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EN
The circumstances in which the Civil Police assumed responsibility for convoy and protection duties on behalf of the justice system until 1939 (in practice, until now). The legal and financial aspects of performing convoy and isolation functions on behalf of the Department of Justice. The unsuccessful attempts to transfer these tasks to the Prison Guard. The methods and tactics deployed in performing convoy and protection duties towards criminal and political prisoners. Convoys on foot and by train and other means of transport. Chronic occurrences and extraordinary events during convoys. How fulfilling these duties effected the Police’s other statutory obligations. The role of isolation in Police arrests. The prevailing conditions. The rights and duties of prisoners. The supervision of prisoners. Extraordinary events and chronic occurrences. The function and purpose of police holding cells for juveniles. Their isolation and rehabilitation functions. The Civil Police in performing their duties in connection with municipal arrests. Police assistance to the Prison Guard in extraordinary situations, especially riots. Protecting prisoners from external attacks. Searching for escaped prisoners. Operational and evidentiary work. Operational and procedural activities against people attempting to communicate with prisoners. Civil Police operational work in prisons. Information exchange between the Civil Police and the Prison Guard. The practice of prison authorities informing the police about people released from prison and the legal basis for doing so. The attitude of politicians and the press to the Civil Police carrying out functions on behalf of the prison service.
EN
The article analyzes the matter of correlation between retribution and purposes of penal punishment due to penal legislation of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The moot point of defining retribution as a purpose or a feature of punishment is discussed. A comparative description of the problem is presented on the basis of legislation of the republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Ukraine. Purposes of punishment are considered to belong to backbone characteristics that determine the structure and tendency of many a legal institutions, influence the application of many norms, e.g. imposition of punishment or release of sentence. Purposes of punishment are defined by the penal policy of the state – formation of certain purposes shows what result the state wishes to achieve by applying penal punishment for committed crimes.The matter of purposes is closely connected with the problem of effectiveness of penal punishment as well as penal law in general. Therefore, purposes of punishment were paid so much attention both in law theory and in legislative practice.
EN
The purpose of this article is to present the main problems connected with criminalization of human behavior. At the level of legislative policy, such problems revolve around two fundamental issues. In this regard, what ought to be noted is the possibility of isolating factors that would decide on making another sphere of human behavior subject to legal and penal control. Furthermore, considering the type and scope of the statutory threat of punishment, which would allow for maintaining rational punishment standards, ought to be recognized as equally important.
EN
The paper presents the attitude of society towards capital punishment during dizerent historical periods and describes the development of philosophical and moral thought regarding the death penalty. It outlines the history of capital punishment in Poland based on various legal norms set out in penal codes of the time. ese are used to investigate the types of crime that carry the death penalty and their number which changed over the years due to signicantly dizerent penal codes applicable in dizerent years. e paper also discusses basic legal acts on the right to life. It presents countries that retain capital punishment, countries that have abolished it and countries where the death penalty is permitted only under military law.
EN
Theft is one of the oldest and clearly condemned crime in history. It takes a significant part in the crime structure in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems to be a forgotten and uninteresting subject among modern criminological research. In public opinion, theft invariably causes indignation,and the way of punishing thieves is a field of interest for both public opinion and politicians.In Poland, theft is an offence that can either be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a crime –it depends on the value of the property stolen. Therefore, legal penalties for crime related to theft may vary considerably. It is precisely this line between misdemeanor and crime that is currently being discussed in Poland. To talk about changes concerning the punishment of thieves,one should first check what is the current state of the criminal policy in this regard. Therefore, I want to present the results of the research, which I carried out at the Institute of Justice in 2017.I examined randomly selected court files of two above mention categories of theft, which ended validly and in which the enforcement proceedings ended in 2016. The research was conducted on 420 cases (including 233 misdemeanor and 187 crime cases). On the basis of the collected material emerges the image of the criminal policy against thieves who stood before the court,which gives the opportunity to consider whether and what changes in the law can be predicted against the perpetrators of the simple theft.
EN
The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and  punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular  shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape.             During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime  was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy,  it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more  sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is  unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started:  sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly.  Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively).  Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years  1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991.  The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison  term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines  (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court  in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of  persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts  of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures,  the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact,  the trends of that  period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual  mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).
EN
The paper characterizes the evolution of penal policy with respect to per peetrators of transgressions, pursued in Poland by elected agencies attacbed to the state administration and called “transgression boards”. In the years 1972–1989, their decisions were supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Most of the discussion, based on statistical materials, concerns changes in the structure and dynamics of penal measures applied by the boards. The measures have been defined as all legal reactions applicable upon the finding the perpetrator’s guilt. The present paper does not deal with all of those measures, though: for lack of statistical data, tukets imposed by the penal prosecution agencies and the possible reactions on part of those agencies if they renounce moving the case to the board for punishment according to the principle of  expediency of prosecution could not be discussed. Penal policy has been characterized against the background of amendments introduced in the period under analysis and of instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs that shape the boards’ decisions. After 1982, such instructions usually aimed at aggravating repression. The statutory catalogue of penal measures contained in the transgressions code is relatively extensive. The most severe measure is detention which amounts to deprivation of liberty for up to 3 months. As stated in the code, it should be applied in exceptional cases only. In the first decade of validity of the code, detention was imposed in l–l.5 % of all decisions which meant the deprivation of liberty of 9,00–10,000 persons. It is therefore doubtful whether detention was indeed treated as an exceptional measure by practicians. In the next years, it was imposed much less often. The penalty of suspended detention played any role in the practice of transgression boards. As shown by studies, those who applied law  treated suspended detention as a separate penal measure to replace other measures not involving deprivation of liberty rather than a way of limiting the use of immediaste detention. Also disappointed were the  expectations related to another new measure, formally more severe than fine, that is limitation of liberty which was to “educate through work”. According to the legislators’ assumptions, that penalty was to  be the main alternative to detention; in practice, it was imposed rather often  (about 5% of all measures applied) but served mainly as a substitute for fine. The basic measure applied to perpetrators of transgressions was fine, imposed on 90% of cases of those punished by the boards. According to provisions of the Transgressions Code, though, a substitute penalty of detention can be imposed in the case of justified doubts as to the possibility of execution of fine. For this reason, it was found advisable in the present analysis to treat this form of fine as a measure different in quality from fine imposed without a substitute penalty which could in no case lead to imprisonment. Also research findings encouraged the treatment of these two kinds of fine as separate penal measures: the substitute penalty was treated in practice as a specific method of aggravating repression, and imposed in defiance with provisions of the Code. Owing to this approach it could be evidenced that the proportion of fines combined with the threat of deprivation of liberty (another measures designed as exceptional) went up rapidly in mid-1910s to become stabilized at about 20% of all decisions of the  transgression boards. The abuse of that measure, also designed as exceptional, was accompanied mainly by less frequent fines without a substitute penalty. At the same time, the proportion of the two most lenient measures, that is admonition and renouncement of inflicting punishment, went down regularly and amounted to a mere 2% of decisions despite the broad applications of those measures contained in the Code. This reflects the practicians’ tendency to use the aggravating legal solutions much more often than those which mitigate penalty; this led to increased repressiveness of penal policy. Beside the above-mentioned reactions, the Transgressions Code provides for a number of measures called additional penalties which are to accompany the principal ones. They can also be applied as self-standing measures in specific situations. Yet the agencies that apply law never availed themselves of this latter possibility. Instead, additional penalties were lavishly imposed (particularly the witholrawal it driving licence and the penalty of making the sentence publicly known) which led to accumulation of repressions suffered by the punished person. This is why the serious growth in the number of additional penalties, after the legal changes introduced in mid-l980s and instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs in particular, was still another proof of the aggravation of penal policy with respect to perpertrators of transgressions. Characteristically, the Polish Transgressions Code combines the application of some of the non-custodical measures with the threat of deprivation of liberty in the case of failure in the execution of those measures. This concerns the above-mentioned fine but also, in definite conditions, the limitation of liberty and suspended detention. In practice, the threat of imprisonment was used very often, the total proportion of the three above measures becoming stabilized, after an initial growth, at about 20–25% of decisions which mainly resulted from excessive imposition of fines with a substitute penalty of detention. Most importantly, though, that threat was realized with respect to every fifth or sixth person in that group. As a result, the average of 20–25 thousand persons a year were imprisoned despite the fact that a measure not involving deprivation of liberty had originally been applied to them. A paradoxical situation arose where persons sentenced to the principal penalty of detention constituted a small percentage of those imprisoned by force of decisions of the transgression boards, while most served a substitute penalty due to a failure in the execution of the previously applied non-custodial measure. Still another expression of the growing repressiveness of penal policy was the greater and greater involved in the most frequently imposed penalty of fines in both of its forms: due to amendments of the Transgressions Code, the amound of fine went up a quicker pace than the average wages in socialized economy during most of the 1980s. A statutory solution concerning transgression that was most vehemently critized by the doctrine was the most limited judicial supervision over  decisions of the transgression boards. The appel instance were boards of  the second instance; only decisions imposing detention and limitation of liberty could be appealed against to the court. Thus judicial supervision concerned neither the substitute penalties which involved deprivation of liberty nor the most acute ban on driving motor vehicles. Meanwhile as shown by experimental findings, 6–15% of persons punished by the boards were acquitted by the court to which they complained, and a non-isolation measure was  substituted for deprivation of  liberty in over one-third of the cases. This shows that courts saw decisions of the boards not only as essentially defective but also as excessively repressive. This latter conclusion is rather symptomatic the fact considered that penal policy pursued by courts with respect to offenders was sewere, too. What has also to be stressed when characterizing the decisions in cases of transgressions is the frequent use of the statutory possibility of deciding in expedited proceedings and proceedings  by writ of payment. From the viewpoint of rational penal policy, that tendency deserves to be criticized as protection of the defendant’s basic processual guaranties suffers statutory limitation in those modes of procedure, and the speed and simplification of proceedings affect the individualization of punishment. Also of importance was the fact that the frequent decisions in expedited proceedings served as a specific form of aggravation of represion since – as shown by research findings – the penalties imposed in that mode were more severe than in the ordinary proceedings. Analysis of the evolution of decisions of the transgression boards has led to the conclusion that throughout the period under analysis, penal policy was regularly aggravated which was largely influenced by punitive instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The only periods of mitigation of penalties were  the years 1981 and 1989: this resulted mainly from social conflicts and public opinion pressure on reduction of repressiveness of the penal system. For this reason, the 1989 amendment of the Transgression Code, forced by systemic changes, which deprived the Minister of Internal Affairs of his original control over decisions of the transgression boards and submitted all of those decisions to judical review brings the hope for liberalization and rationalization of penal policy in cases of transgressions.
PL
Przedmiotem rozważań artykułu jest fragment polityki karnej państwa obejmujący działalność sądów w celu przeciwdziałania i ograniczania przestępczości w drodze stosowania przepisów prawa karnego wobec cudzoziemców przebywających w Polsce. W szczególności poruszane jest zagadnienie polityki wymierzania kar i środków karnych cudzoziemcom, którzy dopuścili się czynów zabronionych przez polskie prawo karne i trafili do systemu formalnej kontroli społecznej. Celem analizy jest ustalenie, w jaki sposób na przestrzeni lat 2004-2012 kształtowała się polityka sądowego wymiaru kary cudzoziemcom, jakie kary i środki karne były wobec nich najczęściej stosowane w odpowiedzi na popełnienie poszczególnych rodzajów przestępstw oraz sprawdzenie czy, a jeśli tak, to w jakim kierunku i zakresie, polityka ta odbiega od polityki karnej stosowanej wobec polskich obywateli.
EN
The article consists of two parts. The first systematises definitions of penitentiary law and presents relations between penitentiary law and other branches of law and fields of science. The voices in discussion on penitentiary law sometimes differ, even in such basic issues as the scope of the very term. This sometimes gives rise to difficulties in qualifying particular provisions to a particular branch of law and causes doubts which rules to apply to particular institutions. Relations between penitentiary law and executive penal law, procedural law, penitentiary science and penal and penitentiary policies are discussed. The second part of the article discusses selected problems of current penal policy related most of all to the use of imprisonment sentence. Between penitentiary law and penitentiary policy or, more broadly speaking, penal policy there are obvious relations. On one hand, this policy is shaped on the basis of the letter of law, on the other hand, based on collected experience, it forces changes in law which fails to respond to actual challenges. Sometimes penitentiary policy, and even mere penitentiary practice, influences provisions of penal law, including penitentiary law, directly. It also happens that law and penitentiary policy (or penal one) fail to meet as far as their goals and assumptions are concerned. It seems it is so in the case of imprisonment, which often looks different in penitentiary law provisions and in statistics resulting from employment of penal and penitentiary policy. The basic paradox consists in that, in spite of observed decrease in crime levels , penitentiary system becomes more and more inefficient. Poland has one of the highest prisonisation indices in Europe and constantly growing number of persons sentenced by the courts and waiting for imprisonment sentence to be executed .The waiting line for imprisonment is approaching the number of the imprisoned. This may be due to a several reasons. Firstly, since the beginning of 1990s there has been a steady increase in the shortest imprisonment sentences (of up to 6 months) which were often administered to those guilty of driving a vehicle under alcohol influence. Secondly, Polish prisons are places where a significant number of imprisonments due to probation violations are served – which shows the weakness in execution of alternatives to incarceration. Another problem is cancellation of suspended sentences. The criminal code provided for two ways a suspended sentence can be cancelled, facultative and obligatory. The latter raised serious doubts and was questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal in its decree of 17.07.2013 r., file no. SK 9/10 (as published in the Journal of Laws as item 905).
EN
This article presents assumptions and results – along with their exhaustive discussion – of a middle-term crime forecast and its institutional and environmental crime conditioning obtained with a simulation version of WF-CRIME model for Poland for 2012-2020 Moreover, the article presents assumptions and results of two simulation scenario groups which assume realistic changes in current penal policy and environmental conditioning of crime. As for penal policy two cases were analysed: an increase of law enforcement sector (“tightening” scenario) and its decrease (“loosening” scenario) in comparison with the base solution (forecast). In the context of environmental conditioning of crime also two scenarios were drafted – “acceleration” and “deceleration” – in which activity of economic environment is a broadly understood delimitation meta-factor. All analysed scenarios are characterised by realistic assumptions and thus the results should not be considered only in the terms of purely academic discourse of experiment. Presentation of analyses results was preceded by a brief discussion of data sources, applied methodology and the structure of relations between crime and all links of law enforcement system which create simulation system of WF-CRIME model. Appendices enable the reader an independent evaluation of credibility of used data and to track the structure of relations of the system. Based on the performed analysed one can draw a number of conclusions of general nature. First, the possibilities of crime destimulation with the use of institutional measures are very limited. Decrease in general number of crimes in following penal policy toughening is not impressive. Disproportional increase in funds for certain links of the law enforcement system gives a certain chance to increase effectiveness of the whole system: greatest in funding of the judiciary, secondly for public safety. In the light of multiplier and scenario analyses outcomes, directing additional funds to penitentiary system is ineffective, unless its aim is to increase the number of places in existing prisons. Second, environmental factors – external from the point of view of law enforcement system but (at least a part of them) in the set of decisive / quasi-decisive variables from macroeco-nomic point of view - influence crime to a much greater degree than institutional measures. Among these factors, the key role falls to average real salary and economic disparity. Quick economic increase which does not happen at the cost of increase of socioeconomic disparity seems the concise formula for long-term effective crime control. To use metaphor from medi-cine, shaping an anti-criminogenic environment is a treatment of the source, not a treatment of symptoms – the latter can be applied to acting on crime by institutional measures.
PL
Theft is one of the oldest and clearly condemned crime in history. It takes a significant part in the crime structure in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems to be a forgotten and uninteresting subject among modern criminological research. In public opinion, theft invariably causes indignation, and the way of punishing thieves is a field of interest for both public opinion and politicians. In  Poland,  theft  is  an  offence  that  can  either  be  prosecuted  as  a  misdemeanor  or  a  crime - it depends on the value of the property stolen. Therefore, legal penalties for crime related to theft may vary considerably. It is precisely this line between misdemeanor and crime that is cur- rently being discussed in Poland. To talk about changes concerning the punishment of thieves, one should first check what is the current state of the criminal policy in this regard. Therefore, I want to present the results of the research, which I carried out at the Institute of Justice in 2017. I examined randomly selected court files of two above mention categories of theft, which ended validly and in which the enforcement proceedings ended in 2016. The research was conducted on 420 cases (including 233 misdemeanor and 187 crime cases). On the basis of the collected material emerges the image of the criminal policy against thieves who stood before the court, which gives the opportunity to consider whether and what changes in the law can be predicted against the perpetrators of the simple theft. Kradzież jest jednym z najstarszych przestępstw znanych w historii. Przy ogólnej tendencji spadku ilości popełnianych przestępstw, kradzieże wciąż stanowią znaczący udział w strukturze polskiej przestępczości. W Polsce kradzież jest czynem, który może być ścigany jako wykroczenie lub jako przestępstwo – zależy to od wartości skradzionej własności. W związku z tym, kary za kradzież mogą się znacznie różnić. Sposób i wysokość tzw. „przepołowienia” kradzieży, czyli granicy od której będzie traktowana jako przestępstwo (i co za tym idzie surowiej karana), jest obecnie przedmiotem dyskusji w Polsce. Aby sprawdzić jak w rzeczywistości wygląda struktura orzekanych kar i za jakie wartości skradzionego mienia sprawcy byli pociągani do odpowiedzialności, przestawiam wyniki badania, które przeprowadziłam w Instytucie Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości w 2017 roku. Przedmiotem analizy były losowo wybrane akta sądowe 420 spraw (w tym 233 spraw wykroczeń i 187 spraw przestępstw), które zakończyły się prawomocnie i w których postępowanie wykonawcze zakończyło się w 2016 r. Na podstawie zebranego materiału wyłania się obraz polityki karnej przeciwko sprawcom kradzieży, którzy stanęli przed polskimi sądami. Artykuł jest rozszerzoną i zmodyfkowaną wersją referatu wygłoszonego na XVIII Konferencji Europejskiego Towarzystwa Kryminologicznego w Sarajewie, która odbyła się w dniach 29 sierpnia 2018 r. - 1 września 2018 r.
EN
Theft is one of the oldest and clearly condemned crime in history. It takes a significant part in the crime structure in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems to be a forgotten and uninteresting subject among modern criminological research. In public opinion, theft invariably causes indignation, and the way of punishing thieves is a field of interest for both public opinion and politicians. In  Poland,  theft  is  an  offence  that  can  either  be  prosecuted  as  a  misdemeanor  or  a  crime - it depends on the value of the property stolen. Therefore, legal penalties for crime related to theft may vary considerably. It is precisely this line between misdemeanor and crime that is cur- rently being discussed in Poland. To talk about changes concerning the punishment of thieves, one should first check what is the current state of the criminal policy in this regard. Therefore, I want to present the results of the research, which I carried out at the Institute of Justice in 2017. I examined randomly selected court files of two above mention categories of theft, which ended validly and in which the enforcement proceedings ended in 2016. The research was conducted on 420 cases (including 233 misdemeanor and 187 crime cases). On the basis of the collected material emerges the image of the criminal policy against thieves who stood before the court, which gives the opportunity to consider whether and what changes in the law can be predicted against the perpetrators of the simple theft.
EN
This report devoted to presenting the probation system in Poland together with the duties performed by probation officers is made up of two chapters. In the first chapter all primary legal acts regulating the institutions of the probation officers were discussed, also with the functions they perform in the system of criminal justice. In the second chapter, results of research conducted in all court districts in Poland in 2002 were presented. Both, the analysis of legal regulations, as well as the research, have been conducted after the implementation of the basic reform in Poland, yet there is still a lot to be done organisation wise, i.e. enlarging the number of probation officers, improving their essential preparation as well as implementing modem and effective forms of activity.       In the first chapter, where the legal bases of probation officers are discussed, the most important legal acts were mentioned first. Their number is quite substantial, since in the nine laws there are regulations concerning the socio-legal status and duties of probation officers. In order to indicate the most significant of them the following cannot be omitted:       The Penal Code of 1997 which regulated matters concerned with probation officers performing a number of supervisory forms (including probation);       The Executive Penal Code of 1997 by means of which piobation officers were given a rank of one of the important organs responsible for executing punishments and means of punishment. These tasks have been extended in order to grant the probation officers: executing the punishment of restriction of liberty and substitutive penalty ‒ community service, and also certain duties have been precised concerned with executing the punishment of deprivation of liberty and providing the post penitentiary help.        The law on the organisation of law courts (dated from 2001) in which only few articles are devoted to probation. They are, however, immensely important because they helped to precise this system, constituting that probation officers are an autonomous organ operating within the judiciary system, meaning by that regional and district courts, towards which presidents of the law courts and judges occupy supervisory and controlling positions. Simultaneously, the professional and social character of the probation officer has been confirmed in that law.       Another very important legal act is the law of 1982 on the procedures in juvenile cases (with later changes, especially with a very thorough amendment of 2000) which regulates the use of probation (family courts) in cases of defining the supervisory methods or reformative for the juveniles.       Amongst the discussed laws one, from 2001, about the probation officers is of a special significance. This law has almost a pioneer character. It has been created by the Polish Parliament from the initiative of probation officers and with their considerable participation. While enacted from the beginning of 2002, it has normalised in a complex way the socio-professional status of probation officers and precisely settled the location, organisation and the duties ofthe probation service in the judiciary system.         In this report laws and obligations of probation officers have been discussed, together with their calling and prospects for promotion, as well as competence connected with performing duties foreseen in the law of probation officers, and other laws, especially in the Penal Code, the Executive Penal Code, Code of Penal Procedure and in the Civil Code.        The bills conceming the probation service and the persons of probation officers, are an additional documentation to the executive acts, to the regulations and orders of the court. In example we can mention one of the most significant regulations, created by the Minister of Justice in 2003, in matter of a detailed executing of the authorities and obligations of probation officers.        In the second chapter the activity of probation officers in 2002 has been presented, in the light of the research results. They were conducted by sending a questionnaire to all 40 court regions (all together 150 questionnaires, part of which has been filled in in groups). It needs to be stressed at this point that amongst the questions none of the issues which could be called stressful were taken up. The research included 50 different issues, amongst which the following should be discussed: - kinds and number of performed interviews by the probation officers during the time of criminal proceedings and later of executing, - executing of measures to examine a convicted offender in case of conditional discontinuance of legal penal proceedings, a conditional suspension of penalty execution, a conditional release from serving the full sentence, - the content of adjudged and executed guardianship, in other words what is the character of probation officers’ contacts and work with persons under their ward, - ęxecuting of penalty of imprisonment and community service, - activity in the area of executing the penalty of imprisonment, - the difficulties in the work of probation officers, - opinions of probation officers concerned with cooperation with social workers as well as in reference to the significance of specific purposes of penalty.        It is difficurt to summarise the research results. Therefore, only for the purpose of a small illustration, the following conclusions can be  mentioned: - probation officers' opinion about their insufficient number (there is about 2000 professional probation officers for adults) in order to be effective in the assigned roles, - the legal system seems to have achieved a desired state, - supervisions performed by probation officers do not comply with all the obligatory (i.e.- caring - job finding); however, the controlling functions over the sentenced under supervision seem to be accepted as satisfactory.
EN
  The paper describes and appraises the policy of prosecution and punishment in cases of transgressions in the years 1990‒1994, i.e. after the systemic transformations in Poland. It is a continuation of a study of penal policy carried out while the former Code of Transgressions was still in force; the aim now is to draw a comparison between the old and new tendencies in the practice of prosecution and punishment. The comparison, however, encounters specific difficulties. The first reason for this is that a full judicial control over decisions of transgression boards was introduced and the boards were submitted to the Ministry of Justice supervision. The second reason is that the statistical data gathered now by that department are much scantier as compared to those formerly gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs while the transgression boards were still subordinated to it. In the seventies, a systematic aggravation of the penal policy took place. Admittedly, that policy was then temporarily mitigated with the birth of Solidarity; yet after the imposition of martial law in 1982, followed by the passing of the 1985 act, penal policy once again grew repressive, this time much more so. Then, at the close of the past decade, as a result of social pressure, penal policy was quite distinctly liberalized. To show the transformations of that policy in the nineties, it has usually been compared to the tendencies found in both a “repressive” year of 1987 and a “liberal” one of 1988. As follows from analysis of the prosecution policy measured by the number of motions for punishment submitted to transgression boards, the number of such motions was greatly reduced in the years 1990-1994 as compared to preceding decades. The fact considered that recorded crime went up distinctly in that period, as probably did also the number of petty infringements of the law – that is, transgressions – this reduction can be interpreted as a limitation of the scope of prosecution with respect to such acts. On the one hand, this resulted from a lowered activity of the police, on the other hand – from the force’s aim towards improving their image in society. A similar trend could be found in the case of police orders the number of which was also reduced. Characteristically, the average fine imposed by police order amounted to not even a half of the statutory upper limit. This notwithstanding, a draft amendment of the code of transgressions was published in the Spring of 1994 which suggested that the limit be raised tenfold; the draft also provided for an identical raise in the upper limit of fine as a main penalty, This solution was sharply criticized by the present author as its actual implanentation would result in a general aggravation of economic repression. The structure of transgressions for which the boards imposed punishment in the nineties underwent a rather significant change: the number of persons brought before the boards for traffic transgressions went up considerably (to about 70%) while that of persons guilty of disturbance of public order went down. This latter trend should be seen as advantageous since the formerly mass-scale prosecution of perpetrators of such acts, most of them alcohol dependent, was generally considered futile. Also liberalized was the structure of penal measures imposed on all perpetrators of transgressions. Admittedly, fine remained the prevalent response (about 95% of decisions); yet the proportion of the strictest measures (arrest and limitation of liberty) went down distinctly, and that of the most lenient ones (reprimand and renouncement of inflicting punishment) went up. The fact considered that the penalty of arrest was limited to the minimum and imposed chiefly on persons guilty of the acts that are to be classified as offenses under the draft of the Penal Code, the proposed preservation of that penalty in the future Code of Transgressions cannot be praised. This same conclusion is also true for conditional suspention the execution of arrest which is nearly a dead institution in practice. As clearly follows from statistical data used in the present analysis, changes in the structure of penal measures imposed reflected a mitigation of penal policy. Instead, no data are gathered as to the severity load of those measures. This situation is bound to provoke criticism, chiefly because of the lack of data on the amounts of fines. Fines being the most frequently imposed measures, their amounts constitute the basic index of punitiveness of the boards’ decisions. The fact considered that the statutory amount of fine was last raised in 1992 while nominal wages showed a regular upwards trend, the conclusion is justified that we in fact dealt with what was perhaps an unintended mitigation of the actual severity of economic repression. As follows from the principles of rational penal policy, the provions legal in force have to be to be amended. Due, however, to pauperization of society, the raise in the maximum statutory fine cannot be as drastic as suggested in the above-mentioned draft amendment of 1994. This might well lead to revival of the once pursued practice of using fines as an instrument of adding to the budget. The statistical data under analysis also provide no information on the imposition of additional penal measures, the sole exception being prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles. All that can be observed is a very serious growth in the proportion of this latter penalty which was due to a mass prosecution of perpetrators of petty traffic offenses. Characteristically, though, the incidence of imposition of this measure on such persons (those additionally guilty of drunken driving included) has been on a regular decrease. Also astonishing is the fact that despite the introduction of judicial review of the boards’ decisions (which had been postulated for many decades by the scientific circles), no statistical data are gathered showing the extent to which penal policy pursued by those boards is actually corrected by courts. Admittedly, it follows from the findings of the solo relevant research project conducted in the nineties that today as in the past, courts usually tend to reduce the penalties imposed by transgression boards (the penalty of prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles in particular). What remains unknown, though, is both the general number of persons who demand that their cases be examined by courts and the actual decisions of those courts. Although penal policy in cases of transgressions grew slightly more severe in 1990‒1994, its present liberalization as compared to the two preceding decades is generally seen as favorable. What probably accounts for this liberalization is the exclusion of transgression boards from under the supervision of Ministry of Internal Affairs and the resulting deprivation of the head of that particular Ministry of the right to issue instructions as to the sentencing policy which invariably increased its punitiveness. Thus an instrument of pressure was abolished which limited the discretion of members of transgression boards. This shows that respect for the independence of those appointed to apply tbe law may result in a reduction of repressiveness even with no legislative changes in the system of penal measures. This is not to say, though, that – still  based on rigorous provisions as it is – the system does not require a possibly prompt amendment.
EN
Rapid increases in imprisonment rates and the adoption of severe penal policies in some countries have, in recent years, prompted a burgeoning scholarly literature on the determinants of penal policy. However, much of this literature may be asking the wrong question. The authors typically focussed on the causes of harsher penal policies and offered explanations. However, it seems more reasonable to ask what recent changes in penal policy tell us about the country itself. The paper shows that crossnational differences in penal policy tell us important things about differences in penal culture, and that decisive changes in penal culture may both indicate and portend major, and sometimes regrettable, changes in larger political cultures. The paper has been divided into three sections, each addressing a separate question. The first considers the reasons for penal policies in Britain, Australia, the U.S., and elsewhere becoming harsher over the final three decades of the twentieth century. The short answer is that the question is based on a false premise. Only in some places did penal policies become harsher and in importantly different ways. The assumption that penal policies everywhere tightened over that period is wrong. The second addresses the questions of why penal policies in particular countries did and did not become more severe. A wide range of explanations are available. They range from national differences in constitutional arrangements, the organisation of criminal justice systems, the nature of the mass media, and the nature of national politics to fortuities of personality and event. The key points, however, are that, at day's end, policies are chosen and choices have consequences. The third question is why policy choices matter. One answer, of course, is that they matter because they affect what happens to individual human beings. Another important reason why they matter is that policies adopted and implemented sometimes change the world and sometimes change the ways people think. Repressive policies, rationalised and justified, and in due course followed, desensitise us to the reasons why at the outset they appeared to be repressive and make it easier, when new controversial issues about crime control policies arise, to adopt even more repressive policies. America, over the past 30 years, England for the past 15 years, and other countries for different periods, have through their changes in penal policies changed their penal cultures in ways that portend ill for the future.
EN
The paper focuses on penal policy, or to be more accurate, on its part related to “the operation of the courts of law with a view to preventing and reducing the crime rate through the application of criminal law,”1 though with regard to a selected group only, i.e. foreign nationals who reside in Poland. In very simple terms, it addresses the policy of punishments and punitive measures pursued with respect to foreign nationals who have committed offences expressly prohibited by Polish criminal law, and were subsequently embraced by a formal system of social supervision. The studies at issue were conducted on the basis of statistical data collected by the Ministry of Justice. They comprise information on the kinds of punishment and punitive measures applied to foreign nationals for committing respective types of criminal offences, as revealed and discovered by Polish justice system throughout the country, in the period spanning 2004–2012. It appears that an 8-year period of scrutiny regarding the application of penal policy to foreign nationals allows for the identification of all attendant key trends, as well as any portents of forthcoming changes. An appraisal of the structure of criminal offences committed by foreign nationals reveals that they fall most frequently (87% in total) within 5 key categories, i.e. 21% of convictions against the credibility of documents, 20% against public order, 18% against the safety of transportation, 15% fraud, 13% against property. Criminal offences falling within the scope of other legislative constraints that serve as the conviction basis against foreign nationals are encountered much less frequently and comprise primarily offences against: human life and health, the justice system, family and family care, sexual freedom, public security, environment, commercial endeavours, and against the Republic of Poland. There are also criminal offences whose characteristics fall within the scope of other legal classifications than those comprised in Polish Criminal Code, usually the following ones: the Polish Fiscal Penal Code of September 10, 1999 (Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 83, Item. 930), the Promotion of Sobriety and Prevention of Alcohol Abuse Act of October 26, 1982 (Journal of Laws of 1982, No. 35, Item. 230), the Health Protection Against the Consequences of Consumption of Tobacco and Tobacco Products Act of November 9, 1995 (Journal of Laws of 1996, No 10, Item 55), and finally, the Industrial Property Act of June 30, 2000 (Journal of Laws of 2001, No. 49, Item 508). The current policy of criminal convictions against foreign nationals does not substantially differ from the general trends in Polish penal policy. By far, most frequently the courts of law opt for a term of imprisonment with conditional suspension of its execution as a penal measure. The next option in line comprises a fine, and then comes an immediate custodial sentence, occasionally a restriction of personal liberty.2 It is clear that the key category of criminal offences for which foreign nationals ended up in Polish prisons were offences against property. In this particular category, most offenders had been convicted in pursuance of the provisions of Article 278 § 1, Polish Penal Code (theft), Article 279 §1, Polish Penal Code (burglary with forced entry), and Article 280 §1, Polish Penal Code (aggravated theft). The legislation in place provides for an opportunity to apply a diversity of punitive measures apart from the penalty itself, also as probation measures, or as preventive measures. The legislators clearly aimed for generally increasing the role and overall significance of punitive measures within the penal policy, although an overall body of convictions meted out against foreign nationals over the years 2004–2012 in Poland demonstrates that the courts of law were not particularly forthcoming in this respect, rather seldom ordering punitive measures against the perpetrators, and if so, they would usually reach out for the option of ordering fines and a driving ban, or a forfeiture of property. Statistical data taking into account the lawfully convicted foreign nationals, stratified by a specific type of criminal offence, gender, and punishment meted out for the principal offence, reveal that in 2005 there was a significant reduction in the number of punitive measures ordered by the courts. In fact, compared with 2004, their number decreased fivefold, and remained approximately at the same level throughout the following four years, whereas in 2010, a penal measure was ordered only once, none in 2011, and in 2012 – twice. The sentencing and penal measures policy pursued by the Polish courts, as addressed in the present study, was assessed not only at the level of statistical data made available by the Ministry of Justice, but also through meticulous research conducted on the court’s case files pertaining to foreign nationals whose cases had lawfully been closed, randomly sampled. Both the sampling methodology applied and the number of the records brought under study makes the results of this research project fully representative. Examination of the court’s case files yielded the results fully consistent with the results obtained on the basis of the statistical data obtained from the ministerial records, including in terms of the actual application of the penal policy against foreign nationals committing criminal offences in Poland, although certain exceptions were encountered with regard to the policies applied to the perpetrators of specific types of criminal offences. On the other hand, though, those seem to have much more in common with a particular type and nature of the offence itself, rather than the fact that it was committed by a foreign national. The conclusions drawn from the statistical data under study, as supplemented by a detailed appraisal of the court records, give sufficient grounds to believe that in its essence, the penal policy applied to foreign nationals residing in Poland does not differ from that applied in Poland at large.
EN
The subject matter of the article is the penal policy of courts of law implemented in 2005 and 2010, and in the years 2014–2015, presented based on court statistics. The principal objective of the discussion is to find the answer to the question of whether the penal code reform implementedby the Act of 20 February 2015, which became effective on 1 July 2015, brought about the expected changes in the jurisprudence. The preliminary results of the research demonstrated that the penal code reform did to an extent result in the expected changes in the penal policy, because, after its implementation, the extent to which the penalty of imprisonment with conditional suspension of its enforcement was imposed decreased, and the importance of the penalty of restriction of liberty increased. Also, the importance of the so-called mixed penalties increased. However, contrary to the expectations, the importance of unconditional imprisonment did not decrease and, instead, its share increased from 12.1% in 2014 to 14.4% in 2015.
EN
 The idea of socio-educating function of punishment is not recent. It appeared in XVIIIth century. Its renewal of XXth century is explained by the disappointment of the deterrent and re-socialising effectiveness of criminal punishment. It is also a reaction towards the abolitionary postulates’ questioning the sense of existence of the criminal punishment. There are many versions of this theory. It is widely popular in Germany where it is calted ‘positive general prevention’ or the ‘integrating prevention’.         The term ‘positive general prevention’ was constructed in Germany in opposition to the traditional term ‘general prevention’ understood solely as a general deterrence. It is meant to stress the turn away from the so understood ‘general prevention’ and a promoting of the positive function of criminal punishment. This ‘positive’ or ‘integrating’ function of punishment is, in most simple terms, based on strengthening the morality, supporting the desired attitudes and ways of behaving, strengthening the trust in law, in shaping the law awareness, and also encouraging norms recognition. The purpose of the punishment is preserving and strengthening the normative integration of society. It is realised not by creating fear but by using persuasion, by teaching about necessity and usefulness of the criminal law norms and by obeying them for the social order. It is also important to bring about a custom of law obedience.         The popularity of the positive general prevention is explained differently in the German studies. Most often, it is pointed out that, on the one hand, a return towards the absolutist theories is commonly rejected there, and on the other hand, that there is a popular disappointment with the efficiency of prevention and re-socialisation. The positive general prevention an opportunity for keeping a preventive character of theory of punishment with a simultaneous introduction of a retributive element in form of guilt rule. It thus creates a combination of rationality of prevention theories with a guaranteed character of the absolutist theories. It also has an advantage over the mixed theories of punishment as it is directed at a single goal.         Despite of a significant differentiation of the positive general prevention theories, it is relatively easy to define some of its characteristics: the addressee of an execution of the criminal law and punishment is society and not an individual person, where it is mostly about the influence on those members of society who do obey the law. the positive general prevention aims at long term, indirect activity and not at an immediate, short term effect on society. the persuasive nature of the criminal law is stressed, its ability to persuade, as well as the symbolic, expressive meaning of punishment as means of communicating. The content of that message in German conception is, in general, that criminal law norm is still valid. It exceptionally evokes to the moral condemnation of a deed as a subject of that message. the representatives of the theory of positive general prevention educe the purpose of the punishment from the entire penal law system. Penal law and the penalty itself come in those ideas on the very same grounds. Therefore it is not a theory of punishment but a theory of the penal law. these theories agree that the positive, integrating effect can be brought about only by a just punishment. a very typical feature of the German ideas is using the term of guilt in reference to functionality. It makes them vulnerable to a reproach that, in fact, they are veiled absolutist theories.        I analyse five ideas of the positive general prevention in this article. It was my aim to select those ideas which could indicate its diversity. Mayer's theory contributed to the rebirth of the socio-educational theory of punishment function in German studies. It belongs to the movement of the expressive punishment theories. According to Mayer penalty has an educational aspect for the society by strengthening or creating morality of the community.        Integrating prevention, as understood by H. Muller-Dietz, is an activity of punishment which is based on creating and strengthening the ways that law is perceived by the citizens. The integrating function is realised by the regulatory and court systems of justice.       The most popular in Germany is the theory of G. Jakobs. It clearly refers to the theory of systems by Niklas Luhmann. Jakobs stresses that punishment expresses a protest against breaking a norm paid by the offender. It shows that the norm broken with a deed is still valid and that it is determinant as an orientation example for social interactions.       A very strong feature of W. Hasserman’s idea is the emphasis of how the penal law system influences the entirety of social control processes. Streng refers to the psychoanalysis and psychology of the punishing society, in order to explain the general preventative activity of punishment. He mentions three unconscious, emotional sources of punishment.       In the conclusion I discuss the significance of the presented theories for the studies of criminal law and the practices of administration of criminal justice.  
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