In Christian literature (particularly in popular theological publications, on Christian web sites, and also in homilies) the threefold differentiation of love, referring to the ancient Greek linguistic reality, frequently appears: it is said that the lowest, self-interested love corresponds to the Greek term of eros, the higher love based on mutual sympathy corresponds to the term philia, and the highest, selfless, unconditional love was allegedly called agape by the ancient Greeks. The article refutes this myth and presents the Greek words of “love“ and “to love“ as they were used by non-Christian writers and the Church Fathers. The subsequent article will compare these findings with the situation in the Septuagint and the New Testament.
Zu Beginn des Neuen Testaments entsteht in die Diaspora in Alexandrien Sophia Salomonos. Im Buch der Weisheit treffen sich die semitische Kultur des Bildes und die griechische Kultur der Begriffe. Der Autor berücksichtigt sowohl die traditionell Denkenden als auch ist offen auf die hellenistische Welt. Dieses Verwurzeln – Sein in der Geschichte mit der Offenheit gegenüber der ganzen Menschheit hat in der Darstellung des Bundes seinen Ausdruck gefunden. Im ersten Teil (1,1-6,21) und im dritten (Weish 10,1-19,22) verwendet der Autor den Begriff berith, im zweiten (6,21-9, 18), benutzt er den fuer damalige Kultur bedeutungsvollen Begriff philia. Durch die Anwendung von Antonomasie behandelt der Autor des Bundes der Weisheit die geschichtlichen Erfahrungen als die Typen von universellen Handlungen. Der Universalismus des Buches der Weisheit übernimmt das Neue Testament, besonders de Apostel der Voelker.
For the God of self-giving, kenotically-donated love, the decision to express love at all times comes first. In my conception, “full-Oorded” love would encompass what is ordinarily contained within the definition of agape love, but it would also include “eros love”, for the latter is the love of co-laborment. In my appropriation has of this terminology of eros love, it would be the type of love that the desires to, e.g., expand one’s territory or one’s domain, which makes it applicable to the modern theory of evolution by natural selection. Evolution – i.e., “descent with modification”, to invoke a Darwinian phrase – then, recognizes self-giving love, and the goodness thereof, in that species regularly undergo commensalist symbiotic relationships in nature, whereby one is aided by the other, while the “other” is neither “aided” nor “harmed”. This is self-giving love in its entirety, and a proper demonstration of it. My understanding of necessarily-expressed, “full-Oorded” love also includes dimensions of philia love. Philia could be akin to the symbiotic relationship known as mutualism in biology, especially since philia love has historically been associated with friendship or the interrelatedness of the natural world. Notably, Aristotle indicates that even nonhuman animals can express philia love . The relationships marked by philia, then, could be identified by mutuality, reciprocity, and cooperation , which fits the above biological connotation well. While agape or eros might benefit from cooperation, reciprocity, and mutuality, those two forms of love do not require any of those three nouns. Philia does. I contend, in fact, that the kenosis of the Spirit into creation amounts to self-giving, betrothed love through self-donation. The union, then of agape, eros, and philia love could be expressed as mutual aid, or full-orbed, or even as I like to say, “full-Oorded” love. Flourishing lives – be they human or some other mammal – I aver, consistently and necessarily express “full-Oorded” love. Oord suggests that Process philosophy can aid one to see that full-orbed love – that which I have designated “full-Oorded” love – plays an important part in the work to increase the common good of society as a whole. Indeed, “full-Oorded” love would repay evil with good as agape would; such a “full-Oorded” love would additionally welcome the intrinsic value and beauty in others, just like eros love does; and “full-Oorded” love would also recognize the import of friendship and mutuality as does philia love. Following Oord and Wojtyla again, since God commands that we show necessarily “self-giving”, “self-donating” love, we therefore indeed have the ability to love others as kenotically-donating entities, just as the creating Spirit does. When we act as a genuine conduit and amplifier of the creating Spirit’s self-donating and self-giving love, we can truly and entirely and infinitely love others, just as God does. Of course, we cannot expect that we humans will always love alike unto how God does because we do not have an eternal and unchanging nature that is necessarily inclined toward love , but we are at least always able to do it.
This article engages Friendship: A Central Moral Value by Michael H. Mitias. It questions Mitias’ distinction between friendship as a moral and theoretical concern as opposed to a practical one. It distinguishes the narrow from the wide meanings of philia in Aristotle’s approach. It looks at the resonances of classical approaches in later theories of friendship, while also attending to the innovations of later thinkers. It suggests that the moral paradigms Mitias delineates might not be as hegemonic nor as hermetically sealed as he suggests. Mitias’ contribution is better understood as an addition to moral philosophy than to friendship studies.
W uwadze otwierającej Etykę nikomachejską VIII 1 Arystoteles stwierdza, że „philia jest określoną aretē lub jest nierozłączna z aretē” (EN VIII 1 1155a 1–2). Celem artykułu jest interpretacja tego stwierdzenia, z podziałem na dwie części. W pierwszej autor przeprowadza badanie dotyczące aretē i jej różnych typów, w szczególności aretē ludzkiej. W drugiej bada pojęcie philia, czyli przyjaźń i jej poszczególne typy. Autor wykazuje, że związek pomiędzy philia i aretē można rozumieć na dwa sposoby: a) jeśli philia oraz aretē są rozpatrywane z punktu widzenia możliwości prowadzenia eudaimonicznego życia, to philia oznacza przyjaźń aretologiczną, a aretē - aretē ludzką; b) jeśli philia jest rozpatrywana jako termin wielorako orzekany (pleonachōs legetai), a aretē jako termin względny, czyli „bycie dobrym w czymś”, to philia oznacza każdy typ przyjaźni, czyli przyjaźń aretologiczną, hedonistyczną i utylitarną, a aretē - konkretną umiejętność lub skuteczność w działaniu charakterystycznym dla każdej z wymienionych przyjaźni. Zgodnie z a) związek pomiędzy philia i aretē ogranicza się do przyjaźni aretologicznej, ale kosztem zredukowania aretē do aretē ludzkiej. Zgodnie z b) związek pomiędzy philia i aretē dotyczy każdego typu przyjaźni, jako że każdy typ przyjaźni pozostaje w związku z przynależną do niej aretē, której praktykowanie skutkuje doskonałym spełnieniem jej funkcji, czyli niezawodnym osiąganiem celu przez przyjaciół.
EN
In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē-the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē-qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.
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