Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help
Authors help
Years help

Results found: 61

first rewind previous Page / 4 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  normativity
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 4 next fast forward last
EN
The article discusses Monika Szczepaniak monograph: Habitus żołnierski w literaturze i kulturze polskiej w kontekście Wielkiej Wojny [Habitus Soldier in Polish Literature and Culture in the Context of the Great War]. Following the changes taking place in the Polish habitus at the beginning of the 20th century, the author analyzes the strategies of creating a hegemonic normative militarized masculinity, which in its Polish variant refers to the heroic Romantic-Sarmatian models. In this context, the author discusses minority narratives, presenting various non-heroic masculinity superseded by dominant discourses.
2
Content available remote

Etyka filozoficzna jako normatywna refleksja krytyczna

94%
EN
Distinguishing philosophical ethics from morality, the author defines the former by indicating its normative, reflective and critical disposition. The author agrees with Robert Spaemann that philosophical ethics cannot be treated as a theory of morality; it has to be understood rather as a reflection that elucidates cognitively not only the object to be studied, but also the studying subject. In the next part of his article, the author explains the normative nature of ethics and refers to the typology of moral norms by Georg Henrik von Wright. According to this typology, the normativity of philosophical ethics does not reduce itself to a specificity of rules, prescriptions and directives. In the third and last part of the article the author, in reference to Nicolai Hartmann, postulates the three-level method of ethical research. On the first level of research, ethics should be the domain of the phenomenology of morality; on the second level – the aporetic of morality; on the third level – the theory of morality. This three-level method of research could make philosophical ethics critical to its attempts and findings, which is indispensable.
PL
Odróżniając etykę filozoficzną od moralności, definiuje autor tę pierwszą przez wskazanie na jej normatywny, refleksyjny i krytyczny charakter. Autor zgadza się z Robertem Spaemannem, że etyki filozoficznej nie można ujmować jako teorii moralności, lecz należy rozumieć ją jako refleksję, która poznawczo oświetla nie tylko badany przedmiot, ale także badający podmiot. W kolejnej części autor wyjaśnia normatywny charakter etyki przez odwołania się do zaproponowanej przez Georga Henrika von Wrighta typologii norm moralnych. Zgodnie z nią, normatywność etyki filozoficznej nie wyczerpuje się w specyfice reguł, preskrypcji i dyrektyw. W trzeciej części artykułu, autor w nawiązaniu do Nicolaia Hartmanna postuluje trzystopniową metodę badań etycznych. Na pierwszym etapie badań etyka miałaby być fenomenologii moralności, na drugim aporetyką moralności, na trzecim zaś teorii moralności. Trzystopniowa metoda badań miałaby zapewnić etyce filozoficznej niezbędną krytyczność wobec własnych usiłowań i wyników.
3
94%
Poradnik Językowy
|
2023
|
vol. 804
|
issue 5
93-100
EN
This article discusses the change in the normative qualification of the verb ubrać/ubierać (‘to dress’) in the sense ‘to wear’. This meaning, and hence collocations such as ubrać płaszcz, ubrać sukienkę, ubrać kapelusz have been consistently evaluated as linguistic errors, which is evidenced by both dictionary entries and prescriptive advice. Looking into the scope of usage of this type of expressions – their commonness in speech and writing among Poles of various social classes from southern and western Poland – enforces a consideration of whether this meaning of the verb ubrać/ubierać should not be included into the group of regionalisms accepted as a norm of regional usage. As a sidenote, the emerging question is whether there actually are any normatively unaccepted regionalisms or the unacceptance should be ascribed only to dialecticisms in general language.
Umění (Art)
|
2020
|
vol. 68
|
issue 3
271-277
EN
For Adolf Loos architectural meaning was not inherent in one‘s materials. Meaning, in other words, was historical, changing, and dependent on context. As I argue, Loos‘ normative approach to architectural meaning stood in direct contrast to the rise of an affective account of architecture that began to dominate architectural thinking and practice in the opening decades of the twentieth century. For August Endell, Hermann Obrist, Henry van de Velde and into the Bauhaus, architecture was increasingly conceived as generating material effects through formal qualities inherent in materials. Loos was prescient in his rejection of the growing consensus around the surefire effect of architectural forms and materials. At stake for Loos were qualities of risk, chance and failure that made meaning possible.
CS
Význam architektury pro Adolfa Loose nespočíval ve vlastních materiálech, ale pokládal ho za historický, proměnlivý a závislý na kontextu. Prokazuji, že Loosův normativní přístup k architektonickému významu byl v přímém protikladu ke vzestupu afektivního pojetí architektury, které v architektonickém myšlení a praxi začalo převládat v prvních desetiletích 20. století. Pojetí architektury Augusta Endella, Hermanna Obrista, Henryho van de Veldeho a členů Bauhausu spočívalo především na působení materiálu za využití jeho inherentních formálních vlastností. Loos prozíravě odmítal sílící obecnou shodu na jistém účinku architektonických forem a materiálů. Vsadil na přednosti risku, náhody a selhání dodávající význam.
EN
These considerations take the issue of creating the community in the institution of therapy workshop. Workshops are usually located away from the centers understood as a space location, as well as mental distance from the normativity. These are the reasons, among the other things, because of which the creation of a community is possible in the workshops.
EN
The paper proposes an empirical method to investigate linguistic prescriptions as inherent corrective behaviors. The behaviors in question may but need not necessarily be supported by any explicit knowledge of rules. It is possible to gain insight into them, for example by extracting information about corrections from revision histories of texts (or by analyzing speech corpora where users correct themselves or one another). One easily available source of such information is the revision history of Wikipedia. As is shown, the most frequent and short corrections are limited to linguistic errors such as typos (and editorial conventions adopted in Wikipedia). By perusing an automatically generated revision corpus, one gains insight into the prescriptive nature of language empirically. At the same time, the prescriptions offered are not reducible to descriptions of the most frequent linguistic use.
EN
Where do the rules of critical discussion get their normative force? What kinds of norms are involved? Unreasonable behaviour in the critical discussion - e.g., continuing to assert the contradictory of a proven standpoint, performing some action pragmatically inconsistent with a proven standpoint, or the same with regard to the starting-points agreed to in the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force. I will attempt to fill this gap in pragma-dialectical theory.
Human Affairs
|
2007
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1
71-77
EN
The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.
Human Affairs
|
2007
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1
54-70
EN
This paper examines mortality-the fact that we humans are all going to die-as an issue in philosophical anthropology, by applying a fourfold typology of some key forms of philosophical anthropology to the topic of death and mortality. First, this typology, originally suggested by Heikki Kannisto, is outlined; the mortality issue is, then, viewed from the perspective it opens. Finally, the challenges to our understanding of death and mortality that this perspective may help us meet are discussed. The treatment of mortality from the perspective of philosophical anthropology may make it more understandable in a manner that will highlight the importance of the concept of normativity in the philosophical examination of any such humanly relevant issue.
Human Affairs
|
2015
|
vol. 26
|
issue 2
128-139
EN
The article considers human enhancement from the perspective of liminality. It defines the concept of liminality, introduced by ethnologist van Gennep in an attempt to generalise the rites of passage. It shows how, thanks to Turner, this concept has spread beyond anthropology to characterise the many situations ‘betwixt and between’ associated with transitioning from the original social structure to the new one. The article points out that, by definition, liminal situations break down traditional structures; hence, polemical debates on whether to allow human enhancement cannot be conducted from the position of existing normative standards. It argues, on the contrary, that these must be fundamentally expanded so as to reflect the current transitional phase from treatment to enhancement and that preparations must be made for the policies and institutions that will deal with the consequences. Otherwise, we will face threat of a new kind of totalitarianism.
Glottodidactica
|
2018
|
vol. 45
|
issue 2
89-104
DE
Since the start of the new millennium, research into intercultural communication and intercultural competence has embarked on an open debate on normative orientations for action in situations of intercultural contact. The contribution at hand presents the preliminary results and impressions from a thematic qualitative content analysis of central academic publications on intercultural communication from the past six decades. Earlier utilitarian paradigms on the one side and a growing outreach towards interpretative paradigms from ethnographic research have, of late, steered intercultural communication research into a moral vacuum. Since then, the discipline can be characterized as undergoing a moral turn. As a consequence, future research may face an opportunity of reflecting on its own moral paradigms in order to produce even more precise orientations for action in intercultural contacts
EN
This article is concerned with an analysis of semantics and the normativity of evaluative judgments, in which “aesthetic concepts” and “predicates of personal taste” are used in the context of the evaluation of selected cultural forms (foods and beverages). Qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interviews with representatives in four categories of actors in the cultural field (non-experts, fans, makers, and professional critics) are analyzed. In the light of the findings, theories of aesthetic judgment are critically assessed, which on the one hand, postulate the categorical semantic and normative difference between aesthetic concepts and predicates of personal taste and, on the other hand, conceive aesthetic disputes from an epistemological point of view and do not sufficiently take into account their pragmatic context. In conclusion, a functional analysis of the semantics and normativity of evaluative judgments is presented, in which the speakers use terms from the field of aesthetics.
Human Affairs
|
2009
|
vol. 19
|
issue 1
87-95
EN
Here I discuss two controversial distinctions that have an essential role in Rorty's pragmatism: the distinction between descriptive and normative discourses, and the distinction between the private and public dimensions of human life. Neither of them is Rorty's novelty, but the way he stresses them is unique. The first is a central presupposition of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), while the other is the argumentative base of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). I will argue that the distinctions provide metaphilosophical tools for Rorty's pragmatism, and that our stance towards the latter depends on the plausibility of them.
14
Content available remote

Kant’s Justification of Welfare

71%
Diametros
|
2014
|
issue 39
1-28
EN
For several decades, theorists interested in Kant’s discussion of welfare have puzzled over Kant’s position on the issue of the redistribution of goods in society. They have done this both in order to clarify his position and as a source of inspiration for current conceptual problems faced by contemporary political philosophers who attempt to reconcile the ideal of equal freedom with the asymmetric interference necessary for redistribution and social provision. In this paper, I start with Kant’s brief discussion of welfare in Rechtslehre and I identify four claims that Kant clearly asserts as characteristic for his view. I then outline five main interpretative directions in the literature, I evaluate and rank them. The most accurate view of Kant’s justification of welfare, which I call the “genuinely Kantian” position is, however, unable to explain the nature of the duty of welfare that it asserts. By going back to Kant’s text, I suggest one solution. This solution, together with some further questions, can be seen as initiating a new interpretative direction in the literature.
EN
This article discusses how to interpret the so-called Knobe effect, which refers to the asymmetry in judgments about the intentionality of the side effects caused by one’s actions. The observed tendency is explained through the “moral undertone” of the actions judged. So far, discussions have mostly been held among philosophers in the analytical tradition, who see the theory of morality largely as an ethics of rules. The analysis developed in this article advances the research carried out so far to include teleological ethics, most notably the tradition of Thomistic ethics. Philosophical discussions address the problem of normative orders, focusing in particular on two types of cognition concerned, respectively, with moral judgments and facts. Investigating this issue proves to be helpful not only to explain the Knobe effect, but also to better understand the very notion of an intentional action as employed in the philosophy of action. As a result of this analysis, the Author explains the existing asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality to actions with the respondents’ confusion between cognitive orders. This problem brings us to the issue of normative competences. In analyzing the Knobe effect, normative competences would be responsible for the classification of the data collected and separation of the “purely informative” order from the order of moral judgments, referring to norms or values.
16
Content available remote

Moral Perfection and the Demand for Human Enhancement

71%
Ethics in Progress
|
2015
|
vol. 6
|
issue 1
23-37
EN
In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of selfunderstanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally better future motives”.
EN
The goal of the text is to reconstruct the concept of cultural normativity found in the phenomenological philosophy of law. The starting point of the text is the distinction between cultural normativity and normativity in culture. This distinction is based on reference to an extra-cultural, but not non-human instance – transcendent to the creations of humanity and its world, but in relations with the human equipment, with the characteristics of a specific human being and its existence. The specific relations between cultural and legal normativity can be found in phenomenological concepts of law, which draw on the Husserlian transcendentalism and essentialism. The phenomenology of law attempts to answer the question of the sources, and the ontological and epistemological status of normativity as such. Normativity as a written and unwritten set of norms is characterized by phenomenologists with reference to value and axiology. The values are assumed by them as certain fixed reference points (“horizon of values” given to be recognized), because norms make it possible to establish rules for various individual and collective practices within a particular community and culture on the basis of values.
EN
In previously published papers (Przegląd Sejmowy no. 5(142)/2017 and 2(163)/2021) the authors proposed definitions of notions: normativity, redundancy, and uselessness of the legal text and analysed from a typological point of view the basic units of the integral (articulated) part of normative acts, i.e. legal provisions. In this text, the analysis has been extended to include the other elements of the legal text, i.e.: preambles, titles, subtitles, definitions in brackets, footnotes and attachments, which contain sentences and other elements (tables, equations, graphics, maps, sheet music). The terminology has also been extended to include fragments of provisions, normative acts as a whole, and plural provisions. These elements can (with some definitional amendments) be analysed in the same way as provisions using the categories: “doubles”, “widows”, “orphans”, and “botches”. In their closing remarks, the authors signaled the need to complement the analysis with a theoretical and comparative perspectives: to confront the proposed theses with the leading normative and descriptive theories of legal text drafting and interpretation. The fourth part of this cycle of papers, devoted to these problems, is currently being prepared.
EN
In a previously published article (Przegląd Sejmowy No. 5(142)/2017) the authors proposed definitions of the following concepts: normativity, redundancy and uselessness of a legal text. The article provides a typological review of Polish legal texts. The authors analysed the basic units of the integral (articulated) part of normative acts, i.e. legal provisions, showing their normativity, redundancy, and uselessness. The analyse includes: internal preambles, provisions describing the object and subject scope of the act, legal principles, programme and task provisions, meliorative provisions, emendations, permanently unrealisable regulations, legal definitions. The analyses led to identification of four basic types of errors in legal provisions, which were named: “doubles”, “widows”, “orphans”, and “botches”. In their closing remarks, the authors signalled the need to supplement the analysis with a description of non-integral (non-articulated) parts of normative acts. Another part of the study, devoted to these problems, is currently being prepared.
20
Content available remote

Axioms, axiomatization and law

71%
The Lawyer Quarterly
|
2018
|
vol. 8
|
issue 3
254-270
EN
This paper examines the possibility and the desirability of axiomatization in law. In the first part, the paper examines the notion of axiom and the ways how it was or could be introduced into law. It is here where the authors openly invite the reader to lose the conventional approach and think about alternative ways to build basic legal concepts. In the second part, the paper continues by presenting several theories which endeavored (or appeared to endeavor) to show that law can (and should be) axiomatized and which even attempted to axiomatize it. After establishing whether these theories were successful at all, the authors add some of their own ideas on the topic of axiomatization.
first rewind previous Page / 4 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.