Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  neutralność światopoglądowa państwa
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
PL
Today’s Europe is dominated by secular states. The principles of secular state in Europe are promoted by the diversity of religious and philosophical population, especially by the large percentage of the population of non-believers. The contemporary principle of secular state serves no longer to reduce the social significance of religion or religious organizations. Secular states frequently interact with religious organizations for general public scopes. A way of expressing the principle of secularism in constitutional acts is diversified – often it is necessary a complex analysis of the content of the constitution. The principle of secular state is directly expressed in Europe in the constitutions of approximately 14% of countries. State Secularism is frequently equated with the principle of separation between church and state. In Europe, however, there are countries that are exceptions to this rule. In total the formula of the separation between church and state is expressed in approximately 25% of European constitutions. Often this principle is expressed in the constitutions in a veiled form. As the most important feature of a secular state is considered the principle of the neutrality of the worldview. However, it is rarely explicitly expressed in the European constitutions. It spread rather by the constitutional court decisions and the statements of legal doctrine.
PL
Today’s Europe is dominated by secular states. The principles of secular state in Europe are promoted by the diversity of religious and philosophical population, especially by the large percentage of the population of non-believers. The contemporary principle of secular state serves no longer to reduce the social significance of religion or religious organizations. Secular states frequently interact with religious organizations for general public scopes. A way of expressing the principle of secularism in constitutional acts is diversified – often it is necessary a complex analysis of the content of the constitution. The principle of secular state is directly expressed in Europe in the constitutions of approximately 14% of countries. State Secularism is frequently equated with the principle of separation between church and state. In Europe, however, there are countries that are exceptions to this rule. In total the formula of the separation between church and state is expressed in approximately 25% of European constitutions. Often this principle is expressed in the constitutions in a veiled form. As the most important feature of a secular state is considered the principle of the neutrality of the worldview. However, it is rarely explicitly expressed in the European constitutions. It spread rather by the constitutional court decisions and the statements of legal doctrine.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
|
2018
|
vol. 18
|
issue 2
195-214
EN
Summary   Many legal scholars have claimed that historically religious freedom could be considered the “prototype” of all the other human rights. Thus it is not surprising that the well-established status of religious freedom is present in the international legal documents on human rights. Religious freedom has a very strong foundation in positive law, alongside freedom of conscience and freedom of thought. However, recently its status as a special right has been denied more and more often. This is mainly due to problems with establishing the grounds for its special status: it is hard to say what sets religion apart from other, non-religious views, while at the same time maintaining the special status and privileges of religion as against other views which are not guaranteed such privileges. This article attempts to reconstruct and analyse the grounds for religious freedom presented by two antithetical trends in the contemporary philosophy of law, viz. liberalism and communitarianism.
PL
W nauce prawa prezentowane było stanowisko głoszące, że wolność religijna, historycznie rzecz biorąc, jest „prototypem” wszystkich pozostałych praw człowieka. Nie może więc dziwić ugruntowany status wolności religijnej w dokumentach międzynarodowego prawa praw człowieka. Wolność ta znajduje bardzo mocne oparcie pozytywnoprawne, występując obok wolności sumienia i myśli. Pozycja wolności religijnej jako specjalnego prawa jest jednak coraz częściej negowana. Wskazywane są problemy z jej uzasadnieniem. Wynikać mają one zasadniczo z braku możliwości przypisania religii przekonującej differentia specifca w konfrontacji z innymi, niereligijnymi poglądami, przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu szczególnego statusu i uprawnień z niej wypływających, niegwarantowanych tym poglądom. W artykule podejmuję próbę odtworzenia i oceny uzasadnień wolności religijnej prezentowanych przez dwa przeciwstawne nurty współczesnej filozofii prawa – liberalizm i komunitaryzm.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest kwestii obecności argumentacji religijnej w sferze publicznej. Postawione zostaje pytanie o to czy ten rodzaj argumentacji powinien być dopuszczalny w dyskusji publicznej jako wystarczająca podstawa np. dla prawodawstwa, czy też nie, a w razie twierdzącej odpowiedzi – jakie powinny być warunki obecności tej argumentacji. Autor opisuje przebieg i wyniki dyskusji toczącej się w tym przedmiocie w Stanach Zjednoczonych począwszy od lat 80` XX w., rozważa dlaczego kwestie, które są raczej oczywiste w dużej większości innych liberalnych demokracji wywołały tak emocjonalną dyskusję w amerykańskiej humanistyce. Postawiona zostaje teza, że historyczne przykłady pozytywnej bądź negatywnej roli religii w życiu społecznym są zbyt słabą podstawą dla budowania jakiegokolwiek stanowiska w komentowanym zakresie. W ostatniej części artykułu wnioski filozoficznoprawne konfrontowane są z orzecznictwem Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka dotyczącym wolności religii.
EN
The article is devoted to the question of the presence of religious argumentation in the public sphere. The crucial problem is whether the religious argument should be completely accepted in the public discussion as sufficient basis for e.g. law-making or not, and – if so – what are necessary conditions of the presence of such factor. The author writes about course and results of the debate on pointed issue which has started in The United States in the late 80s of XX century. He also wonders why issues which are rather obvious for the great majority of other liberal and democratic countries involves such emotional discussions in American humanities. One of the author’s observations is that historical examples neither with the positive or negative influence of religion on social life are too weak ground for building any position to the considered problem. In the last part of the article, the philosophical conclusions are compared with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in regards to the freedom of religion.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.