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Contextualism and Disagreement

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Qin W.

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics

2011

vol. 7

issue 2

309-322

This paper argues that attributor contextualism is in conflict with ordinary language methodology. Attributor contextualism has at its center the thesis that, the truth-values of knowledge attributions vary with the conversational (speaker) contexts. This thesis entails that if two speakers in similar contexts make conflicting knowledge attributions, at least one of these attributions is false. One important argument for attributor contextualism depends on ordinary language methodology, a methodology that places great trust in ordinary speakers and prevents judging a substantial group of ordinary speakers' simple knowledge attributions false. I argue that there is strong empirical evidence that ordinary speakers do extensively disagree in similar contexts. My conclusion is that one cannot coherently hold the attributor contextualist thesis and use ordinary language methodology, because the lesson we learn from the empirical evidence is that using the methodology would prove the thesis false. Since prominent attributor contextualists explicitly adopt the methodology, and that the methodology is what distinguishes attributor contextualism from its main rival, invariantism, the conflict with the methodology is a problem for attributor contextualism.

Dwie (anty)filozoficzne „gramatyki” Ludwiga Wittgensteina

51%

Czesna E., Nowaczyk A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2013

issue nr 23

45-70

Wittgenstein is the author of two conceptions of “grammar”, that were meant to be tools of reaching the same goal: discrediting of the traditional, i.e. “metaphysical” questions of philosophy. His early conception concerns logical grammar being the language of logic notation, which is devoid of logical constants. This idea was supported by the ontological thesis that there are no logical objects. In fact, it was not indispensable for achieving the intended purpose, since the elimination of philosophical problems was provided by the semantic argument that the only sensible statements are those of the natural sciences. The second concept of grammar, presented in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, seems more ambiguous. Grammar is a set of rules of the language game, having a status of grammatical statements. Examples of such statements are diverse, and desirable, according to the authors, reformulation of them all into concrete orders or prohibitions seems problematic. In the Investigations Wittgenstein distinguishes between deep and surface grammar, which serves to determine the proper task of philosophy as description of the deep grammar (especially the grammar of philosophically relevant words). In this sense New Philosophy is a kind of philosophical grammar. Wittgensteinian grammar is also anti-philosophical, as it aims at the elimination of erroneous (pseudo)metaphysical claims derived from misleading forms of surface grammar. Despite the differences in the concepts of language and grammar in the early and late Wittgenstein, he has not changed his critical approach to the traditional philosophical questions.

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1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

1 Lodz Papers in Pragmatics

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Contextualism and Disagreement

Dwie (anty)filozoficzne „gramatyki” Ludwiga Wittgensteina