Is it possible that Heidegger was a reist? An attempt to reconstruct Heideggerian onticity The paper aims to answer the following question: does Martin Heidegger’s ontology has its complement in some kind of onticity? In the attempt to reconstruct it, I show that Heidegger’s concept of being is combined with the reistic theory (represented i.a. by Tadeusz Kotarbinski), according to which a being is always a thing. I argue that this is the result of the basic principles of Heideggerian being: that being is unfolding of the particularity and peculiarity of each being and that being discloses itself through the structures of time-space, and hence it can occur only in the single, unique, and concrete beings such as things, and not in ideas or general and abstract beings.
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