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EN
The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state of affairs, the same propositions about the ‘present past’ (the past before the present moment) are true as are true in the present state of affairs. The paper argues that Van Inwagen’s reasoning is inconclusive, it contains the type of mistake of confusing conditional impossibility with unconditional and presents a methodologically wrong method of solving a philosophical problem. It is because in the very construction of the problem determining the available solution. The article points to the possibility that the human freedom of some action is not excluded by the fact that specific past facts logically entail that this event will occur.
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EN
Theists believe that our world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. If God with such traits creates a world, we would expect that the world to have certain features. Such features should be compatible with God’s traits. We do not expect a God who is omnipotent and omniscient to create a poorly-designed world. If we believe that our world is created by God with the aforementioned traits and yet our world is poorly designed, we would either abandon our belief that our world was created by God or we would preserve our belief. If we wish to preserve our belief we would either revise the traits we attribute to him, or we would find a way to justify the co-existence of God with such traits as the creator and a poorly-designed world. In the history of philosophy one feature of our world has been subject to a great many debates, namely ‘evil’. By evil we have all the pain and sufferings that sentient beings go through. God is said to be omnibenevolent, as a result he would not want us to go through pain and suffering. He is also omniscient and omnipotent and therefore he has the knowledge and power to do so. Yet we are facing pain and suffering in this world. For the theists reconciling the existing evil in this world with God is a great challenge and atheists try to argue from evil and prove the non-existence of God. The debate between theists and atheists surrounding the problem of evil presupposes a certain conception of God. The presupposition is that God is a person who possesses a mind, will power and has a moral character. For Wittgenstein attributing personhood to God is a confusion. As a result, for Wittgenstein there can be no ‘problem of evil’ and the debates between the theists and atheists is not engaging with a real problem but a pseudo-problem. The problem of evil does not need a solution and smart arguments and counter-arguments, rather it needs therapy.
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Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor’s Theorem

99%
Forum Philosophicum
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2012
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vol. 17
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issue 2
211-223
EN
Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.
EN
The analysis of the views of Jan Amos Comenius regarding education, treated as a combination of the process of education and upbringing, reveals many innovative pro-posals, as for his times. The interest in his pedagogical thought undoubtedly results from the universality of the adopted assumptions. A significant part of the theory is reflected in modern pedagogical concepts. Comenius' views laid the foundations for the humanistic orientation of pedagogy, which was developing at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. They grew up on the basis of criticism of the school, postulating radical changes in raising and education. The intention of the article is to identify the thoughts of Jan Amos Komenski, which make up the model of an educational school, whose ideas and message find their place in the multidimensional education of the 21st century. The aim of the article is to show the pedagogue's thoughts embedded in the education system, understood as: organisation of school work, planning and implementation of the educational process based on the resources and needs of students, creating student-teacher relationships, taking actions related to shaping attitudes, creating the atmosphere and climate of the school.
PL
Analiza poglądów Jana Amosa Komeńskiego – odnoszących się do edukacji traktowanej jako połączenie procesu kształcenia i wychowania – ujawnia wiele nowatorskich, jak na współczesne mu czasy, propozycji. Zainteresowanie jego myślą pedagogiczną wynika niewątpliwie z uniwersalizmu przyjmowanych przez niego założeń. Znaczna część jego teorii znajduje odzwierciedlenie we współczesnych koncepcjach pedagogicznych. Poglądy Komeńskiego stworzyły podwaliny orientacji humanistycznej w pedagogice, ukształtowanej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Wyrosły na gruncie krytyki szkoły oraz postulowania radykalnych zmian w wychowaniu i kształceniu. Zamierzeniem artykułu jest identyfikacja myśli Jana Amosa Komeńskiego składających się na model szkoły kształcącej, której idea i przesłanie znajdują swoje miejsce w wielowymiarowej edukacji XXI wieku. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie myśli pedagoga osadzonych w systemie kształcenia, rozumianym jako organizacja pracy szkoły, planowanie i realizacja procesu edukacyjnego, bazującego na zasobach i potrzebach uczniów, tworzenie relacji uczeń – nauczyciel, podejmowanie działań związanych  z kształtowaniem postaw, tworzenie atmosfery i klimatu szkoły.
EN
The problem considered in this article concerns the relationship between the pre-scientific and philosophical knowledge of God’s attributes. The paper argues that although common sense does not experience omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence directly in the world, it nevertheless attributes them to God. Common sense, however, cannot justify their attribution to God. The problem of justification arising from a pre-scientific cognition is dealt with, among others, by philosophers. On the one hand, this confirms the idea that philosophy corrects and complements pre-scientific cognition. On the other hand, however, it is argued that pre-scientific knowledge is sufficient to recognise and get acquainted with God’s attributes.
PL
Problem rozważany w tym artykule dotyczy relacji między zdroworozsądkowym a filozoficznym (realistycznym) poznaniem atrybutów Boga. Na przykładzie wszechmocy, wszechwiedzy i wszechobecności Boga dochodzi się do wniosku, że w oparciu o bezpośrednio daną rzeczywistość i przy zastosowaniu tylko poznania zdroworozsądkowego człowiek nie doświadcza tego rodzaju własności w świecie, lecz przypisuje je Bogu. Natomiast sam z siebie nie potrafi ich uzasadnić. Kwestią uzasadnienia problemów, powstających na gruncie poznania potocznego, zajmuje się m.in. filozofia. Dlatego przyjmuje się, że filozofia koryguje i uzupełnia poznanie przednaukowe. Jednakże dla samego orientowania się i uznania wspomnianych przymiotów Boga poznanie zdroworozsądkowe jest wystarczające.
EN
The article was inspired by the tenth anniversary of the death of Archbishop Życiński and the article containing polemic with his panentheism published by Wojtysiak. Wojtysiak claims that the essence of theism is the thesis about the existential self sufficiency of God and the resulting asymmetry of his causal relationship with the world, which consists in the fact that God can exert causal influence on the world, but the world cannot influence God in this way. Since Życiński contradicts this thesis, according to Wojtysiak, his panentheism is not theism at all. I do not agree with this judgment, and what Wojtysiak calls ‘theism’ I call ‘classical theism’. Both panentheism and classical theism constitute legitimate versions of theism. Ishow that the classical theism in the version proposed by Wojtysiak is entangled in serious difficulties. One of them is that on cosmological level it harmonizes best with occasionalism, that is, with full theological determinism. Another one is connected with the thesis t that God is impassible, which deprives him of the possibility of ful filling these pro-religious functions, which are crucial for Christianity, such as God’s experiential involvement in the history of the world. I propose that the recogni tion of divine passibility be the minimum condition for any panentheism or position similar to it. Meeting this condition does not require the rejection of the thesis about the classically understood divine immutability, omnipotence or the creation of the world ex nihilo, but it is conducive to the revision of these notions. I point out that revisions proposed by Życiński in his version of panentheism were incomparably smaller than those proposed by Whitehead or especially Hartshorne, but still they cannot be treated as a minor supplement to classical theism. They constitute ver sion of panentheism or neoclassical theism, which is a much better philosophical basis for Christianity.
EN
The article “Language Dynamics in the case of an Omniscient” is the study of the idea of an omniscient person on the basis of the classical Jain literature (5th–10th c. CE) in the context of language materiality, human activity and entanglement of a person into karmic bondage.
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Losowość i natura Boga

50%
PL
Dzisiejsza nauka odnotowuje liczne zjawiska, których natura wydaje się losowa. Jednakże wielu naturalistów, jak i teistów podziela przekonanie, że pojęcie losowości stoi w sprzeczności z treścią wiary chrześcijańskiej. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wykazanie, że naukowa koncepcja losowości i tradycyjne chrześcijańskie ujęcie natury Boga są wzajemnie zgodne. Co więcej, zostanie pokazane, że nie da się naukowo rozstrzygnąć, czy w świecie przyrody losowość faktycznie występuje. Niemniej losowość zostanie zdefiniowana jako pojęcie matematyczne przydatne do właściwego interpretowania danych naukowych. Natomiast w myśl ujęcia powszechnie przyjmowanego przez teologów systematycznych natura Boga jest zgodna z obecnością zjawisk losowych w przyrodzie.
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Observations of apparently random phenomena are commonplace in science. However, randomness and Christian belief are often seen as incompatible, both by naturalists and by theists. This article argues that the scientific concept of randomness and the historic Christian understanding of God’s nature are compatible. It argues that the existence of randomness cannot be settled scientifically; nevertheless, it clarifies randomness as a mathematical concept, argues that it provides a plausible interpretation of scientific data, and argues that its existence is consistent with God’s nature as it is commonly understood by systematic theologians.
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