects. Then I try to reconcile this claim with the well-documented fact that within the larger framework of Leibniz's theory of truth and his principle of suffi cient reason, Leibniz was indeed committed to a 'necessitarian' position – in the sense that every item in the actual world is, after all, a matter of hypothetical necessity in rebus (or nearly so) – and that he was prepared to integrate causes into this larger picture. My point will be that the apparent confl ict between these two views is due to our failure to distinguish the analytic task concerning causation from various explanatory tasks in which causation is involved.

4

Konieczność i przypadek w ewolucji wszechświata

80%

Heller M.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

|

2009

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issue 44

3-12

PL

There are two extremities in contemporary discussions on the role of random events in the evolution of the Universe: one extremity consists in reducing the evolution to a blind game of random events, the other extremity in seeing everywhere traces of the 'intelligent design'. Both these doctrines are based on misunderstandings. It is argued that casual or random events are not a 'foreign body' in the network of physical laws, but rather its indispensable element without which the laws of physics would be ineffective.

5

Taking human lives in extreme situations of terrorist attacks and the defence of necessity

80%

Zaoralová P.

The Lawyer Quarterly

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2017

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vol. 7

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issue 1

50-59

EN

The paper focuses on the issue of weighing human lives with a criminal law perspective. It addresses the criminal defence of necessity and its relationship to the most serious crimes of intentional killing occurring in emergency situations. Under extreme conditions, such as terrorist attacks, individuals are often forced to act under great fear and may therefore act differently than usual in order to protect the lives of themselves and others. The purpose of this paper is to provide the legal background on acting under the defence of necessity when human lives are weighed against each other, from the perspectives of Czech, German, French, and English Law.

6

Amor fati Fryderyka Nietzschego (konieczność i przypadkowość losu człowieka)

71%

Pałasiński P.

Racjonalia. Z punktu widzenia humanistyki

|

2013

|

vol. 3

EN

This article is about the concept of amor fati in the Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy. In philosophy of Beyond Good and Evil the author’s idea of amor fati combines reflections on fortuitousness and necessity in the context of human life. In this paper, the author attempts to show the significance of this idea by the interpretation of Nietzsche’s statements about the following concepts: fortuitousness and necessity. The other issue is Nietzsche’s writing about his own attitude to life and the world. The amor fati idea appear to be an existential challenge that Nietzsche confronts with people who want to see their life as meaningful. By Nietzsche fortuitousness as the essence of the world is subordinate to the human life requiring the purpose. The amor fati concept appears as one way of life in the world without purpose.

PL

This article is about the concept of amor fati in the Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy. In philosophy of Beyond Good and Evil the author’s idea of amor fati combines reflections on fortuitousness and necessity in the context of human life. In this paper, the author attempts to show the significance of this idea by the interpretation of Nietzsche’s statements about the following concepts: fortuitousness and necessity. The other issue is Nietzsche’s writing about his own attitude to life and the world. The amor fati idea appear to be an existential challenge that Nietzsche confronts with people who want to see their life as meaningful. By Nietzsche fortuitousness as the essence of the world is subordinate to the human life requiring the purpose. The amor fati concept appears as one way of life in the world without purpose.

7

Hume o nutnosti, svobodě a odpovědnosti

70%

Marvan T.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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vol. 65

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issue 2

221-235

EN

The paper presents a reconstruction of Hume’s complex argument that takes determinism as a prerequisite for moral evaluation of actions and for the attribution of moral and criminal responsibility for an act. The paper falls into three sections. The first outlines Hume’s “doctrine of necessity”, i. e., his deterministic theory of action, and shows how determinism can be reconciled with the possibility of free action. The second section focuses on Hume’s view of moral judgement and explains how determinism and the denial of free will can be reconciled with the notion of moral responsibility for an act. The last section, devoted to Hume’s ideas about just punishment, canvasses Hume’s hybrid conception of the different purposes of punishment.

8

Analyticity and Modality

70%

Karimov A.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2014

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issue 3

89-93

EN

In this paper I defend the concept of metaphysical analyticity, and argue for the no-tion of analyticity as truth in virtue of the reference determiner, introduced by Gillian K. Russell. Contrary to Russell, I try to show that necessary a posteriori statements are analytic under this notion. Also, I maintain that contingent a priori statements cannot be properly called analytic.

9

Necessary, Kenotically-donated, & Self-giving Love

61%

McCall B.

Studia Ełckie

|

2019

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vol. 21

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issue 2

231-241

EN

For the God of self-giving, kenotically-donated love, the decision to express love at all times comes first. In my conception, “full-Oorded” love would encompass what is ordinarily contained within the definition of agape love, but it would also include “eros love”, for the latter is the love of co-laborment. In my appropriation has of this terminology of eros love, it would be the type of love that the desires to, e.g., expand one’s territory or one’s domain, which makes it applicable to the modern theory of evolution by natural selection. Evolution – i.e., “descent with modification”, to invoke a Darwinian phrase – then, recognizes self-giving love, and the goodness thereof, in that species regularly undergo commensalist symbiotic relationships in nature, whereby one is aided by the other, while the “other” is neither “aided” nor “harmed”. This is self-giving love in its entirety, and a proper demonstration of it. My understanding of necessarily-expressed, “full-Oorded” love also includes dimensions of philia love. Philia could be akin to the symbiotic relationship known as mutualism in biology, especially since philia love has historically been associated with friendship or the interrelatedness of the natural world. Notably, Aristotle indicates that even nonhuman animals can express philia love . The relationships marked by philia, then, could be identified by mutuality, reciprocity, and cooperation , which fits the above biological connotation well. While agape or eros might benefit from cooperation, reciprocity, and mutuality, those two forms of love do not require any of those three nouns. Philia does. I contend, in fact, that the kenosis of the Spirit into creation amounts to self-giving, betrothed love through self-donation. The union, then of agape, eros, and philia love could be expressed as mutual aid, or full-orbed, or even as I like to say, “full-Oorded” love. Flourishing lives – be they human or some other mammal – I aver, consistently and necessarily express “full-Oorded” love. Oord suggests that Process philosophy can aid one to see that full-orbed love – that which I have designated “full-Oorded” love – plays an important part in the work to increase the common good of society as a whole. Indeed, “full-Oorded” love would repay evil with good as agape would; such a “full-Oorded” love would additionally welcome the intrinsic value and beauty in others, just like eros love does; and “full-Oorded” love would also recognize the import of friendship and mutuality as does philia love. Following Oord and Wojtyla again, since God commands that we show necessarily “self-giving”, “self-donating” love, we therefore indeed have the ability to love others as kenotically-donating entities, just as the creating Spirit does. When we act as a genuine conduit and amplifier of the creating Spirit’s self-donating and self-giving love, we can truly and entirely and infinitely love others, just as God does. Of course, we cannot expect that we humans will always love alike unto how God does because we do not have an eternal and unchanging nature that is necessarily inclined toward love , but we are at least always able to do it.

10

Necessity and the physicalist account in Aristotle’s Physics. Difficulties with the rainfall example

61%

Olesiak J.

Diametros

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2015

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issue Diametros 45

35-58

EN

The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rainfall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot be used in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. I would like to thank Hasse Hamalainen and Marcin Karas for looking at earlier drafts of this paper. I am also especially grateful for the numerous remarks and suggestions of three anonymous referees

11

Remarks About Targeted Killing in the Light of Public International Law

57%

Łaski P.

Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review

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2020

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vol. 11

59-66

EN

The premises concerning the use of force are currently changing, as are the goals and methods, which entails that appropriate adaptation and interpretation of international legal norms is required in the context of new threats and methods of combating them. This constitutes a significant problem, especially in the event of extraordinary circumstances that are to justify the use of unilateral measures without the consent of the UN Security Council. This encompasses, inter alia, the issue of targeted killing, i.e. eliminating in the territory of another state, while not operating against such a state, on the order of a specific government, a specific person responsible for the illegal use of force, if other methods of apprehending the perpetrator are unrealistic. This makes such a method, in a given circumstance, a legal form of combat, as long as the criterion of necessity and proportionality is taken into account.

12

David Hume’s Theory of Action

51%

Van den Abbeel J.

Kultura i Edukacja

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2016

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issue 2(112)

53-65

EN

The main goal of this paper is to reconstruct David Hume’s theory of action from the perspective of the second book Of the Passion in his work A Treatise of Human Nature. My paper will proceed in three steps. In the first part I present the main assumptions of Hume’s views on action together with a general outline of his theory. I show that for Hume action has a uniform character and that there is a constant relation between action and the motive which can be understood as desire or aversion. Next, in the second part, the main elements involved in the process of human activity will be outlined, such as: passions, will, liberty, and reason. Although Hume emphasizes that the passions are the main motive of action, since they have the power to initiate and withhold action, reason also plays an important role. In order to come to a better understanding, I will consider the functions which these elements are playing in human action and some of the problematic issues which are connected with them such as, whether each of the passions can motivate a person to action, what the relationship between passions and will is, and what kind of relation between passions and reason can be found. Finally, in the third and last part of my paper, I will conclude with a schematic outline of human action and the relation between different components engaged in the process of action.

13

Entrepreneurship in Underdeveloped Economies: A Study of Nigeria

51%

Sadiq Kasum A., Gunu U.

Studia i Materiały

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2017

|

issue 1/2017(23)

48-61

EN

Against the background of the importance of entrepreneurship to economic growth and development, this paper investigates the potential for achieving growth and development through entrepreneurship in underdeveloped economies. Specifically, the study investigated the availability of the environment for and the extent to which individuals and groups are able to recognize/create opportunity for providing goods and services; and the extent to which they are able to utilize such opportunities. The study collected primary data about the environment for entrepreneurship development in Nigeria, the extent and nature of opportunity creation and the prospect for carrying through innovations in the country. The data were collected from entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship professionals, using a well-structured questionnaire administered to a sample of 360 respondents, drawn from among the groups. The responses were analyzed using Kruskal Wallis and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests. The study revealed that Nigerians are innovative and enterprising. It also revealed that infrastructural facilities, funding, and entrepreneurship education are significant impediments. The study also showed that economic growth in Nigeria is influenced by entrepreneurship growth, therefore the slow growth in entrepreneurship development in Nigeria contributed to the underdeveloped status of the economy. The study recommended specific solutions to the different entrepreneurship problems identified in the study.

PL

W artykule zbadano możliwość osiągnięcia wzrostu i rozwoju dzięki przedsiębiorczości w gospodarkach słabo rozwiniętych w kontekście znaczenia przedsiębiorczości dla wzrostu i rozwoju gospodarczego. W szczególności analizie poddano istnienie odpowiednich warunków i zakres, w jakim jednostki i grupy są w stanie rozpoznać/stworzyć możliwości dostarczania towarów i usług, a także stopień, w jakim są one w stanie wykorzystać takie możliwości. W ramach badania zebrano podstawowe dane o środowisku dla rozwoju przedsiębiorczości w Nigerii, zakresie i charakterze tworzonych możliwości oraz perspektywach wprowadzania innowacji w kraju. Dane zebrano od przedsiębiorców i specjalistów ds. przedsiębiorczości przy wykorzystaniu odpowiednio ułożonego kwestionariusza skierowanego do próbki 360 respondentów wybranych spośród grup. Odpowiedzi zostały przeanalizowane za pomocą testu Kruskala Wallisa i testu Wilcoxona dla par obserwacji. Badanie wykazało, że Nigeryjczycy są innowacyjni i przedsiębiorczy, jak również, że źródłami znaczących utrudnień są infrastruktura, finansowanie i edukacja w zakresie przedsiębiorczości. Badanie pokazało, że wzrost przedsiębiorczości wpływa na wzrost gospodarczy w Nigerii, a zatem powolny rozwój przedsiębiorczości w tym kraju przyczynił się do tego, że gospodarka nigeryjska jest słabo rozwinięta. W badaniu wskazano konkretne rozwiązania różnych zidentyfikowanych problemów dotyczących przedsiębiorczości.

14

The Blizzard of the World: COVID-19 and the Last Say of the State of Exception

51%

Tacik P.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

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2021

|

vol. 96

17-32

PL

Celem artykułu jest ujęcie pandemii COVID-19 jako socjopolitycznej katastrofy w sensie Waltera Benjamina. Zakres i natura kryzysu związanego z COVID-19 są nam niedostępne z racji naszej bliskości do jego centrum. W tym szczególnym momencie zaciemnieniu ulegają polityczno-prawne ramy wspólnoty międzynarodowej, w których suwerenność i turbokapitalizm łączą się w celu stworzenia biopolitycznych urządzeń. W artykule dokonano przeglądu zastosowań stanu wyjątkowego w poszczególnych państwach; jego konkluzją jest ogólne zaniedbanie kwestii praworządności nawet w krajach, które głoszą do niej przywiązanie. Bez wątpienia kluczową rolę zaczęła ponownie odgrywać suwerenność – podważając parlamentaryzm oraz swobody obywatelskie w imię konieczności. Prawo międzynarodowe okazało się niezdolne nie tylko do odpowiedzi na to zjawisko, ale nawet do wyegzekwowania odpowiedzialności Chin za złamanie reguł WTO. Artykuł zamyka konkluzja, zgodnie z którą COVID-19 otworzył nowe-stare ścieżki zarządzania żywymi, które odegrają planetarną rolę w przyszłych walkach o dominację i przeobrażą funkcjonowanie kapitalizmu.

EN

The paper aims to grasp the COVID-19 pandemic as a socio-political catastrophe in the Benjaminian sense. As argued in the article, the scope and nature of the COVID-19 crisis eludes us due to our closeness to its inner core. What is obfuscated in this moment is the politico-legal framework on which the international community is based, where sovereignty and turbocapitalism join their forces to produce biopolitical devices. The paper looks into uses of the state of exception in particular countries, concluding that the rule of law in the pandemic was generally put on the back burner even by the countries that officially praise it. Sovereignty clearly returned to the stage, undermining parliamentarism and civil liberties in the sake of necessity. International law remained incapable of addressing this return, let alone of enforcing responsibility of China for infringing WHO rules. As a conclusion the paper argues that COVID-19 opened new-old paths of governing the living that will play a planetary role in the future fights for dominance and imposing a new face of capitalism.

15

‘Niezrodzony' i 'niezniszczalny’ jako znaki prawdy u Parmenidesa w kontekście pojęcia czasu

51%

Biedrzyński D. W.

Folia Philosophica

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2018

|

vol. 39

EN

Parmenides in his revolt of the first philosophy discarded the principle - arche and introduced in its place being - to eon. The effectivess of this revoltion of thought rested upon - among others - revealing a permanent connection between logic and ontology which connection was most seen in ‘signs of truth’, i.e. features of being. Two of these features - ‘unborn’ and ‘indesrtructible’ - show in a sense entanglement in the context of time whose consideration requires the analysis of Parmenides’ poem and insight into historical-philosophical development of the notion of time from the perspective of its use by natural philosophers in defining the principle - arche.

PL

Parmenides dokonując rewolty filozofii pierwszej odrzucił pojęcie zasady – arche, a na jej miejsce wprowadził byt – to eon. Skuteczność tej rewolucji myślowej oparta była miedzy innymi na ujawnieniu trwałego związku pomiędzy logiką i ontologią, który to związek realizował sie w najwyższym stopniu w „znakach prawdy”, czyli cechach bytu. Dwie z tych cech – ‘niezrodzony i niezniszczalny’ – w pewnym aspekcie ujawniają uwikłanie w konteks czasowości, którego rozpatrzenie wymaga analizy samego poematu Parmenidesa, jak i wglądu w historyczno-filozoficzny rozwój pojęcia czasu w perspektywie jego zastosowania przez filozofów przyrody w definiowaniu zasady – arche.

16

On classical behavior of intuitionistic modalities

51%

Drobyshevich S.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

|

2015

|

vol. 24

|

issue 1

79–104

EN

We study connections between four types of modal operators – necessity, possibility, un-necessity and impossibility – over intuitionitstic logic in terms of compositions of these modal operators with intuitionistic negation. We investigate which basic compositions, i.e. compositions of the form ¬δ, δ¬ or ¬δ¬, yield modal operators of the same type over intuitionistic logic as over classical logic. We say that such compositions behave classically. We study which modal properties correspond to each basic compositions behaving classically over intuitionistic logic and also prove that KC constitutes the smallest superintuitionistic logic over which all basic compositions behave classically.

17

Ockhamowa krytyka teleologii a narodziny nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury

51%

Majcherek K.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

|

2017

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vol. 53

|

issue 4

49-74

EN

This article attempts to analyse the influence of William of Ockham’s views upon the transition from the medieval to the modern understanding of the final directedness of nature (i.e. the non-rational entities). To begin, the views of a number of modern authors on the idea of natural final causality are analysed. A “traditional” interpretation according to which the transition from the medieval period to modern times involved giving up the notion of a final causality in the natural sciences, and replacing it with efficient causality is criticised. The author favours instead a recent and more subtle interpretation, pointing out that modern philosophy does not reject final causality; rather, it offers a reinterpretation of this notion. Accordingly, the author proposes to distinguish between two different strands within modern philosophy. The next part of the article is an analysis of Ockham’s views , focusing in particular on the themes that – it is claimed here – could have influenced the birth of the modern understanding of natural final causality. The author characterises and discusses four such themes, and tries to associate them with the aforementioned two strands in the modern approach to the teleology of nature.

PL

Artykuł ten stanowi próbę omówienia wpływu, jaki poglądy Williama Ockhama wywarły na przejście od średniowiecznego do nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury (tj. celowości bytów nierozumnych). Rozważeniu poddaje się sposób, w jaki do idei celowości świata natury odnosili się wybrani autorzy nowożytni. Krytyce poddaje się „tradycyjną” interpretację przejścia, jakie dokonać miało się w tym aspekcie między średniowieczem a nowożytnością, podług której nowożytność miała przynieść całkowity kres posługiwaniu się celowością w filozofii natury, zastępując ją odwołaniami do przyczynowości sprawczej. Następnie wskazuje się na nowsze, bardziej subtelne próby podejścia do tego zagadnienia, wskazujące na to, iż w filozofii nowożytnej mamy raczej do czynienia z reinterpretacją, a nie porzuceniem idei przyczynowości celowej. W związku z tym autor artykułu proponuje wyróżnienie w obrębie owej filozofii dwóch głównych nurtów. Dalszą część stanowi analiza koncepcji Ockhama, polegająca na wskazaniu w niej tych wątków, które – jak się twierdzi – mogły wywrzeć szczególny wpływ na narodziny nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury. Autor wymienia cztery takie wątki, próbując je powiązać z wyróżnionymi wcześniej dwoma nurtami nowożytnego rozumienia teleologii natury.

18

Idea korelacji między wolnością a modalnością na podstawie dzieła Roberta Grosseteste De libero arbitrio

51%

Wierdak D.

Studia Sandomierskie. Teologia-Filozofia-Historia

|

2020

|

vol. 27

353-362

EN

The article presents the correlation between freedom and modality that has become the subject of the philosophical research of the English thinker Robert Grosseteste. This excellent but little-known scholastic author has included his reflections on freedom on the pages of De libero arbitrio. Grosseteste drew his most important philosophical inspirations from ancient and medieval philosophy, especially from Aristotle. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that it is possible to compare freedom and modality by introducing atemporal terms.

PL

Artykuł prezentuje korelację pomiędzy wolnością a modalnością, która stała się przedmiotem filozoficznych badań angielskiego myśliciela, Roberta Grosseteste. Ten znakomity, choć mało znany autor scholastyczny przedstawił swoje rozważania na temat wolności na kartach traktatu De libero arbitrio. Najważniejsze inspiracje filozoficzne Grosseteste czerpał ze źródła filozofii starożytnej i średniowiecznej, zwłaszcza od Arystotelesa. Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że dzięki wprowadzeniu pojęć atemporalnych możliwe jest zestawienie ze sobą wolności i modalności.

19

Marcin Tkaczyk’s Ockhamism, or Whether the Theory of Contingentia Praeterita is the only Plausible Solution to the Problem of Futura Contingentia

51%

ŁUKASIEWICZ D.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2018

|

vol. 66

|

issue 4

115-134

EN

In the first part of this article, we point out and discuss these the contained in Marcin Tkaczyk’s book, Futura Contingentia, with which we agree completely or at least partially. In the second part of the paper, we seek to consider whether the solution of the futura contingentia prob¬lem, rooted in the basic intuitions of William of Ockham, is the only one possible and availa¬ble for us. We argue that there is another possible approach to the problem of how to re-concile di¬vine omniscience with contingent events rather than the Ockhamist solution. The alter-native view, which we suggest, is “eternalism”, meaning that God is timeless, and that temporal necessity is compatible with contingent events and free decisions.

PL

W części pierwszej artykułu wskazujemy i pokrótce omawiamy niektóre tezy zawarte w roz-prawie Futura contingentia Marcina Tkaczyka, z którymi się solidaryzujemy w pełni lub w du-żym stopniu. W drugiej części zastanawiamy się, czy rzeczywiście rozwiązanie problemu przy-szłych zdarzeń przygodnych, zgodne z koncepcją Ockhama, jest jedynym możliwym rozwią¬za-niem dla problemu futura contingentia. Jako propozycję alternatywną proponujemy stanowisko zwane eternalizmem. Tezą główną eternalizmu jest, że Bóg istnieje poza czasem i że konieczność temporalna nie wyklucza przygodności zdarzeń w tym libertariańskiej wolności woli.

20

Wokół Istnienia Poszczególnego, niezależności i konieczności. Kilka uwag w perspektywie monadyzmu biologicznego Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza

51%

Kmiecikowski W.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

|

2023

|

vol. 20

7-28

EN

The aim of this article is to present the issue of independence and necessity in the philosophical refl ection of Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, which is a constant component of the system created by this thinker. Accordingly, an analysis of selected representative writings of Witkiewicz has been undertaken. The result of the considerations contained in the article is the postulation of a discussion on the subject of the (excluded) Necessary Being and the Mystery of Existence.

PL

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja zagadnienia niezależności i konieczności w filozoficznej refleksji Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza, które jest stałym komponentem systemu tworzonego przez tego myśliciela. W związku z tym podjęto analizę wybranych reprezentatywnych pism Witkiewicza. Wynikiem rozważań zawartych w artykule jest postulat dyskusji na temat (wykluczonego) Bytu Koniecznego i Tajemnicy Istnienia.

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