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EN
It has been suggested that in nonsense literature the form sometimes directs the events of the story (Tigges 1988, Lecercle 1994). Translation of a poem may make this even more evident, as with "Mr Pii Poo" (1956, originally “Herra Pii Poo”), a poem by the Finnish author Kirsi Kunnas, born in 1924. "Mr Pii Poo" tells a story about a magician in a conflict between rural and urban elements, a figure who is introduced also as a witch and who could at the same time be interpreted as an alter ego for the poet Kunnas. In this poem, Kirsi Kunnas binds a bizarre bundle of rhymed and free verses around the Finnish word noita (a witch) and its multiple uses as a noun, a pronoun and a case ending. Sirke Happonen discusses nonsense elements of this witty and whimsical poem by describing its translation process from Finnish into English – a piece of work she has done with the help of her nonsensical colleagues. (As a small epilogue, Happonen presents a "movable reading" of another poem by Kunnas called “Kattila ja perunat”, "The Pan and the Potatoes".)
EN
The main objective of my article is the presentation and critical analysis of two possible interpretations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I juxtapose the so-called resolute reading with the metaphysical reading. The crucial dissimilarity between these interpretations is that they ascribe different roles to the sentences contained in the Tractatus. According to the metaphysical reading, these sentences – although they are nonsensical from the point of view of the Tractatus – attempt to express a certain view of reality and language, whereas according to the resolute reading, these sentences are mere nonsense and only seem to make sense; they exemplify nonsense and therefore show the nonsensicality of philosophical theories. I consider the objections against both interpretations and point out that although the resolute reading adequately presents and explains many questions concerning Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it requires essential modifications. In the last part of my article, I suggest that the sentences of the Tractatus do not function as propositions but as rules of translation.
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ES
El sinsentido de la guerra de Malvinas no se debió a que fuera una guerra que no podía ganarse, sino a que fue una guerra que no convenía ganar (ganarla habría supuesto seguramente una prolongación de la dictadura militar imperante). Esa ausencia de sentido plantea un desafío visceral a las narraciones de la guerra, que se encara de maneras distintas según se trate de narraciones ficcionales o testimoniales.
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The Adventures in Wonderland: Alice's translation

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EN
The article presents Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as a classical work within the genre of fantasy, or literature of nonsense. The classification is made according to the “five procedures,” postulated for the genre by the American poet and scholar, Susan Stewart. From the point of view of the translator, the procedures make it possible to define the dominant of the book as the tension between the sane protagonist and the mad world of Wonderland. The criterion of dominant, combined by requirements imposed by double readership, makes it possible to characterize Polish translations of the book, which make a translation series. What becomes a challenge for the translator is the wide context of the book, which changes over time. It is possible to trace, within the series, some general tendencies, as well as to demonstrate that, ultimately, translating Alice becomes “translating Alice.”
EN
Nonsense and humour are two cognitive and linguistic phenomena that frequently overlap. The focus of this article falls on chosen instances of humorous nonsense poetry, targeted at English-speaking children, which contains verbal and visual modes of expression. Formal sources of nonsense-creation in natural language can be several, among others semantic anomaly, syntactic ill-formedness and structural ambiguity, phonetic and graphological experimentation. The interplay of nonsense with the visuality of the text in children's poetry assumes three distinct forms: 1) visual poems, 2) multimodal texts,, where illustrations, often nonensical and funny in themselves, support the verbal text, and 3) texts based on the phonetic play. Examples will be drawn from the classics of the Anglophone children's poetry: Mother Goose, the Victorian classics L. Carroll and E. Lear, 20th-c. British and American poets - L. Hughes, e.e. cummings, T. Hughes, J. Agard, as well as the Polish-British pair W. Graniczewski and R. Shindler. In all the poems to be analyzed multimodality has an important role to play in the creation and strengthening of the effect of humorous bisociation/incongruity. A tight intertwining of the phonetic, semantic and visual layers in such texts becomes an additional challenge for their translators. The theoretical keystone for our considerations remains H. Bergson's study Laughter (1900/2008), which deftly combines the Superiority, the Incongruity and the Release Theory of Modern Humour Studies. Bergson rightly links the sources and effects of the nonsensical and the comic to the notion of game/play and to the idea of dream-like illusion they create.
EN
This article compares the nonsense works of Lewis Carroll to the poetry of the canonical Hebrew poet Yona Wallach. Both writers present literary works which are not based on the logic of 'ordinary' reality, but rather on systems of unfamiliar, surreal and 'dreamlike' logic. However, Carroll's logical nonsense is famously comical and playful in nature. Unlike him, Yona Wallach's poetry is mostly regarded as 'serious', even tragic, with a 'doom-like' atmosphere hovering over it. Nonetheless, and precisely because of their considerable dissimilarity, the comparison between Yona Wallach and Lewis Carroll discloses their surprising similarity. In this artiel will examine two mechanisms in which they both play with the conventional meanings of words and use them incongruously, non-commonsensically.Throughout this article, Carroll reveals his serious and gloomy face whereas Wallach reveals her (hardly spoken of) logical and amused face.Thus, the contrasts between the comically playful accuracy of Carroll's work and Wallach's ambiguous and mostly "dark" poetry, sheds light on their respective mechanisms of signification and humor-making, in a manner indiscernible when each is treated in isolation.
EN
Due to the limitations of the subjective (own competence) and the objective (article’s volume), I decided to focus on the phenomenon or rather a sense of humor and surrealism. I understand humor as a spe-cifically human power, sensitivity and individual way of feeling different comic phenomena (including absurd and ironic phenomena). Surrealism in visual arts (broadly – in the art of interlaced threads of the surreal) in the right way is testing the recipient’s (as creator) sense of humor. Surreal humor suspended between intellect, emotions and pleasure rarely becomes frustrating; more often – cathartic. It does not include any depreciating properties of laughter which may arise when there is a sense of superiority over the others. Humor contributes to taming the absurd, which is, nolens volens, an integral part of our lives. I search for answers to the following question: ‘What does surrealistic humor purifies in us?’. I analyze functions (anti-functions?) in surrealist objects by Man Ray, Marcel Duchamp, Meret Oppenheim, Oscar Dominguez, Marcel Jean, Marcel Marien and others.
EN
In this article the “translatability” (and/or untranslatability) of nonsense is addressed. For this purpose, five Swedish versions of Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem “Jabberwocky” from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass (1871) are examined: the vocabulary, the syntax, the metre and rhythm, as well as the poem’s contextual framing, here mainly understood as the narrative in which Jabberwocky is embedded. Attention is also paid to the generic and stylistic context of the poem, and the corpus of Swedish translations. Such an exegesis is warranted by the status of Jabberwocky both as a seminal work of nonsense and as a translation showpiece. Influential critics, from Elizabeth Sewell (1952) to Jean-Paul Lecercle (1994) have used Jabberwocky as a key nonsense text. And even when it is to question whether Jabberwocky is a good example or not – Michael Heyman, for instance, argues that Jabberwocky is something of an “outlier” in the realm of nonsense since its nonsense is linguistic rather than logical (2015) – it remains a defining nonsense text. Moreover, it also a pivotal text in translation history. Indeed, because of the perceived difficulties in translating it, Jabberwocky has rightfully been called “the holy grail of translation” (Heyman 2015), something that is borne out by the large number of studies devoted to it, such as Orero Pilar’s 2007 monograph of several Spanish versions of Jabberwocky. What I bring to this critical discussion is empirical material that has not been brought to light before (the Swedish translations), and a new perspective. 
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics
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2011
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vol. 7
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issue 2
189-204
EN
How should we understand Wittgenstein's proposals that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein 1953, §43) and that a name only has a meaning in a language-game (ibid. §49)? Are they incompatible with occasion-invariant semantics? In this paper I present two leading interpretations of Wittgenstein's contextualism: James Conant's meaning-eliminativism (ME) and Charles Travis's meaning-underdetermination (MU). I argue that, even though these two interpretations are very similar, the latter gives a more nuanced account of Wittgenstein's contextualism which does not involve a commitment to the claim that words have no meaning outside immediate contexts of use.
EN
Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
EN
These deliberations may be considered a reaction to the words of encouragement formulated by E. Grodziński to extend his Zarys teorii nonsensu (1981). They are not, however, meant to provide a continuation of the issues discussed by this author in his monograph on nonsense. In fact, they are aimed at entering into a dialogue with some of the solutions and ideas presented by him, in particular those ones which can, to some extent, refer to my field of interest, i.e. the meaning of nonsense, and its synonyms. Polemical reflections on the theses presented in Grodziński’s book lead to determining the direction which semantic investigations of the concept of nonsense should take.
EN
Individuals differ in their appreciation of jokes and cartoons with respect to the structure of the humorous material (e.g., whether the jokes and cartoons are can be categorised in terms of incongruity-resolution or in terms of nonsense), as well as content (e.g., whether they contain sexual themes or not). While the 3WD (3 jokes dimensions) test allows for the measurement of such differences in a paper-pencil test of verbal jokes and visual cartoons, humour transported by other media, such as TV advertisements, has not been included so far. The current study aimed at assessing the appreciation of jokes and cartoons alongside the appreciation of humorous TV ads that were pre-categorized according to the structure and content factors of the 3WD. Moreover, relationships to personality and willingness to buy were also assessed. A sample of 134 adult participants completed the study. A joint factor analysis of the 3WD scores and humour appreciation in TV ads shows a five-factor structure, with three factors denominating the appreciation of incongruity-resolution humour, nonsense humour and sexual humour, a fourth factor denominating the liking of incongruity resolution humour with sexual themes (in both ads and jokes) and an advertisement specific factor. Thus, the 3WD dimensions can also be verified in humorous ads. Psychoticism and sensation seeking correlated negatively with the perceived funniness of incongruity resolution humour, replicating findings for the 3WD and additionally showing that the relationships are similar with respect to humour appreciation in TV advertisements. Moreover, the appreciation of humour predicted the willingness of the individual to buy the product or use the service. To conclude, the structure of humour appreciation is generalizable across media. Yet, there is also some advertisement specific variance and future studies may address the question of whether the 3WD covers all aspects of humour appreciation across media types. Moreover, knowing the target group of a product (and personality features of this group) may help to tailor the humour of the advertisement to match the “humour taste” of potential customers.
EN
This article is an analysis of Wisława Szymborska’s style of reading used by the poet in her quasi-reviews collected in Lektury nadobowiązkowe [Non-compulsory readings]. The ludic poetics of the book is closely related to the author’s inclination towards curiosity and nonsense humour which expresses her typical “sense of oddness”. The aim of the reading is thus to reveal in radically diverse texts (a floristic compendium or a popular guidebook How to live more comfortably side by side with Montaigne’s Essays or Nietzsche’s Aphorisms) some uncommon details, humorous paradoxes and unexpected facts and incidents. Szymborska’s way of reading, animated by the spirit of a sophisticated play, has also its source in the historic concept of cabinets of curiosities, reflected here in the Bibliotheca Curiosa as well as in Julian Tuwim’s device cicer cum caule structuring his famous collection of “useless knowledge”.
PL
Artykuł stanowi analizę praktyk czytelniczych stosowanych przez Wisławę Szymborską w ramach tak zwanych lektur nadobowiązkowych. Zgromadzony w obszernym tomie zbiór książkowych quasi-recenzji reprezentuje twórczość ludyczną, której źródłem jest właściwy poetce – miłośniczce kuriozów i nonsensowego humoru – zmysł dziwności. Celem lektury, obejmującej różnorodne pod względem tematycznym i gatunkowym teksty (podręcznik bukieciarstwa czy popularny poradnik Jak mieszkać wygodniej sąsiaduje tu z Próbami de Montaigne’a czy z Aforyzmami Nietzschego), jest zatem poszukiwanie w nich niezwykłych szczegółów, komicznych paradoksów czy zaskakujących faktów i zdarzeń. Czytaniu Szymborskiej, podporządkowanemu poetyce wyrafinowanej zabawy, wydaje się patronować zarówno idea dawnych gabinetów osobliwości, której odpowiednikiem w przypadku rzeczywistości książkowej staje się swoista, odzwierciedlająca kierunek lektury Bibliotheca Curiosa, jak i Tuwimowska zasada cicer cum caule, określająca podstawę stworzonej przez poetę kolekcji „niepotrzebnych wiadomości”.
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Paradoks kłamcy

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EN
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed. In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski’s solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premises of any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: ‘the reconstruction’ of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct. In the second part I present an approach to the liar which appeals to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language. The conclusion of my consideration is that the liar sentence is nonsense, which means it is not given any sense – either its logical form is determined but we do not fix any definite meaning to some parts of it, or an attempt to determine its logical form in the standard way leads to regress ad infinitum.
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