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EN
The Author is interested in the states of becoming silent, discontinuing one’s utterance, which are associated with certain mechanisms of the functioning of the brain, as well as in the observation of such states in different artistic disciplines. Looking for an answer to the question how aposiopesis operates in words, sounds, and images, she analyzes pieces of music, poems (Zbigniew Herbert’s Pora), and examples of visual arts (Wojciech Pakmur’s paintings of the tango). In her reconstruction of the research field, the Author refers to rhetoric ( Jerzy Ziomek, Seweryna Wysłouch), the philosophy of language (Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard), and neurophenomenology. The aim of the article is to suggest a new mode of reading that seeks inspiration and language in works from the field of neuropsychology (Maria Pąchalska), hermeneutic phenomenology (Mark Johnson), or neurology (António Damásio, Oliver Sacks). The Author’s analyses refer to Raoul Schrott and Arthur Jacobs’s concept (Gehirn und Gedicht, 2011), and the conclusions confirm that one should not look for a model (pattern) in the reception of art, but describe mental processes. The proposed mechanism of interpretation is most accurately reflected by the metaphor of dance improvisation, where one does not meditate on and then perform particular steps and gestures, but “thinks in motion.” This mode of reading emphasizes the spatial dimension of thought processes and their dynamic nature.
PL
The Author is interested in the states of becoming silent, discontinuing one’s utterance, which are associated with certain mechanisms of the functioning of the brain, as well as in the observation of such states in different artistic disciplines. Looking for an answer to the question how aposiopesis operates in words, sounds, and images, she analyzes pieces of music, poems (Zbigniew Herbert’s Pora), and examples of visual arts (Wojciech Pakmur’s paintings of the tango). In her reconstruction of the research field, the Author refers to rhetoric ( Jerzy Ziomek, Seweryna Wysłouch), the philosophy of language (Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard), and neurophenomenology. The aim of the article is to suggest a new mode of reading that seeks inspiration and language in works from the field of neuropsychology (Maria Pąchalska), hermeneutic phenomenology (Mark Johnson), or neurology (António Damásio, Oliver Sacks). The Author’s analyses refer to Raoul Schrott and Arthur Jacobs’s concept (Gehirn und Gedicht, 2011), and the conclusions confirm that one should not look for a model (pattern) in the reception of art, but describe mental processes. The proposed mechanism of interpretation is most accurately reflected by the metaphor of dance improvisation, where one does not meditate on and then perform particular steps and gestures, but “thinks in motion.” This mode of reading emphasizes the spatial dimension of thought processes and their dynamic nature. 
EN
The aim of this paper is a short overview of the book of Evan Thompson Waking, Dreaming, Being. Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, with some polemic remarks. Thompson presents an interesting approach to the problem of cognition, knowledge and selfknowledge the problems considered in philosophy, psychology, neurosciences, which if they interact create an interdisciplinary platform called “cognitive sciences”. However, Thompson proposes to bring on the debate within the field of a new discipline: contemplative neuroscience, for which he argues in the presented book. Using the methodology offered by this new kind of science he analyzes such phenomena as dream, perception, imagination, and even dying all of them in reference to the problem of what consciousness is.
PL
Przedmiotem analizy w artykule są korzyści i trudności, które niesie ze sobą wykorzystywanie niektórych rozwiązań wypracowanych w ramach stanowiska fenomenologicznego w badaniach kognitywistycznych nad podmiotem poznania. Wskażę, jakie znaczenie można nadać pojęciu naturalizowania fenomenologii, oraz jakie związki zachodzą pomiędzy obiema dziedzinami badań nad poznaniem – fenomenologią i kognitywistyką. W artykule przywołam próbę uzasadnienia owocności nowej dziedziny badań nad podmiotem poznania – neurofenomenologii wyrosłej ze splotu różnych tradycji filozoficznych. Jej zwolennicy borykają się zwłaszcza z problemem uzgodnienia metodologii, która łączy w sobie pierwszoosobową metodę fenomenologii oraz trzecioosobową metodę nauk szczegółowych. W artykule pokażę, że naturalizowanie fenomenologii rozumianej jako stanowisko filozoficzne wobec podmiotu poznającego jest przedsięwzięciem niemożliwym do zrealizowania. Większa nadzieja leży w próbach wykorzystania pewnych elementów metody fenomenologicznej w badaniach kognitywistycznych. Celem sięgania po owe elementy jest uzyskanie opisu świadomego doświadczenia dużo bardziej bezpośredniego i przez to dokładniejszego od opisu introspekcyjnego. Zwolennicy takiego podejścia mają nadzieję na rozwój nauki o perspektywie pierwszoosobowej dalekiej od introspekcjonizmu i psychologii zdroworozsądkowej.
EN
The paper presents benefits and difficulties carried by the project of incorporating the method of phenomenology into cognitive science. I explain the consequences of naturalizing phenomenology and analyse relations between the two lines of reflection on cognition – phenomenology and cognitive science. I also present some difficulties associated with neurophenomenology introduced by Francisco Varela. Neurophenomenology grows out from four philosophical traditions founded on different or even incompatible assumptions on the cognitive subject. The main task for this discipline is to determine a consistent set of assumptions and methods which could constitute a theoretical ground composed of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. In the paper I argue that naturalizing phenomenology is an illusion. The only hope for a joined reflection on cognition lies in researches which combine the method of phenomenological reduction with the neuroscientific method of picturing the activity of the brain. Revealing neural correlates of the firstperson experiences awakens hope for development of science about first-person perspective which is based neither on introspection nor on folk psychology, but on phenomenological reduction, and which together with cognitive science constitute the new value in the reflection on cognition.
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Trauma and Phenomenology

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EN
The phenomenology of trauma is a historical, epistemological, and methodic inquiry that wishes to test the validity of an already settled dynamic model of surprise as shock-rupture based on its correlated inner structures of attention (as an open awaiting) and emotion (as a perduring resonance). Thanks to an integrative approach, crossing (micro)phenomenological subjective experiences and empirical (neuro and physiological) data, we hope to renew the understanding of the blank lived experience of trauma and the passive preconscious dynamics of traumatism, as well as to generate possible therapeutic effects.
EN
The paper presents benefits and difficulties carried by the project of incorporating the method of phenomenology into cognitive science. I explain the consequences of naturalizing phenomenology and analyse relations between the two lines of reflection on cognition – phenomenology and cognitive science. I also present some difficulties associated with neurophenomenology introduced by Francisco Varela. Neurophenomenology grows out from four philosophical traditions founded on different or even incompatible assumptions on the cognitive subject. The main task for this discipline is to determine a consistent set of assumptions and methods which could constitute a theoretical ground composed of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. In the paper I argue that naturalizing phenomenology is an illusion. The only hope for a joined reflection on cognition lies in researches which combine the method of phenomenological reduction with the neuroscientific method of picturing the activity of the brain. Revealing neural correlates of the firstperson experiences awakens hope for development of science about first-person perspective which is based neither on introspection nor on folk psychology, but on phenomenological reduction, and which together with cognitive science constitute the new value in the reflection on cognition.
PL
Przedmiotem analizy w artykule są korzyści i trudności, które niesie ze sobą wykorzystywanie niektórych rozwiązań wypracowanych w ramach stanowiska fenomenologicznego w badaniach kognitywistycznych nad podmiotem poznania. Wskażę, jakie znaczenie można nadać pojęciu naturalizowania fenomenologii, oraz jakie związki zachodzą pomiędzy obiema dziedzinami badań nad poznaniem – fenomenologią i kognitywistyką. W artykule przywołam próbę uzasadnienia owocności nowej dziedziny badań nad podmiotem poznania – neurofenomenologii wyrosłej ze splotu różnych tradycji filozoficznych. Jej zwolennicy borykają się zwłaszcza z problemem uzgodnienia metodologii, która łączy w sobie pierwszoosobową metodę fenomenologii oraz trzecioosobową metodę nauk szczegółowych. W artykule pokażę, że naturalizowanie fenomenologii rozumianej jako stanowisko filozoficzne wobec podmiotu poznającego jest przedsięwzięciem niemożliwym do zrealizowania. Większa nadzieja leży w próbach wykorzystania pewnych elementów metody fenomenologicznej w badaniach kognitywistycznych. Celem sięgania po owe elementy jest uzyskanie opisu świadomego doświadczenia dużo bardziej bezpośredniego i przez to dokładniejszego od opisu introspekcyjnego. Zwolennicy takiego podejścia mają nadzieję na rozwój nauki o perspektywie pierwszoosobowej dalekiej od introspekcjonizmu i psychologii zdroworozsądkowej.
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