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PL
Artykuł zawiera porównawczą analizę aktualnie obowiązujących przepisów dotyczących wotum zaufania w Republice Federalnej Niemiec i Polsce. Cel stanowi ocena poziomu zaawansowania racjonalizacji systemu parlamentarnego w obu tych państwach w zakresie obejmującym analizowaną instytucję prawną. Racjonalizacja parlamentaryzmu rozumiana jest przez autora artykułu jako dążenie za pomocą odpowiednio ukształtowanych środków prawnych do stabilności i efektywności ustroju poprzez wzmacnianie rządu kosztem legislatywy. Wielofunkcyjny charakter niemieckiego wotum zaufania, a zwłaszcza brak obowiązku dymisji kanclerza w razie porażki w głosowaniu nad wnioskiem o wotum zaufania, sprawiają, że niemiecka wersja tej instytucji pełniej niż jej polski odpowiednik realizuje koncepcję parlamentaryzmu zracjonalizowanego.
EN
The article contains a comparative analysis of the provisions concerning the vote of confidence currently in force in Germany and Poland. The aim of the article is to evaluate the level of the parliamentary system’s rationalization in both countries, as far as the aforementioned legal institution is concerned. The concept of the rationalization of parliamentarism is construed by the author as aiming at political stability and effectiveness by means of properly formed legal tools, through strengthening of the government at the expense of the legislative power. The multifunctional character of the German vote of confidence and, especially, the lack of the chancellor’s obligation to dismiss in case of defeat at the voting on the motion in the parliament, justify the conclusion that the German version of the analyzed institution fulfills the concept of the rationalized parliamentarism more accurately than its Polish counterpart.
EN
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 is one of the latest (apart from Albanian and Hungarian) constitutional acts adopted after the transformation of the 1990s. Its external inspirations were not uniform. As concerns the arrangement of regulations, it is modelled on the constitutions of: Italy of 1948, Greece of 1975, Portugal of 1976 and Spain of 1978. These solutions were also followed by the legislatures in other countries of the region. The following standard of arrangement was developed: general principles — freedoms and rights of the individual — central organs of the state — public fi nances — extraordinary measures — amending the constitution — transitional regulations. The regulations of individual freedom and rights were based (with some modifi cations) on the standards established in the Universal Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of December 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The constitutional legislator could also draw on the case law of the Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Varied are the inspirations for adoption of the system of government. Given the party disintegration and the precariousness of preferences, it was imperative to stabilize the system. Regarding the election of the president of the Republic, the constitutional legislator copied the approach used in the Fifth Republic of France (after the 1962 amendment), that is the procedure of universal and direct elections, with extended term and exclusion of accountability to parliament. The solutions taken after the German Basic Law of 1949, such as (1) the parliamentary responsibility of the government limited to the collective one, (2) constructive vote of no confidence in place of an ordinary vote of no confi dence, (3) strong position of the head of government, contributed to ensuring the government stability. Some regulations deserve further consideration: the demarcation of roles in the dualistic executive, the dissonance between imposing performance targets on ministers by the prime minister and their individual responsibility, the defi nition of the Senate’s function and composition. The institution of revision of the constitution, known in Polish tradition, and not present in the Constitution of 1997, also deserves consideration.
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