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„Esse apparens” a jeho role v Auriolově výkladu smyslového vnímání

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Lička L.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 4
539-557
EN
The main aim of this paper is to propose an adequate interpretation of the concept esse apparens (apparent being) which was used by Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol (c. 1280-1322), especially focusing on his account of sensory perception. Drawing on an analysis of the relevant passages of the commentary on the Sentences by Auriol, first, I introduce his famous account of sensory illusions, and then his own claims about the nature of esse appparens (Auriol refuses to treat it either as a separate entity serving as a mediator of perception, or as only an extrinsic denomination of the perceived object). In the next part, I reject the interpretation which identifies esse apparens with mental representation. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to place this concept into the context of scholastic doctrine of objectiver or intentional being (popularized mainly by Duns Scotus and his disciples). At the end of the paper, I return to Auriol's account of illusions and show that it is compatible with esse apparens being understood as mode of being.
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The Content/Object Equivocation: Shepherd’s Neglected Contribution

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Whitaker M.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2022
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issue 1
233-248
EN
John Searle roundly rejects what he calls the Bad Argument: a long-standing equivocation in philosophy over the contents and the objects of perception. But, as Josh Armstrong points out, this insight is not unique to Searle. By the late 19th Century the equivocation had been observed by Franz Brentano and students of his, such as Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski, and was highlighted too in the 20th century by G. E. M. Anscombe. What Armstrong does take to be a novel to Searle is his use of this observation to undermine some of the primary objections to a realist theory of perception. In fact, though, it had already been put to much the same use by Mary Shepherd in her 1827 book Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation. Shepherd not only argues that the equivocal use of the term “things we perceive” is a crucial flaw in Berkeley’s case for Idealism, but also goes on to use this in service of her own, largely realist, theory of perception.
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