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Robot Morality: Bertram F. Malle’s Concept of Moral Competence

100%
Schmiljun A.
Ethics in Progress
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2017
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vol. 8
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issue 2
69-79
EN
Bertram F. Malle is one of the first scientists, combining robotics with moral competence. His theory outlines that moral competence can be understood as a system of five components including moral norms, a moral vocabulary, moral cognition, moral decision making and moral communication. Giving a brief (1) introduction of robot morality, the essay analyses Malle’s concept of moral competence (2) and discusses its consequences (3) for the future of robot science. The thesis will further argue that Malle’s approach is insufficient due to three reasons: his function argument is very simplifying and therefore troubling; each component of his theory is inconsistent and, finally, closely connected to our common understanding of personhood, which raises new philosophical questions surrounding the basic issue of if and/or when machines can be considered people.
2
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Moderate Communitarianism and the Idea of Political Morality in African Democratic Practice

88%
M. Majeed H.
Diametros
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2019
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vol. 16
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issue 61
51-71
EN
This paper explores how moderate communitarianism could bring about a greater sense of political morality in the practice of democracy in contemporary Africa. Moderate communitarianism is a thesis traceable to Kwame Gyekye, the Akan philosopher. This thesis is a moderation of the infl uence of the community in the Akan, an African social structure. In ensuring good political morality in the Akan, and therefore the African community, Gyekye proposes moral revolution over the enforcement of the law. I perform two main tasks in this article: (i) I reinforce the view that in a democratic framework (such as the framework within which many African states now fi nd themselves), moderate communitarianism offers lessons on political morality, and (ii) I challenge the notion that moral revolution has greater prospects for bringing about political morality than law enforcement.
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Should we sacrifice embryos to cure people?

88%
Lara F.
Human Affairs
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2012
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vol. 22
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issue 4
623-635
EN
Medical stem cell research is currently the cause of much moral controversy. Those who would confer the same moral status to embryos as we do to humans consider that harvesting such embryonic cells entails sacrificing embryos. In this paper, the author analyses critically the arguments given for such a perspective. Finally, a theory of moral status is outlined that coherently and plausibly supports the use of embryonic stem cells in therapeutic research.
4
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The person and the personhood from the perspective of the U. S American legall doctrine

75%
Beran K.
The Lawyer Quarterly
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2019
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vol. 9
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issue 1
13-24
EN
The mode of solving legal issues within the Anglo-American legal culture has been usually based upon human experience and pragmatic reasoning. This is also the way for the U. S. American legal doctrine to approach the concept of person in law as the basic legal institution. I tend to argue that such approach should be seen as incorrect since fundamental legal concepts – such as a person in law – should not be constructed upon practical human experience. I would claim that this intentionally “anti-theoretical” attitude is the reason why the Anglo-American legal terminology applicable to the concept of person appears unclear. It is difficult to identify differences between “legal entity” and “legal person” as well as the relation and/or difference between terms “person” and “personhood
5
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The Analysis of Value-Free or Value-Ladenness of Work in the Light of Catholic Social Teaching of John Paul II

75%
Ugwu I. S.
Studia Ełckie
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2023
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vol. 25
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issue 2
209-224
EN
This article presents the metaphysical study of work. Based on this understanding, the author makes a comparative analysis of the dilemma: whether human work is value-free or value-laden in realizing the fundamental purpose of work, and proper understanding of personhood. It compares absolute value in the epistemic value of the person with economic value as what people experience at work. It also investigates which of these values in the contemporary approach to work realizes the fundamental goal of work and personhood. The author aligns with John Paul II’s Social Reflection on value of work in relation to human person, and discovers that value-ladenness of work realizes both the purpose of work and self-determination.
6
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Peirce on the Symbolical Foundation of Personhood

75%
De Tienne A.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2021
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vol. 5
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issue 4
79-100
EN
This paper discusses the semiotic and metaphysical framework within which Peirce elaborated a symbolical and dynamical conception of personhood. It exhibits the centrality of Peirce’s early conception of the “unity of consistency” along with its decentering advantages. It describes how this gave rise to a metaphysics of personhood that questions the singularity of individuals. It then conducts a semiotic study of the evolutive process across which something indeterminate evolves into something determinate that increasingly personifies itself following the logic of symbolization, taking into account two major types of indetermination: generality and vagueness. It then considers the kind of teleology at work within personification. It concludes that personhood so conceived is not restricted to only individual human beings, for the process of symbolization at work is not confined to a particular species-specific application.
7
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Karol Wojtyła on the metaphysics of the person

75%
Hołub G.
Logos i Ethos
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2015
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issue 2(39)
97–115
EN
The article undertakes the issue of metaphysical subjectivity in the philosophy of the human person developed by Karol Wojtyła. He drew extensively upon the notion of suppositum but there is no systematic exposition of the concept in his work. The article undertakes the task of investigating the issue. First, Wojtyła’s approach to metaphysics is presented. Second, the paper sets out the philosopher’s understanding of suppositum. Finally, some further clarifications are developed, including those helping to better understand the association of the metaphysical subjectivity with the personal. Wojtyła’s concept of suppositum requires a stronger reference to a pro-personalistic notion of substance. The latter seems to be offered by an original project of Thomistic metaphysics presented by W. Norris Clarke. The last part of the paper is an attempt at demonstration of the complementarity of metaphysical ideas of these two philosophers.
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A life in need of “neither protection nor preservation”: Joseph Fletcher, Down’s syndrome and euthanasia

75%
Sydow R. F. v.
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2014
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vol. 6
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issue 2
246-258
EN
Joseph Fletcher claims in his Christian situation ethic developed in the nineteen sixties that there is nothing wrong with the use of euthanasia on children born with Down’s syndrome. But is it possible to use his claim of non-persons as non-moral subjects in an ethic that claims not to be legalistic? This paper affirms that Fletcher’s claims are wrong, and that questions motivated by a lack of resources should be answered with a critical discussion regarding those resources. Not with an ethic that supports euthanasia.
9
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Mýtus ontologického personalismu

63%
Suchánek M.
Časopis zdravotnického práva a bioetiky (Journal of Medical Law and Bioethics)
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2017
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vol. 7
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issue 3
49-66
EN
The article deals with criticism of ontological personalism. According to ontological personalism every human being is a person because he belongs to the biological species Homo sapiens. It is shown that the membership of Homo sapiens is not a necessary or sufficient condition for obtaining the moral status of a person. An individual should be a person because they possess certain personal characteristics and not because they belong to a certain genealogical line. Further, the article deals with the genetic criterion of a person. Human individuals have innate basic capacity that they have from the beginning of their existence. The human individual is therefore a person from the moment of conception. I have shown, among others, that the genetic criterion of a person is morally unjustified. There is no morally re levant h aving certain capacities (DNA), but the real disposition to show this capacity.
CS
Článek se věnuje kritice ontologického personalismu, podle kterého je každý lidský jedinec osobou na základě té skutečnosti, že patří do biologického druhu Homo sapiens. Je ukázáno, že druhové členství Homo sapiens není nutnou ani postačující podmínkou k získání morálního statusu osoby, protože jedinec by měl být osobou díky tomu, že vlastní jisté osobu-činící charakteristiky, a nikoli proto, že patří do jisté genealogické linie. Dále je představeno genetické kritérium osoby, podle kterého je lidským jedincům vrozená základní kapacita, kterou mají od počátku jejich existence. Tato kapacita zapříčiňuje u těchto jedinců vývoj osobu-činících charakteristik. Lidský jedinec je díky této kapacitě osobou už od okamžiku početí, a nikoli až když se mu dostatečně vyvinou osobu-činící charakteristiky. Ukázal jsem mimo jiné, že genetické kritérium osoby je morálně nezdůvodnitelné, protože by nemělo být morálně relevantní vlastnění určité kapacity (DNA), ale reálná dispozice projevit tuto kapacitu.
10
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A Senior as an Individual in the Situation of Dementia. Tom Kitwood's Person-Centred Care Model and the Philosophy of Dialogue

51%
Smrokowska-Reichmann A.
Nauki o Wychowaniu. Studia Interdyscyplinarne
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2020
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vol. 10
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issue 1
51-61
PL
Seniorzy cierpiący na demencję, ze względu na specyfikę tej choroby, narażeni są zawsze na podejście redukcyjne i depersonalizujące. Zaniedbywany lub nawet całkowicie negowany jest wówczas wymiar podmiotowości seniora oraz to, że pomimo choroby pozostaje on nadal osobą – z prawami i potrzebami osoby – a nie jedynie bezradnym pacjentem. Artykuł przedstawia zwrot, jaki dokonał się w rozumieniu seniorów z demencją oraz opiece nad nimi dzięki pracy brytyjskiego psychologa Toma Kitwooda. W modelu Person-Centered Care osoba definiowana jest jako istota relacyjna, czująca i historyczna. Jednocześnie bycie osobą jest możliwie jedynie w kontekście interpersonalnym. Stąd wynika propozycja autorki artykułu, aby koncepcję Toma Kitwooda odczytać przez pryzmat filozofii dialogu, będącej zawsze afirmacją podmiotowości i sprzeciwem wobec tendencji reifikujących człowieka. Zdaniem autorki, Tom Kitwood, operacjonalizując wyznaczniki dobrostanu pacjenta z demencją, przetłumaczył główne postulaty filozofii dialogu na język psychologii, gerontologii i opieki senioralnej.
EN
Seniors suffering from dementia are always exposed to a reductive approach and depersonalization due to the specificity of that disease. The subjectivity of a senior is neglected or even completely negated. What remains unnoticed is the fact that, despite their disease, a senior is still a person – with the rights and needs of a person – and not just a helpless patient. The paper presents a break that has been made in the understanding and care of seniors with dementia thanks to the work of Tom Kitwood, a British psychologist. In Kitwood’s Person-Centred Care model, a person is defined as a relational, feeling, and historical being. At the same time, being a person is only possible in the interpersonal context. Hence the author's suggestion to read Kitwood’s concept from the angle of the philosophy of dialogue, which is always an affirmation of subjectivity and an opposition to tendencies that reify human beings. In the author’s opinion, Kitwood translated the main postulates of the philosophy of dialogue into the language of psychology, gerontology and senior care by operationalizing the indicators of the well-being of a patient with dementia.
11
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Thomistic Personalism and Creation Metaphysics: Personhood vs. Humanity and Ontological vs. Ethical Dignity

51%
Selner-Wright S. C.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2018
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vol. 7
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issue 3
469-485
EN
The author seeks to respond to the philosophical appeal of W. Norris Clarke, S.J., “to uncover the personalist dimension lying implicit within the fuller understanding of the very meaning and structure of the metaphysics of being itself, not hitherto explicit in either the metaphysical or personalist traditions themselves.” She does this by discussing the distinctions drawn by Karol Wojtyla: (1) between a human being’s personhood and his humanity, and (2) between the ontological dignity and the ethical dignity of the human person.
12

The Ethos of God and Man in the Christos Yannaras’ Works

45%
Leśniewski K.
Roczniki Teologiczne
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2019
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vol. 66
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issue 7: Teologia ekumeniczna
51-68
PL
Objawienie prawdy o Bogu jako Trójcy ma bezpośredni wpływ na tożsamość i kondycję osoby ludzkiej. Bycie osobą jest nierozerwalnie związane z etosem. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje istotę etosu Boga w odniesieniu do tradycji chrześcijańskiej i etosu osoby ludzkiej stworzonej na obraz i podobieństwo Boże na podstawie myśli teologicznej znanego prawosławnego myśliciela religijnego — Christosa Yannarasa (ur. 1935). Prawda o tym, że Bóg działa w sposób osobowy, jest bardzo ważnym założeniem dla zrozumienia osobowej tożsamości i etosu człowieka. Jedynie w relacji do Boga, który jest Trójcą Przenajświętszych Osób, nasz ludzki etos może być wolny od zwodniczej wizji egzystencjalnej samonegacji oraz indywidualistycznej etyki i moralności.
EN
The revelation of the truth about God as Trinity has a direct impact on the identity and condition of the human person. Personhood implies relationship which is inseparably connected with ethos. This article examines the essence of the ethos of God, as He is understood in the Christian tradition, and the ethos of human person created in the image and likeness of God on the basis of the theological thought of the very famous Greek Orthodox religious thinker, Christos Yannaras (born in 1935). The truth that God acts in a personal manner is a very important presupposition for the understanding of the personal identity and ethos of human being. Solely in the relation to God Who is the Trinity of the Most Holy Persons our human ethos can be free from a deceptive vision of existential self-denial and individualistic ethics and morality.
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