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EN
The goal of this article is to establish (a) the relationship between electoral lists, party membership, and changes in party affiliation in the context of (b) electoral-list mobility. Our basic premise is that the illegible institutional rules for placing candidates on electoral lists favors mobility between lists. We use data from the EAST PaC Database (2005–2015), which allows us to estimate to what extent the composition of electoral lists differs in terms of the party affiliation of candidates and to track the mobility of parliamentary candidates between electoral lists in consecutive elections. Our basic findings confirm that candidates who changed party affiliation and those who were independent were most likely to change electoral lists. This is a quite surprising finding because according to studies (Shabad and Słomczyński 2002, 2004) such candidates, whose election potential is uncertain, should be unwelcome on new electoral lists.
EN
In 1991, the Knesset passed a package of legislation with the aim of preventing the rampant party switching and defections by elected representatives. At the time of its adoption, the so-called anti-defection law was supported by an all-party consensus. Although the legislation has remained in effect, its apparent continuity conceals the way in which it has become transformed from what was at first an “efficient” institution to a “redistributive” one (Tsebelis 1990). In this paper, I review the development of the Israeli anti-defection law and argue that whereas at the initial moment of its adoption the anti-defection law was considered to benefit all parties in the system, over time it has become an instrument in the hands of the governing coalition to manipulate divisions and engineer further defections among the opposition in order to shore up its often fragile legislative base.
EN
The article presents changes that take place in mass media during and after the party switching. The main reason why politicians are changing „their colors” - is that they want to become the celebrities. This work is an attempt of research about possible motivation of those figures. It is also important to consider if exist characteristic features that are assigned to identified political types?
EN
According to classic approach of M. Duverger, political parties are formed internally and externally. The following paper’s aim is to analyze the emerge of political parties in Poland according to the first of the listed courses (internal) by using the concept of parliamentary party switching, which results in formation of new political parties
PL
Partie polityczne – zgodnie z klasycznym ujęciem M. Duvergera – powstają według wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego trybu. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza powstawania partii politycznych w Polsce zgodnie z pierwszym trybem (wewnętrznym), wykorzystując do tego koncept „transferu parlamentarnego”, tj. zmian przynależności klubowej posłów skutkujących powstaniem nowej partii politycznej.
PL
Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie, czy uchwalenie przepisów antydezercyjnych wpływa na zmniejszenie liczby transferów międzyfrakcyjnych w parlamencie. Pytanie jest o tyle zasadne, że część badaczy rezygnuje z analizowania takich przypadków w sytuacji odnotowania w danym systemie politycznym przepisów antydezercyjnych. Przykład Nowej Zelandii dowodzi jednak, że takie postępowanie jest nieprawidłowe. W tym państwie bowiem przepisy antydezercyjne, uchwalone dwukrotnie, nie stanowiły skutecznej bariery zniechęcającej parlamentarzystów do zmian afiliacji partyjnych. Wpłynęły natomiast na wzmocnienie pozycji liderów grup parlamentarnych wobec parlamentarzystów oraz na konieczność uciekania się tych ostatnich do luk w przepisach, które chroniły ich przed dotkliwymi konsekwencjami decyzji o transferze. Do tych wniosków prowadzi analiza dogmatyczna obowiązujących przepisów oraz analiza systemowa wybranego przypadku.
EN
The article addresses whether the enactment of anti-defection legislation reduces legislative party switching in parliament. This question is pertinent because some researchers cease to analyze cases of legislative party switching when anti-defection legislation is present in a political system. However, the example of New Zealand demonstrates the fallacy of such an assumption. Despite anti-defection legislation being passed twice, it has not effectively deterred parliamentarians from changing party affiliations. Instead, they have strengthened the position of parliamentary group leaders in relation to parliamentarians and the necessity for the latter to rely on loopholes that shield them from the severe consequences of party switching. A dogmatic analysis of the current legislation and a systemic analysis of the selected case lead to this overarching conclusion.
RU
В статье рассматривается значение термина «флоркросинг», его основные виды, законодательное регулирование и особенности смены партий в Украине за годы ее независимости. Выяснено, что флоркросинг, смена политических ориентаций и, как следствие, корректировка предвыборных обещаний, реальность, с которой столкнулся украинский политик. Флоркросинг в украинском парламенте стал явлением, которое изменило коалиции, породило оппортунизм и политическую коррупцию. Установлено, что в современной практике возможны два способа воздействия на процесс межпартийных переключений: законодательный запрет или чисто формальное осуждение действий депутата/ партии со стороны электората и членов партии. Для уменьшения количества переключений между фракциями в Украине существует так называемый императивный мандат (особая его версия). Он распространяется только на депутатов, избранных по спискам политических партий. Следовательно, проблема заключается в частичном законодательном регулировании проблемы «флоркросинга», что должно быть закреплено в новых нормативных актах. Это приобретает особое значение в условиях российской военной агрессии и возможной подрывной деятельности пророссийских политиков, деятельность которых должна быть исключена такими законодательными актами. Любые попытки дискредитировать страну со стороны депутатов, заигрывая с агрессором, должны иметь правовые последствия и возможность для электората влиять на избираемого политика. Выявлено, что частая смена партий дискредитирует избирательно-парламентскую систему, показывает недостатки в подборе личностей и причинах их ухода в политику; кроме того, это также может указывать на силу или слабость политических партий. Доказано, что чрезмерные и непрозрачные мотивированные переходы депутатов с каждым новым созывом становятся все более редкими, что свидетельствует о положительной тенденции качественного отбора кандидатов в депутаты из числа членов партии. Окончательное закрепление пропорциональной системы с открытыми списками в Избирательном кодексе и законодательное регулирование межпартийной/межфракционной смены должно стать основой качественного депутатского состава и приверженности декларируемым политическим идеям.
EN
The paper considers the meaning of the term “floor-crossing”, its basic kinds, legislative regulation and features of party switching in Ukraine since its independence. It has been found out that crossing the floor, change of political orientations and, as a consequence, adjustment of pre-election promises, the reality the Ukrainian politician face. Floor crossing in the Ukrainian Parliament has become a phenomenon that altered coalitions, generated opportunism and political corruption. It has been established that in modern practice there are two possible ways of influencing the process of inter-party switching: a legislative ban or a purely formal condemnation of the deputy’s/party’s actions on the part of the electorate and party members. To reduce the number of switching between factions, Ukraine has a so-called imperative mandate (a special version of it). It applies only to the deputies who are elected from the lists of political parties. Consequently, the problem lies in the partial legislative regulation of the problem of “floor-crossing”, which should be enshrined in new regulations /normative acts/. This acquires particular significance in the context of Russian military aggression and possible subversive activity of pro-Russian politicians, whose activities should be ruled out by such legislative acts. Any attempts to discredit the country on the part of deputies, making advances to the aggressor, should have legal consequences and the possibility for the electorate to influence the politician being elected. It has been found that frequent party switching discredits electoral and parliamentary system and shows flaws in the selection of personalities and why they go into politics; in addition, it can also indicate the strength or weakness of political parties. It has been proven that excessive and nontransparent motivated floor-crossing of deputies is becoming rarer with each new convocation, indicating a positive trend in the qualitative selection of candidates for deputies among party members. The final consolidation of the proportional system with open lists in the Electoral Code and the legislative regulation of inter-party/inter-factional switching should be the basis of qualitative deputy composition and commitment to declared political ideas.
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