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1

Między determinizmem a prawdopodobieństwem – analiza poglądów Jana Łukasiewicza

100%

Pruski P.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

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2014

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vol. 4

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issue 2

315-324

EN

In the contemporary philosophical debate about probability, one of the main problems concerns the relation between objective probability and determinism. Is it possible for objective probability and determinism to co‑exist? This is one of the questions this dispute tries to answer. The scope of discussion is conducted between advocates of a positive answer (compatibilist) and co‑existence opponents (incompatibilist). In the early twentieth century, many logicians also developed topics regarding probability and determinism. One of them was the outstanding Polish logician and philosopher — Jan Łukasiewicz. The general purpose of this paper is to analyse and implement Łukasiewicz’s views regarding determinism and probability in the contemporary field of this problem. I will try to show the relation between his interpretations of these concepts and in consequence his attempt to confront them. As a result of the above analysis, I present some different positions (located in the fields of logic and semantics) in the contemporary discourse about the relation between objective probability and determinism. Moreover, I will present Łukasiewicz’s views about this relation and the consequence of these solutions in the field of logic. Słowa kluczowe: objective probability; logical determinism; philosophical interpretations of probability

2

Information about objective probability of a lottery and the illusion of control

75%

Chodzyńska K., Polak M.

Polish Psychological Bulletin

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2020

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vol. 51

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issue 4

3

Decision-making under risk and “statistical thinking” in the 20th century (selected models and persons)

63%

Rybicki W.

Mathematical Economics

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2018

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issue 14(21)

71-94

EN

The paper is the second part of the series of articles surveying chosen models of decision-making under “risky circumstances”. The first segment concerned the earlier period of development of so-called “statistical thinking” (up to the times of J. Neyman and E. Pearson) and has been published elsewhere. These “twins” of papers as a whole, are intended as essays (consciously avoiding any formalization) to introduce the subsequent parts of the cycle – conducted in a more formal style. Several problems were discussed in the first part of the series. The leitmotifs, i.e. Bayesian vs. “orthodox” approaches, and the subjective vs. objective probability meaning are continued in this article, and developed towards the “modern needs and directions”. The role of some outstanding scientists is stressed. The possibility of the unification of the different philosophies on the grounds of statistical decision theory (thanks to A. Wald and L.J. Savage) is noted. “Dynamic” or multistage statistical decision procedures will be also indicated (in contrast to “static, “one-shot” problems). The primary role in developing these ideas played by mathematicians A. Wald, L. Shapley, R. Bellman, D. Blackwell and H. Robbins (plus many others) is stressed. The outline is conducted in a “historical perspective” beginning with F. Ramsey’s work and finishing at H. Robbins achievements – as being very influential in the further development of the stochastic methodology. The list of models, to be discussed in the subsequent (“formal-mode”) article/s, is added at the end of the paper. The central role in the notes is played by the “procession” of the prominent representatives of the field. The first “series” of them was presented in the previous part of the cycle. The subsequent (nine) are placed here. These scientists built the milestones of statistical science, “created its spirit,” exquisitely embedding the subject in the “general stochastic world”. The presentation is supplemented with their portraits. The author hopes that some keystones determining the line-up can be recognized in the course of reading. It is not possible to talk about mathematics without mathematics (formulas, calculations, formal reasoning). On the other hand − such beings as probability, uncertainty, risk can be, first of all, regarded as philosophic and logic in their heart of hearts (as well as being somewhat “mysterious”). So, it can turn out illuminating (sometimes) to reveal and to show merely the ideas and “their” heroes (even at the expense of losing the precision!). The role of the bibliography should also be stressed – it is purposely made so large, and significantly completes the presentation.

4

A Frequentist Solution to a Manifestation of Lindley & Phillips’ Stopping Rule Problem in Ecological Realm

45%

Kubiak A. P.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2014

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vol. 50

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issue 2(200)

135-145

EN

In this paper I provide a frequentist philosophical-methodological solution for the stopping rule problem presented by Lindley & Phillips in 1976, which is settled in the ecological realm of testing koalas’ sex ratio. I deliver criteria for discerning a stopping rule, an evidence and a model that are epistemically more appropriate for testing the hypothesis of the case studied, by appealing to physical notion of probability and by analyzing the content of possible formulations of evidence, assumptions of models and meaning of the ecological hypothesis. First, I show the difference in the evidence taken into account in different frequentist sampling procedures presented in the problem. Next, I discuss the inapplicability of the Carnapian principle of total evidence in deciding which formulation of evidence associated with a given sampling procedure and statistical model is epistemically more appropriate for testing the hypothesis in question. Then I propose a double-perspective (evidence and model) frequentist solution based on the choice of evidence which better corresponds to the investigated ecological hypothesis, as well as on the choice of a model that embraces less unrealistic ontological assumptions. Finally, I discuss two perspectives of the stopping rule dependence.

PL

W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam cząstkową propozycję filozoficzno-metodologicznej obrony klasycznej metodologii testowania hipotez statystycznych. Dokonuję tego poprzez próbę odpowiedzi na zarzuty wynikające z problemu stopu przedstawionego przez Lindleya i Phillipsa w 1976 roku, a osadzonego w realiach hipotezy ekologicznej związanej z pytaniem o stosunek płci u młodych osobników gatunku koala. Rozważania rozpoczynam od przedstawienia problemu, następnie omawiam aplikowalność Carnapa zasady całkowitej obserwacji i związek możliwych form obserwacji oraz modeli z hipotezą ekologiczną. W konsekwencji przedstawiam dwa rozwiązania przedstawionego problemu: pierwsze z perspektywy porównywania alternatywnych form formułowania obserwacji, drugie z perspektywy porównywania modeli. Obydwa odwołują się do ontologicznych konsekwencji klasycznej obiektywnej interpretacji prawdopodobieństwa oraz postawionej hipotezy ekologicznej. Argument kończy przedstawienie dwóch perspektyw zależności wyniku testowania hipotezy od wyboru reguły stopu.

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1 ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

1 Mathematical Economics

1 Polish Psychological Bulletin

1 Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

1 Chodzyńska K.

1 Kubiak A. P.

1 Polak M.

1 Pruski P.

1 Rybicki W.

1 2020

1 2018

2 2014

Między determinizmem a prawdopodobieństwem – analiza poglądów Jana Łukasiewicza

Information about objective probability of a lottery and the illusion of control

Decision-making under risk and “statistical thinking” in the 20th century (selected models and persons)

A Frequentist Solution to a Manifestation of Lindley & Phillips’ Stopping Rule Problem in Ecological Realm