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Několik poznámek k problematice individuality

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EN
The article is concerned with the question of individuality from the perspective of (mainly analytical) philosophy of language. It examines various concepts of individuality and their relation to normative structures of responsibility: individuality in the sense of concrete identity as situated personal irreplaceability; individuality in the sense of exclusion as situated irreplaceability of role/office/function. In conclusion a suggestion is put forward for the analysis of the concept of identity as the specific realisation of the possibilities of a human a linguistic being.
2
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Platońska filozofia mowy

80%
LA
In Platonicis scriptis expressae ad vocabuli dicendique rectitudinem pertinentes animadversiones hac in commentatiuncula tractantur. Quae pars philosophiae Platonis in principiis congruentem se praebet cum placitis nostrae aetatis: Secundum utramque sententiam destinata sunt verba rebus indicandis et docendis alius ab alio hominibus. Quidquid eorum ope enuntiatur, vertit semper ad eum, qui sermonem excipit, nec non ad rem verbis edictis subiectam.
EN
In the epistemological consideration of the function of language, an attempt is made to record how man (the author) linguistically gives existence to his thoughts. In my contribution, I will address the structu- ral dependence of the meaning of the term fiction in private law on the choice of the reference variable on which this term is based. With reference to the conference theme, I will discuss the interaction of different factors in the linguistic formulation of a concept that is central to private law. Epistemological, ontological, historical, etymological and axiological factors will be dealt with. The conclusion of the lecture will argue for the assumption that knowledge of unadulterated truth should not be sought in fragmented images.
EN
The paper explores the status of the proposition "God exists" in late scholastic debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in some key authors of the era. A proposition is said to be self-evident if its truth is known solely from the meaning of the terms and is not inferred from other propositions. It does not appear to be immediately evident from the terms that God exists, for the concept expressed by "God" is based on the relation to creatures and negation of imperfection and does not reach to the divine essence. Thomas Aquinas maintains that there are two types of self-evident propositions: those self-evident in themselves (secundum se) but not to us (non quoad nos) and those self-evident in themselves as well as to us. "God exists" is of the first type. For Scotus a self-evident proposition is such that if its terms are conceived by any intellect, the truth of the proposition becomes known from the terms, non-inferentially. In his view there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition in itself and that in relation to us, because any proposition self-evident in itself is known to be such to any intellect, even though it might not be actually known; it would be known, provided that the terms are conceived. So for Scotus the sentence "God exists" expresses different propositions for the blessed in heaven, the angels and God on the one hand and humans on the other. The former is self-evident, the latter is not. While later scholastics accept either the solution of Thomas or that of Scotus, according to which "God exists" is not self-evident for humans, Thomas de Argentina (also known as Thomas of Strasbourg, 1275-1357) differs in that for him "God exists" is self-evident for humans too. The position of Thomas Aquinas was defended by Domingo Bañez (1528–1604), Francisco Zumel (1540–1607) and Gregorio de Valentia (1549–1603). In contrast, Johannes Poncius (John Punch or Ponce, 1603–1661, also 1599–1672) was a famous adherent of Scotus. There is a fair number of scholastics harmonizing the doctrine of Thomas and Scotus: Bernard Sannig (1638–1704), Luis de Molina (1536–1600), Gabriel Vázquez (c. 1549–1604), Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) and Jean Lalemandet (1595–1647). According to these authors, when Thomas says that "God exists" is self-evident in itself, he speaks about the extensional proposition, i.e. the state of affairs being conceptualized, which does not contradict Scotus's teaching.
DE
Descartes wird traditionell als Vater der modernen Philosophie im Sinne der Hegelschen Philosophie des Bewusstseins wahrgenommen. Von dieser Philosophieauffassung grenzt sich seit ihrer Entstehung die analytische Philosophie ab, in deren Rahmen folglich Descartes als Modellangriffsziel angesehen wird. Der Autor versucht, durch die Interpretation von Descartes´ Sprachauffassung zur Berichtigung dieses Bildes beizutragen. Zuerst macht er auf die Risiken der Interpretation der Descartesschen Philosophie der Sprache durch das Lockesche Prisma, das sich als erstes anbietet, aufmerksam. Er baut dabei vor allem auf die unterschliedliche Auffassung des inneren Sinnes bei beiden Denkern. Dann schreitet er zur Interpretation der überlieferten Auslegungen Descartesʼ zum Thema der Sprache in seiner Korrespondenz, in der er vor allem die Formulierung der sprachlichen Handlung als Kriteriums der Rationalität findet. Dann beschäftigt er sich mit der Interpretation von Descartesʼ Kritik an dem anonymen Projekt der universellen Sprache. Descartes zeigt sich hierbei als prinzipieller Gegner derjenigen Projekte, die das menschliche Denken durch die Kontruktion eines künstlichen Sprachkalküls korrigieren wollen, und verweist im Gegenteil auf die geringe Bedeutung eines solches Projektes für die Verbesserung der Urteilsfähigkeit als solcher, selbst wenn diese gleichzeitig an die Fähigkeit, Sprache zu verwenden, gebunden ist. Die Interpretation gründet in diesem Teil auf der Auslegung des Endes des in der Studie zitierten Briefes als eines implizit die Ansichten des Adressaten Marin Mersenne kritisierenden ironischen Argumentes gegen die Möglichkeiten des diskutierten Projektes.
EN
The article analyses the approach to the study of the sphere of language between theory of law and the philosophy of language. The aim of the paper is to study the range of applicability of philosophical and linguistic conceptions in theory of law. Law theory reflects certain movements and controversies that have been significant in linguistic sciences. The analyses, which, so far, have been conducted in theory of law, concentrated mainly on the use of the results of such achievements made by the representatives of the philosophy of language and linguistics as formal languages theories, transformational-generative theories, structuralism, formalism, pragmalinguistics. In this article, it is claimed that contemporary changes in the humanities justify the expansion of the range of jurisprudence integration to some other approaches, different from formalistic and pragmatic ones.
7
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Movenglish: Dance as Sign System

70%
EN
The paper examines a central question in the philosophy of dance from the vantage point of a specific choreographic practice: Movenglish. Movenglish attempts to establish a one-to-one mapping between English words and dance movement equivalents in the body in a way that maximally captures both the connotative and denotative aspects of the words in question. The paper argues that the success of Movenglish has several important consequences for the philosophy of dance as well as our understanding of sign systems more generally. The paper elaborates one of the strongest contributions to the philosophy of dance – the work of Susanne Langer – in order to show how the conclusions drawn from the dance produced through Movenglish both contribute to and depart from Langer’s philosophy.
Forum Philosophicum
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2007
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vol. 12
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issue 2
207-225
EN
In this paper, I take three snapshots of Wittgenstein's philosophical work in order to jot a few notes on the issue of the continuity in his philosophy. I use Wittgenstein's distinction between what can be 'said' and what can only be “shown” in order to highlight Wittgenstein's continual insistence that our basic relation with reality is seamless. I propose that Wittgenstein holds, throughout his philosophical career, that our thinking does not stop short of the world. In brief, I suggest that Wittgenstein would note that our natural history is largely what the mediaevals would call second nature.
EN
The aim of the text is to show the affinities between the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt and the hermeneutical philosophy, especially those elaborated by H.-G. Gadamer. To accomplish it it develops a special perspective of comparison that goes beyond the philosophy of language, reaching not only the moral-ontological but also the aesthetical foundations of philosophy. The acceptance of the otherness of the others is both of them a pre-form of philosophical anthropology and is connected by both of them with the tradition of dialogical thinking (which in case of von Humboldt goes back to the so-called dialogical principle of Jacobi and in case of Gadamer – to the inspiration gained by Ebner, Rosenzweig and Levinas).
Studia Humana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 2
16-25
EN
In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc.
PL
There is a common opinion that a researcher cannot be entirely objective. Although they can keep a semantic neutrality, their identity and social environment make it impossible to maintain this neutrality in the practice. The author tries to prove that this neutrality is impossible as well because every scientist chooses their own philosophy of language. The author shows examples of certain statements of sociology of religion confronted with three positivist requirements and ways in which the choice can influence the interpretation. We can translate the statements to become compatible with the requirements of the language but every translation is subject to risk of losing the depth, the root of thinker’s intention. Since there are many opposite views on philosophy of language a need arises to develop a sociological thought concerning thisaspect of their work.
12
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EN
The main aim of this article is to show the problem of presupposition from the side of the logical analysis of language. Deliberations on the topic derive from the nineteenth century and are connected to Gottlob Frege. In his work titled "On sense and reference", he asks how the expressions with a referring function should be translated into logical language. He also emphasizes "assumptions for the existence of referent (designation)", whose characteristic feature is that their authenticity is a crucial condition to provide a sentence with a logical meaning. Therefore, Frege highlighted the crucial feature of presupposition that is constancy under negation. However, Frege's concept lacks unity when it comes to the level of the language on which the assumptions should be made. An opposing view on presupposition is presented by Russell and his idea of definite descriptions, which solves the problem of sentences with non-existent subject terms, of which Frege's language philosophy does not provide a precise explanation. Russel claims that denoting phrases can be expressed in the form on conjunction of the value of the sentence and thus sentences predicating on something that does not exist happen to be false. However, Russel's view differs from the one presented by a twentieth-century philosopher, Peter Strawson. The latter maintains that the problems mentioned derive from the fact that scholars do not notice the difference between sentences and sentences used to have an assertive meaning and, consequently, that the sentences cannot be true or false since this is a characteristic feature of statements. He also emphasizes a connection between them, in which one statement is a primary condition to give a logical value to another statement. Strawson called the phenomenon a presupposition and claimed that it can be recognized as a specific kind of pragmatic deduction/presupposition. The article focuses on showing the three views on presupposition on the grounds of the philosophies of language presented by scholars mentioned above.
PL
W artykule dyskutowany jest problem jedności filozofii Wittgensteina. Wykazuje się, że Wittgenstein stosuje dwie metody badań. Modyfikacje jego filozofii są skorelowane z modyfikacjami jego metody myślenia i dociekania. W Tractatus logicophilosophicus jedyną poprawną metodą jest logiczna metoda analizy zdań. We wczesnych latach trzydziestych przekształca on swoją filozofię w fenomenologiczny opis doświadczenia, a za jej cel uznaje konstrukcję języka fenomenologicznego. Po 1933 roku Wittgenstein rozpoznał gramatyczny wymiar języka, i utworzył narzędzia analizy gramatycznej. Wprowadził pojęcia gier językowych i form życia. Jego filozofia stała się morfologią i opisem ludzkiej praktyki językowej.
EN
The article discusses the problem of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The author suggests that Wittgenstein uses different methods of inquiring. The modifications of his philosophy are correlated with modifications of his method of thinking and investigations. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus the only correct philosophical method is that of logical analysis of sentences. In early 30s his philosophy becomes a phenomenological description of experience. The task is to construct phenomenological language. After 1933 Wittgenstein recognizes the grammatical dimension of language, and creates tools of grammatical analysis. He introduces concepts of language- games and forms of life. His philosophy becomes the morphology and description of human linguistic practice.
14
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Language and Idealism

61%
EN
In the philosophical inquiry adopted by logical empiricists, analysis of scientific language becomes something similar to a metaphysical endeavor which is meant to establish the bounds of sense, and this stance may be easily traced back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On the other hand, the analytic tradition transferred this conception to the analysis of ordinary language, and this move, eventually, was able to restore the confidence of many philosophers in their own work. After all they were doing something important and worthwhile, that is to say, something no one else was doing, since linguists are certainly concerned with language, but from quite a different point of view. At this point we may well ask ourselves: What is wrong with this kind of approach, given the present crisis of the analytic tradition and the growing success of the so-called postanalytic thought? At first sight it looks perfectly legitimate and, moreover, it produced important results, as anybody can verify just reading the masterpieces of contemporary analytic philosophy. To answer the question: What is wrong?, we must first of all take into account language itself and check what it is meant to be within the analytic tradition. This will give our question a clear answer. We have to verify, furthermore, what kind of knowledge philosophy needs to be equipped with if it wants to preserve its autonomy. The logical positivists clearly claimed in their program that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge such as the one envisioned by Immanuel Kant. There is, however, an analytic and a priori knowledge which is supplied by mathematics and logic alone. Within this field, the techniques of contemporary formal logic are exalted because they allow us to build artificial languages which - at least theoretically - eliminate the ambiguities of everyday speech.
EN
The goal of the present contribution is to explore what kinds of objects languages are from a biolinguistic point of view. I define the biolinguistic point of view as a naturalistic study of languages and I show that from this point of view, languages are human language organs, that is, they are natural objects. However, languages change over time; therefore, they are also historically modified objects. Considering that natural organisms are historically modified natural objects, I look for inspiration in evolutionary theory to better specify what kinds of objects languages are and how they change and diversify. I conclude that every language is a ‘unique evolutionary history’ within a restricted space of design. This conclusion means that although the structure of languages reveals aspects of formal elegance and aspects of functional efficiency, there are no arguments to state that these aspects are manifested more or less intensely in some languages than in others. Then their formal and functional aspects are part of what is common to all languages, while variable parts of language are a reflection of the essentially historical nature of the lexical interface between the components of our language organs.
EN
Herethis paper is review on monographical pulication „Filozofia słowa. Zarys dziejów” [The Philosophy of the Word. A Short History] by Bolesław Andrzejewski. The Polish philosopher’s book is one and only publication which dares to present and contrast concepts and theories on the word which appears in the history of Western Civilisation from the times of ancient Greek philosophers, through Christian thinkers and German romantics and representants of Enlightenment, ending with English and American pragmatists and positivists, not to omit prominent linguists like Ferdynand de Saussure, Noam Chomsky, Ernst Cassirer or Wilhelm von Humboldt. Original view of the author on philosophy of language makes the reviewed book unique, since Andrzejewski tries to break through the analytic, so common nowadays, paradigm and proposes to run the consideration concerning language in the spirit of lingua ac communitas, so to speak, he treats language basically as a tool for interpersonal communication and a way of gaining understanding within community.
EN
In this paper, I present some directives concerning the ethical use of speech and conversation. I focus on three areas – linguistics, philosophy and religion – and moral rules elaborated there with regard to what should and what should not be revealed by words. From the point of view of linguistics, I analyse modern principles of politeness and maxims of conversation. From the point of view of philosophical reflection, I consider ancient ethics of speech, and in particular: the three sieves of Socrates, rhetoric (lat. ars bene dicendi), and the Aristotelian golden mean. From the point of view of religion, I show the moral rules for words in Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Confucianism, and the Toltec faith.
EN
The article discusses the problem of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The author suggests that Wittgenstein uses different methods of inquiring. The modifications of his philosophy are correlated with modifications of his method of thinking and investigations. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus the only correct philosophical method is that of logical analysis of sentences. In early 30s his philosophy becomes a phenomenological description of experience. The task is to construct phenomenological language. After 1933 Wittgenstein recognizes the grammatical dimension of language, and creates tools of grammatical analysis. He introduces concepts of language-games and forms of life. His philosophy becomes the morphology and description of human linguistic practice.
PL
W artykule dyskutowany jest problem jedności filozofii Wittgensteina. Wykazuje się, że Wittgenstein stosuje dwie metody badań. Modyfikacje jego filozofii są skorelowane z modyfikacjami jego metody myślenia i dociekania. W Tractatus logicophilosophicus jedyną poprawną metodą jest logiczna metoda analizy zdań. We wczesnych latach trzydziestych przekształca on swoją filozofię w fenomenologiczny opis doświadczenia, a za jej cel uznaje konstrukcję języka fenomenologicznego. Po 1933 roku Wittgenstein rozpoznał gramatyczny wymiar języka, i utworzył narzędzia analizy gramatycznej. Wprowadził pojęcia gier językowych i form życia. Jego filozofia stała się morfologią i opisem ludzkiej praktyki językowej.
EN
The Author is interested in the states of becoming silent, discontinuing one’s utterance, which are associated with certain mechanisms of the functioning of the brain, as well as in the observation of such states in different artistic disciplines. Looking for an answer to the question how aposiopesis operates in words, sounds, and images, she analyzes pieces of music, poems (Zbigniew Herbert’s Pora), and examples of visual arts (Wojciech Pakmur’s paintings of the tango). In her reconstruction of the research field, the Author refers to rhetoric ( Jerzy Ziomek, Seweryna Wysłouch), the philosophy of language (Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard), and neurophenomenology. The aim of the article is to suggest a new mode of reading that seeks inspiration and language in works from the field of neuropsychology (Maria Pąchalska), hermeneutic phenomenology (Mark Johnson), or neurology (António Damásio, Oliver Sacks). The Author’s analyses refer to Raoul Schrott and Arthur Jacobs’s concept (Gehirn und Gedicht, 2011), and the conclusions confirm that one should not look for a model (pattern) in the reception of art, but describe mental processes. The proposed mechanism of interpretation is most accurately reflected by the metaphor of dance improvisation, where one does not meditate on and then perform particular steps and gestures, but “thinks in motion.” This mode of reading emphasizes the spatial dimension of thought processes and their dynamic nature.
PL
The Author is interested in the states of becoming silent, discontinuing one’s utterance, which are associated with certain mechanisms of the functioning of the brain, as well as in the observation of such states in different artistic disciplines. Looking for an answer to the question how aposiopesis operates in words, sounds, and images, she analyzes pieces of music, poems (Zbigniew Herbert’s Pora), and examples of visual arts (Wojciech Pakmur’s paintings of the tango). In her reconstruction of the research field, the Author refers to rhetoric ( Jerzy Ziomek, Seweryna Wysłouch), the philosophy of language (Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard), and neurophenomenology. The aim of the article is to suggest a new mode of reading that seeks inspiration and language in works from the field of neuropsychology (Maria Pąchalska), hermeneutic phenomenology (Mark Johnson), or neurology (António Damásio, Oliver Sacks). The Author’s analyses refer to Raoul Schrott and Arthur Jacobs’s concept (Gehirn und Gedicht, 2011), and the conclusions confirm that one should not look for a model (pattern) in the reception of art, but describe mental processes. The proposed mechanism of interpretation is most accurately reflected by the metaphor of dance improvisation, where one does not meditate on and then perform particular steps and gestures, but “thinks in motion.” This mode of reading emphasizes the spatial dimension of thought processes and their dynamic nature. 
EN
The most controversial aspect of generative grammar of Chomsky was a hypothesis that humans have a specific cognitive innate structure in language acquisition, called afterwards the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis. That approach was consequently sustained by him in Syntactic Struc- tures, Aspects of The Theory of Syntax, and The Minimalist Program. In fact, Chomsky’s analytic attention was mostly focused on the structure of the syntax of language, that in turn is to generate different phonological structures as well as semantic ‘interpretation’ respectively. Identifying of UG with a deep-structure level of a language did not influenced in solving a problem of innate cognitive structure of humans. Ray Jackendoff, grown up among the generativists, does not share the ‘syntactocentric’ approach of Chomsky proposing the ‘parallel architecture’ in which phonological, syntactic and semantic levels are reciprocally interfaced in the program of ‘biolinguistics’ that is to encourage the necessary culture of inter-scientific collaboration. By means of his theory of conceptual semantics Jackendoff tries to show that a system of concepts expressed in human lan- guage is an autonomous generative component of human brain/mind that processed out of evolution.
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