This article focuses on presenting the changes implemented to the systematics of penal measures resulting from the amendments made to the Penal Code in 2015. The author pays particular attention to the legislator’s decision to remove confiscation, obligation to pay damages/compensation and punitive damages contained in the catalogue of penal measures in art. 39 of the Penal Code and transferring them to a new chapter „Va” of the Penal Code, which thereby differentiates two new categories of penal measures. The main part of the text concentrates on presenting and analysing the implemented changes within the scope of the regulation of penal measures with regards to the interdiction on driving vehicles (art. 42 of the Penal Code), which are primarily based on extending time limits and the grounds to impose this measure.
This article focuses on presenting the changes implemented to the systematics of penal measures resulting from the amendments made to the Penal Code in 2015. The author pays particular attention to the legislator’s decision to remove confiscation, obligation to pay damages/compensation and punitive damages contained in the catalogue of penal measures in art. 39 of the Penal Code and transferring them to a new chapter „Va” of the Penal Code, which thereby differentiates two new categories of penal measures. The main part of the text concentrates on presenting and analysing the implemented changes within the scope of the regulation of penal measures with regards to the interdiction on driving vehicles (art. 42 of the Penal Code), which are primarily based on extending time limits and the grounds to impose this measure.
The Bill is an attempt to provide state authorities with effective instruments to counteract corruption in public life, but the detailed legislative proposals contained therein may hinder the full implementation of this assumption. Among others the category of corruption offenses was drafted in a selective way, linking the tightening of the punishment policy with the conviction for only some of them. Failure to include some corruption offenses in the Bill will lead to an unjustified privileging of the policy of punishing corrupt practices in certain areas of public and economic life. The author also referred to some of the proposals to introduce employment bans, pointing out that they would be superfluous to the applicable regulations of the Criminal Code, as well as they would lead to consequences which would be difficult to accept from the perspective of seeking a penalty adequate to the committed prohibited act, the real severity of sanctions and the principle of equal punishment.
The paper characterizes the evolution of penal policy with respect to per peetrators of transgressions, pursued in Poland by elected agencies attacbed to the state administration and called “transgression boards”. In the years 1972–1989, their decisions were supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Most of the discussion, based on statistical materials, concerns changes in the structure and dynamics of penal measures applied by the boards. The measures have been defined as all legal reactions applicable upon the finding the perpetrator’s guilt. The present paper does not deal with all of those measures, though: for lack of statistical data, tukets imposed by the penal prosecution agencies and the possible reactions on part of those agencies if they renounce moving the case to the board for punishment according to the principle of expediency of prosecution could not be discussed. Penal policy has been characterized against the background of amendments introduced in the period under analysis and of instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs that shape the boards’ decisions. After 1982, such instructions usually aimed at aggravating repression. The statutory catalogue of penal measures contained in the transgressions code is relatively extensive. The most severe measure is detention which amounts to deprivation of liberty for up to 3 months. As stated in the code, it should be applied in exceptional cases only. In the first decade of validity of the code, detention was imposed in l–l.5 % of all decisions which meant the deprivation of liberty of 9,00–10,000 persons. It is therefore doubtful whether detention was indeed treated as an exceptional measure by practicians. In the next years, it was imposed much less often. The penalty of suspended detention played any role in the practice of transgression boards. As shown by studies, those who applied law treated suspended detention as a separate penal measure to replace other measures not involving deprivation of liberty rather than a way of limiting the use of immediaste detention. Also disappointed were the expectations related to another new measure, formally more severe than fine, that is limitation of liberty which was to “educate through work”. According to the legislators’ assumptions, that penalty was to be the main alternative to detention; in practice, it was imposed rather often (about 5% of all measures applied) but served mainly as a substitute for fine. The basic measure applied to perpetrators of transgressions was fine, imposed on 90% of cases of those punished by the boards. According to provisions of the Transgressions Code, though, a substitute penalty of detention can be imposed in the case of justified doubts as to the possibility of execution of fine. For this reason, it was found advisable in the present analysis to treat this form of fine as a measure different in quality from fine imposed without a substitute penalty which could in no case lead to imprisonment. Also research findings encouraged the treatment of these two kinds of fine as separate penal measures: the substitute penalty was treated in practice as a specific method of aggravating repression, and imposed in defiance with provisions of the Code. Owing to this approach it could be evidenced that the proportion of fines combined with the threat of deprivation of liberty (another measures designed as exceptional) went up rapidly in mid-1910s to become stabilized at about 20% of all decisions of the transgression boards. The abuse of that measure, also designed as exceptional, was accompanied mainly by less frequent fines without a substitute penalty. At the same time, the proportion of the two most lenient measures, that is admonition and renouncement of inflicting punishment, went down regularly and amounted to a mere 2% of decisions despite the broad applications of those measures contained in the Code. This reflects the practicians’ tendency to use the aggravating legal solutions much more often than those which mitigate penalty; this led to increased repressiveness of penal policy. Beside the above-mentioned reactions, the Transgressions Code provides for a number of measures called additional penalties which are to accompany the principal ones. They can also be applied as self-standing measures in specific situations. Yet the agencies that apply law never availed themselves of this latter possibility. Instead, additional penalties were lavishly imposed (particularly the witholrawal it driving licence and the penalty of making the sentence publicly known) which led to accumulation of repressions suffered by the punished person. This is why the serious growth in the number of additional penalties, after the legal changes introduced in mid-l980s and instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs in particular, was still another proof of the aggravation of penal policy with respect to perpertrators of transgressions. Characteristically, the Polish Transgressions Code combines the application of some of the non-custodical measures with the threat of deprivation of liberty in the case of failure in the execution of those measures. This concerns the above-mentioned fine but also, in definite conditions, the limitation of liberty and suspended detention. In practice, the threat of imprisonment was used very often, the total proportion of the three above measures becoming stabilized, after an initial growth, at about 20–25% of decisions which mainly resulted from excessive imposition of fines with a substitute penalty of detention. Most importantly, though, that threat was realized with respect to every fifth or sixth person in that group. As a result, the average of 20–25 thousand persons a year were imprisoned despite the fact that a measure not involving deprivation of liberty had originally been applied to them. A paradoxical situation arose where persons sentenced to the principal penalty of detention constituted a small percentage of those imprisoned by force of decisions of the transgression boards, while most served a substitute penalty due to a failure in the execution of the previously applied non-custodial measure. Still another expression of the growing repressiveness of penal policy was the greater and greater involved in the most frequently imposed penalty of fines in both of its forms: due to amendments of the Transgressions Code, the amound of fine went up a quicker pace than the average wages in socialized economy during most of the 1980s. A statutory solution concerning transgression that was most vehemently critized by the doctrine was the most limited judicial supervision over decisions of the transgression boards. The appel instance were boards of the second instance; only decisions imposing detention and limitation of liberty could be appealed against to the court. Thus judicial supervision concerned neither the substitute penalties which involved deprivation of liberty nor the most acute ban on driving motor vehicles. Meanwhile as shown by experimental findings, 6–15% of persons punished by the boards were acquitted by the court to which they complained, and a non-isolation measure was substituted for deprivation of liberty in over one-third of the cases. This shows that courts saw decisions of the boards not only as essentially defective but also as excessively repressive. This latter conclusion is rather symptomatic the fact considered that penal policy pursued by courts with respect to offenders was sewere, too. What has also to be stressed when characterizing the decisions in cases of transgressions is the frequent use of the statutory possibility of deciding in expedited proceedings and proceedings by writ of payment. From the viewpoint of rational penal policy, that tendency deserves to be criticized as protection of the defendant’s basic processual guaranties suffers statutory limitation in those modes of procedure, and the speed and simplification of proceedings affect the individualization of punishment. Also of importance was the fact that the frequent decisions in expedited proceedings served as a specific form of aggravation of represion since – as shown by research findings – the penalties imposed in that mode were more severe than in the ordinary proceedings. Analysis of the evolution of decisions of the transgression boards has led to the conclusion that throughout the period under analysis, penal policy was regularly aggravated which was largely influenced by punitive instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The only periods of mitigation of penalties were the years 1981 and 1989: this resulted mainly from social conflicts and public opinion pressure on reduction of repressiveness of the penal system. For this reason, the 1989 amendment of the Transgression Code, forced by systemic changes, which deprived the Minister of Internal Affairs of his original control over decisions of the transgression boards and submitted all of those decisions to judical review brings the hope for liberalization and rationalization of penal policy in cases of transgressions.
This paper discusses and appraises changes in the system of penal measures in the draft of the Transgressions Code, and to some extent also in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties. A great variety of problems are discussed: the author concentrates on a broad definition of a penal measure, treating as such measure each legal reaction to the fact of transgression, made by a competent agency upon identification of the perpetrator. The discussion concentrates on the draft’s division into penalties and penal measures. Also discussed are other reactions included in the code that can be applied to the perpetrator but do not belong to either of the above two categories. The autor carries out a critical analysis of the solutions concerning penalties, penal measures, alternatives to punishment, and the main directives as to the severity of penal measures. Taken into account in the analysis have been, on the one hand, the praiseworthy regulations, most of which result from acceptance by authors of the draft of postulates, made for a long time by the doctrine and aimed toward the rationalization and humanization of Polish law on transgressions. On the other hand, the analysis paints out those solutions which the author finds to be redundant or improperly formulated With respect to reactions that are termed “penalties” the author declares himself a resolved opponent of arrest: in his opinion, that penalty should not be imposed on perpetrators of the pettiest transgressions, the more so as some of the offences specified in the draft code are not threatened with deprivation of liberty at all. Here, the practice of deciding in cases of transgressions is brought to mind where arrest was usually imposed for disturbances of public order or peace committed by intoxicated persons; most of such perpetrators were alcoholics, and their short-term imprisonment was in fact a specific preventive measure. The author also expresses his support of the renouncement of the institution of conditional suspention of the penalty of arrest (should even arrest be preserved in the future code): in practice, instead of limiting the use of arrest, that institution was treated as a self-standing reaction, a substitute for the penal measures not involving deprivation of liberty. On the other hand, the author praises the elimination from the draft of the penalty of limitation of liberty which fails to come up to expectations as an alternative to arrest and only causes serious problems with its execution. As regards, further, the penalty of fines ‒ the basic reaction towards perpetrators of transgressions ‒ the author considers the pros and cons and declarls himself in favor of the system of daily rates. Aware of the controversial nature of this suggestion, he justifies it mainly with the need for the unification of the system of imposition of fines in penal law and the law on transgressions. The author praises the solution where only the court is empowered to impose arrest in default of paying a fine. In principle, he also praises the way this sphere ‒ the main weak point of decisions in cases of transgressions so far ‒ has been regulated in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties. Here, arrest as a substitute for fines is treated as the last resort, and many solutions are Offerd to cause the payment of a fine; fines can even be defanted on if then cannot be paid for reasons beyond the convicted person’s control, and it proves impossible or inexpedient to carry out that penalty in another way. The author believes, however, that some of the solutions suggested in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties have not been formulated with sufficient precision. As far as penal measures are concerned ‒ under the draft of the Transgressions Code, they include with deawal of a driving license, forfeiture of property, and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose ‒ the author criticizes mainly the limited possibilities of their application as self-standing measures: they can only be applied in the case of renouncement of inflicting a punishment. This solution is in fact a preservation of the possibility, criticized by scientific community, of the accumulation of different penal measures, and leads to unnecessary aggravation of punishment. On the other hand, the author praises many other novel solutions related to penal measures, including in particular a considerable mitigation of the statutory application of a most annoying withdrawal of a driving license; in his opinion, however, that ban should be optional and not obligatory. The author also praises the regulation of forfeiture of propesty, mainly because of the ban on its application if the decision to impose it were out of proportion with the seriousness of the transgression. Besides, the author fully approves of the renunciation of the former additional penalty, the “ban on pursuit of definite activity or performance of functions requiring a license”, and also of the labelling measure of publication of the sentence. In the sphere of general directives of the imposition of penal measures, the draft is based on the concept which combines elements of just retribution (proportional to guilt) and special prevention. The former directive is to define the maximum degree of severity of reaction under penal law, while the latter should influence the choice and extent of the penal measure applied. Unlike the draft of the Penal Code, the draft of the Transgressions Code does not include the directive of general prevention. The present author praises this omission and supports the opinion, popular in scientific community, that general prevention should be included in the statutory sanctions while its aims can be achieved within the directive of just retribution. With respect to the latter, the author argues that reaction of penal law should be commensurate not only with the guilt but also with the seriousness of the act; he also stresses that compensation for the damages done to the injured person should become an integral part of just retribution, and acquire an important position in the future Transgressions Code. Further discussion concerns alternatives to punishment, that is: (1) renunciaton of inflicting punishment, and (2) refusal to start proceedings before the boards for the adjudication of transgressions where the case is referred to other agencies (e.g. place of employment or school) for application of so-callcd educational measures. Under the draft, renunciation of inflicting punishment may consist both in a complete renunciation of applying any penal measure, and in rcnunciation of imposing a penalty which is combined with the application of another penal measure. In the author’s opinion; this solution has to be modified. The very name of the institution concerned here can hardly be squared with the possibility of applying a penal measure, often one ‒ e.g. withdrawal of a driving license ‒ that is actually more severe than a penalty such as a small fine. For this reason, the author’s suggestion aims at a situation where renunciation of inflicting punishment would consist only in abandonment of the application of any measures whatever. Instead, the possibilities of application of self-standing penal measures should be much extended and regulated by separate provisions. The other of the above-mentioned institutions, whose regulation violates the principle of definiteness of reaction under penal law, should be eliminated altogether. What also speaks for this solution is the fact that the institution concerned is based on a belief in the effectiveness of educational actions which has not been verified empirically; moreover, its application may expose the offender to consequences more severe (e.g. dismissal from work) than those resulting from proceedings before the beards for the adjudication of transgressions. In the final part of the paper, the author comments on the general conception of the Polish reform of broadly conceived penal law. He proclaims himself in favor of the opinion, found in literature, that Polish law has to be amended radically (based on the suggestions contained in the draft), and that the work on its codification have to proceed parallel to its amendment; they must also be given sufficient time to be completed.
W artykule przeprowadzono analizę rozwiązań środków ochrony z ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle seksualnym (ustawa p.z.p.s.). przez pryzmat środków karnych z Kodeksu karnego. Analiza struktury Rejestru Sprawców Przestępstw na Tle Seksualnym wykazała podobieństwo do środka karnego w postaci podania wyroku do publicznej wiadomości. Szczególne obowiązki, które nakłada na pracodawców ustawa p.z.p.s. budzą z kolei słuszne skojarzenia ze środkiem karnym w postaci zakazu prowadzenia działalności związanej z wychowaniem, leczeniem, edukacją małoletnich lub z opieką nad nimi. Analogiczność między rozwiązaniami ustawy p.z.p.s. a Kodeksem karnym jest tak głęboka, że w istocie „szczególne środki ochrony” z tej ustawy powinny być postrzegane jako quasi środki karne. Wprowadzone rozwiązania pozostają nowoczesne jedynie w zakresie formy (tzw. publiczny „rejestr pedofilów”), jednakże materialnie są one kopią rozwiązań od lat funkcjonujących.
EN
In the article there is made an analysis of solutions of protection measures under the Act on Counteracting Threats to Sexual Crimes (the Act) within the context of penal measures from the Penal Code. As a result of the research of the structure of the Register of Sex Offenders, there is a similarity to the criminal measure in the form of making the judgment public. Special obligations imposed on employers under the Act are appropriately associated with a penal measure in the form of a ban on conducting activities related to the upbringing, treatment, education of juveniles or taking care of them. The analogy between the solutions of the Act and the Penal Code in fact leads to a conclusion that „special protection measures” under the Act should be perceived as quasi criminal measures. Innovative measures introduced to the penal system remain modern only in terms of form (the so-called public „register of pedophiles”), but materially they are a copy of solutions that have existed for years.
This comment on the judgment is about degradation. Degradation is an important element of the sanctions system in Polish military criminal law. The author accepts the position of the Supreme Court on this punishment. In the presented study, based on the verdict of 19 February 2020, as well as previous verdicts of the Supreme Court, the premises for its adjudication and the function of degradation were analyzed. The article is also intended to indicate the practical and theoretical problems that the application of this punishment entails.
PL
Przedmiotem glosy jest degradacja, funkcjonująca jako istotny element systemu sankcji w polskim wojskowym prawie karnym. Autor przyjął stanowisko Sądu Najwyższego wyrażone w orzeczeniu z 19.02.2020 r., odnośnie tego środka karnego. Opierając się na powyższym wyroku oraz na innych orzeczeniach Sądu Najwyższego, dokonał gruntownej analizy przesłanek orzekania oraz funkcji degradacji. Opracowanie ma na celu wskazanie praktycznych i teoretycznych problemów, jakie pociąga za sobą stosowanie tej kary.
Prawo wykroczeń zawiera czyny o charakterze zarówno kryminalnym, jak i administracyjnym. Wymusza to na ustawodawcy zróżnicowany system reakcji. Obok stricte penalnych form oddziaływania na sprawcę wykroczenia kodeks wykroczeń pozwala na zastosowanie między innymi środków oddziaływania wychowawczego. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie tych środków, kryteriów ich stosowania oraz podkreślenie potrzeby zmian w zakresie art. 41 k.w.
XX
The law on petty offences includes both criminal and administrative acts. This forces the legislator to have a differentiated system of reaction. Next to strictly penal forms of impact on the petty offence perpetrator, the Petty Offenses Code allows the application of, among others, educational impact measures. The aim of this article is to present these measures, their application criteria and to emphasise the need for changes in the scope of Article 41 of the Petty Offences Code.
In the commented judgment, the Supreme Court took the view that the forfeiture of devices used for gaming machines imposed in the proceedings in fiscal offenses and fiscal misdemeanor cases does not constitute a penal measure, and therefore the cassation appeal against the ruling in the part regarding the penalty is not considered directed against forfeiture under extension of the scope of the appeal based on Article 447 § 2 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure. The paper presents arguments for this position to be considered erroneous and analyses the differences in the regulation of penal measures under general and fiscal criminal law and proposes the necessary legislative changes.
PL
W komentowanym orzeczeniu Sąd Najwyższy stanął na stanowisku, że wymierzony w postępowaniu w sprawie o przestępstwo skarbowe przepadek urządzeń służących do gry na automatach nie stanowi środka karnego, w związku z czym kasacja wniesiona przeciwko orzeczeniu w części dotyczącej kary nie obejmuje rozstrzygnięcia dotyczącego przepadku w trybie rozszerzania zakresu zaskarżenia na podstawie art. 447 § 2 Kodeksu postępowania karnego. W pracy tej przedstawiono argumenty na rzecz uznania tego stanowiska za błędne oraz przeanalizowano różnice w zakresie regulacji środków karnych na gruncie powszechnego prawa karnego i prawa karnego skarbowego, a także wskazano propozycje niezbędnych w tym względzie zmian w ustawodawstwie.
Changes in penal measures resulting from the amendment to the Penal Code of 13 June 2019 constitute the subject matter of the article. The author analyses the consequences of those changes. The authors of the amendments to the act declared that the level would increase the protection of children through criminal law, which was their main motive. The article reveals various errors and disadvantages of the legal framework adopted, which do not allow for a positive assessment of the above mentioned amendment. The article also raises the issues related to changes accounting for a criminal measure in the form of a driving ban. The article refers to the amendments to the Criminal Code, which resulted in significant strengthening of criminal liability for transport crime. The author gives a critical review and demonstrates the fallacy of certain provisions and their inconsistency with other Code stipulations. Furthermore, taking such radical measures – contrary to what the amendment authors pointed out – is not justified by the increasing crime rate. The author is critical about the proposed amendments, emphasising their excessive repressiveness, which is not reasoned by the need to protect traffic safety.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu są zmiany środków karnych wynikające z nowelizacji Kodeksu karnego z 13 czerwca 2019 r. Autor analizuje konsekwencje tych zmian. W ocenie projektodawców głównym celem ma być podniesienie poziomu ochrony dzieci poprzez prawo karne. Artykuł ujawnia różne błędy i wady przyjętych rozwiązań prawnych, które nie pozwalają na pozytywną ocenę wyżej wspomnianej nowelizacji. Artykuł porusza także kwestie związane ze zmianami w zakresie środka karnego w postaci zakazu prowadzenia pojazdu. Artykuł odnosi się do zmian wprowadzonych do Kodeksu karnego, które spowodowały znaczne zwiększenie odpowiedzialności karnej sprawców przestępstw komunikacyjnych. Autor dokonuje krytycznej analizy i pokazuje wadliwość niektórych przepisów oraz ich niespójność z innymi rozwiązaniami kodeksowymi. Co więcej, podejmowanie tak radykalnych środków - wbrew temu, co zauważyli autorzy noweli, nie jest uzasadnione poziomem i dynamiką przestępstw komunikacyjnych. Autor krytycznie odnosi się do proponowanych poprawek, podkreślając ich nadmierną represyjność, która nie jest uzasadniona potrzebą ochrony bezpieczeństwa w komunikacji.
This article aims at analysing the punitive measure in the form of a ban on participation at mass events in the view of the criminal law. The study refers to not only the ratio legis of implementing that institution but also to the statutory prerequisites determining the justifiability of adjudicating that measure. Further, the article also presents possible forms of the said ban, as well as the legal consequences related to the infringement thereof. In the end notes, the study highlights the basic interpretation diffi culties related to the application of the discussed regulation. Furthermore, the article expresses the view that ensuring security during mass events requires, in fact, the application of a number of mechanisms, both of a legal and an extralegal nature.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prawnokarna analiza środka karnego w postaci zakazu wstępu na imprezę masową. W opracowaniu tym odwołano się nie tylko do ratio legis wprowadzenia tej instytucji, lecz także do ustawowych przesłanek determinujących zasadność orzeczenia tego środka. W dalszej kolejności wskazano również możliwe postacie omawianego zakazu, a także konsekwencje prawne związane z jego nieprzestrzeganiem. W ramach uwag końcowych zasygnalizowano z kolei podstawowe trudności interpretacyjne, które wiążą się ze stosowaniem omawianej regulacji. Ponadto, wyrażono pogląd, iż zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa podczas imprez masowych wymaga w istocie zaangażowania szeregu mechanizmów zarówno o charakterze prawnym, jak i pozaprawnym.
The aims of the present study have been: 1) to ascertain the actual conditions of the courts' decisions applying penalties and other measures towards multiple recidivists; 2) to determine the present penal policy towards this category of convicted persons; 3) to compare this policy with the assumptions included in the Penal Code in force. Punishment imposed upon multiple recidivists is regulated by the provisions of Art. 60, para. 2 and 3 Art. 61 of the Penal Code. Their formulation is as follows: on a perpetrator sentenced twice in the conditions specified in para. 1 (special basic recidivism), who has served altogether at leat one year of deprivation of liberty and in the period of 5 years after the serving of the last penalty commits again an intentional offence with the purpose of obtaining a material benefit or of a hooligan character, similar to at least one of the previously committed offencęs, the court shall impose a penalty within the limits of from three times the lowest sanction, but not less than 2 years, up to the highest statutory sanction increased by one half, and if the highest statutory sanction is not higher than 3 years: up to 5 years deprivation of liberty. The increase of the lowest statutory sanction provided in para. 1 or 2 shall not apply, when the offence is a serious offence; in this case the court shall consider the commission of the offence in the conditions specified in para 1 or 2 as a circumstance increasing the penalty. In particularly justified cases when even the lowest penalty imposed on the basis of Art. 60. paras 1 or 2 would be incommeasurably Severe by reason of the motives for the action of the perpetrator, his traits and personal conditions as well as his way of life before the commission and his behaviour after the perpetration of the offence, the court when imposing the penalty may refrain from applying the rules specified in Art. 60. paras 1 or 2; in these cases the court shall take into consideration the commission of the offence in the conditions specified in Art. 60, para 1or 2 as circumstances influencing increasing the penalty. With regard to a perpetrator sentenced in the conditions specified in Art. 60, para. 2 he court shall adjudge protective supervision; if adjudging this supervision is not sufficient to prevent recidivism, the court shall adjudge .the commitment of the sentenced person to a social readaptation centre. (Art. 62, para. 2). The present work has been based on the author's own research and to a minimum extent only on the analysis of the national statistical data. The point of departure for the study of the actual conditions of the courts decisions were the conditions specified in the Penal Code now in force. The conditions specified in Art. 61 of the Penal Code and related to the offender only have been assumed to form the ratio legis of special recidivism in the Polish penal legislation. If, however, when aplying this provision, the courts prefer the conditions related to the most recent act of the offender, this mignt be an indication of their different attitude towards the aim of punishment in the case of the discussed category of offenders. The existence of such divergences between the conditions of application of Art 61 of the Penal Code as included in the law on the one hand, and those applied by the courts on the other hand has been one of the hypotheses verified in the present study. The study has been based on the examination of court records. All the accessible records of criminal cases (230) have been included in it, in which Sentences were passed with regard to multiple recidivists (under Art 60. para. 2 and Art. 61 in connection with Art. 60, para. 2 of the Penal Code) in the District Court of the city of Poznań in the years 1975-1981. The question arised whether this could be treated as an equivalent to a random sample of the national population of convicted multiple recidivists. As shown by a comparison of distributions in question are highly convergent. A questionnaire to investigate the ourt records consisted of 41 questions concerning the convicted recidivist, his previous offences and criminal record, his last offence and the content of the last sentence. The impact of a number of variables on the application of Art. 61 of the Penal Code, on the length of the prison sentence and on the decision of commitment to a social readaptation centre has been analysed in succession. Conclusions from the study are as follows: 1. In the application of Art.61 of the Penal Code ,the predominating part is played by the conditions connected with the degree of socil danger of the act and with its legal label. The conditions connected with the person of the perpetrator seem to have a much smaller effect. The reason of this state of affairs may be seeked in the fact that the court is obligated by Art. 60, para.2 of the Penal Code to impose long-term penalties of deprivation or liberty regardless of the degree of social danger (seriousness) of the offence which may be trivial in particular cases. Therefore, it is not to be wondered at that in these cases the courts apply Art. 61 of the Penal Code so as to impose a lower or more lenient penalty in order to make it commeasurable with the offence. The following conditions have been found to exert the greatest influence on the length of sentences to deprivation of liberty under Art. 60, para. 2: firstly, the legal appraisal of the offence and the related content of the instructions for meting out punishment specified in Art. 60, para. 2 of the Penal Code, and secondly, the degree of social danger of the offence. The character of the offence and the appraisal of its social danger influence the sentence too, including the type of penalty, when Art. 61 of the Penal Code is applied by the court. This is probably a further result of following the same conditions already when deciding on the application of Art. 61 of the Penal Code. When adjudging the commitment of convicted persons to a social readaptation centre, the courst were guided by the conditions connected with intense symptoms of demoralization of these persons and with a previous application of various penal measures towards them; thus the conditions were formally the same as those to be found in the Penal Code. At the same time, conditions connected with the recently committed offence were left out of account here. One should be particularly careful when interpreting the findings in this case aS the decisions in question may be conditioned by the courts' various attitudes towards the practical functioning of the centers, and by different purposes of their adjudgement in definite cases. The length of the perod for which commitment to a social readaptation centre was adjudged has appeared to increase with the length of the sentence to deprivation of libety. Admittedly, outright conclusions as to the need for amendments of the provisions of the Penal Code in its part concerning recidivists do not follow immediately from the findings of the present study. These findings have. however, demonstrated the degree to which the instructions for meting out, punishment specified in Art. 60, para. 2 of the Penal Code sever the relation between the offence and punishment, as well as the fact that the corrective function of punishment imposed upon multiple recidivists - officially assumed by the legislator-has a fictious character in practice. In consequence, Art. 61 of the Penal Code is used in discord with its purpose; it is applied to adjust the adjudicated punishment to the seriousness of the offence committed.
According to the Corrections Code, execution of penalty or penal measure is subject to fulfillment of corrective and preventive goals. Since the 18th century, progressive tendencies regarding imprisonment indicated the need to corrective influence — motivating the perpetrator to exhibit socially-acceptable behavior in order to prevent his relapse into crime. The system of execution of deprivation of liberty (imprisonment) is called a system of slow progression, which means that the penalty can be modified in case of progress in social adaptation or lack of such. The modification process is related to many procedures during execution of penalty. Based on diverse character of such procedures, one can classify them as incidental or autonomous, the latter leading to modification of penalty, e.g. external or internal, permanent, episodic, conditional or unconditional and others, all of which optimize the possibility of fulfillment of the primary goal of the penalty, that is preventing of relapse into crime.
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